Europees Extern Beleid

INLEIDING

Jan Orbie
2019-2020





lesmateriaal



reader


Avondlezingen

› Ik schrijf me in

- 17 oktober 2019: **Europees ontwikkelingsbeleid** (Els Hertogen (Algemeen directeur 11.11.11) en Dirk Brems (Coördinatie EU ontwikkelingssamenwerking - Ministerie Buitenlandse zaken), gemodereerd door Sarah Delputte)
- 23 oktober: **Europees mensenrechtenbeleid** (Marc Franco (voormalige EU-ambassadeur in Egypte en in Rusland) en Simon Papuashvili (Programmadirecteur van de mensenrechtenorganisatie International Partnership for Human Rights, gemodereerd door Fabienne Bossuyt)
- 5 november 2019: **Europees handelsbeleid** (Kathleen Van Brempt (SP.A) en Olivier Joris (VBO/BusinessEurope), gemodereerd door Ferdi De Ville)
- 18 november: **Europese defensie** (Assita Kanko (N-VA) en Ludo De Brabander (Vrede vzw), gemodereerd door Jan Orbie)
- 12 december: **Europees klimaatbeleid** (Sprekers worden later meegedeeld, gemodereerd door Claire Dupont). Dit is een Engelstalige lezing.

Evaluatie

1. Multiple choice
   - 12/20 punten (**geen** giscorrectie, wel standard setting)
   - Ong. 40 vragen
   - kennis en inzicht, maar ook enkele details (ook citaten)

Voorbeelden MCE vragen

Mark Leonard gebruikt de 'parabel van de goudpot' om te illustreren dat:

A. de 'power of the purse' een belangrijk machtsmiddel is in EU extern beleid
B. naburige landen EU-normen zullen overnemen wanneer ze perspectief hebben op lidmaatschap
C. andere regio's de EU als een model van regionalisme beschouwen
D. geen van bovenstaande

Een centrale vraag in het denken over de internationale rol van de EU, betreft de vraag naar de 'distinctiviteit' van Europa. Volgens Karen Smith onderscheidt de EU zich HET MINST van andere internationale actoren in de nadruk op:

A. Mensenrechten
B. Overtuiging en dialoog
C. Regionale integratie

- *Welke stelling uit de les van dr Anna Herranz over extern energiebeleid van de EU is CORRECT?*
  - De voorbije 10 jaar is de EU in haar discours steeds meer nadruk gaan leggen op 'energie diplomatie' in plaats van 'energie governance'
  - De voorbije 10 jaar is de EU in haar discours steeds meer nadruk gaan leggen op 'energie governance' in plaats van 'energie diplomatie'
- *De nieuwe generatie EU-handelsakkoorden omvat ook een dialoog met de civiele samenleving over engagementen inzake duurzame ontwikkeling. Deze mechanismes voor dialoog met de civiele samenleving krijgen veel kritiek. Welke kritiek is van toepassing?*
  - er is geen budget voorzien voor de bijeenkomsten
  - het bedrijfsleven is oververtegenwoordigd in de meetings
  - bij schending van arbeidsnormen stellen deze mechanismes te snel handelssancties in

- *Het Europees Parlement heeft medebeslissingsmacht in het EU-handelsbeleid sinds:*
  - het Verdrag van Lissabon
  - het Verdrag van Maastricht
  - het Verdrag van Rome
  - geen van bovenstaande antwoorden is juist
- Sinds de COP in Kopenhagen is er volgens sommige auteurs een shift in de Europese leiderschapsrol inzake klimaat merkbaar. Meer bepaald is de EU geëvolueerd van een *leader* – die vooral op basis van interne ambities haar leiderschapsrol legitimeert - naar een *leadiator* - die meer de nadruk legt op alliantievorming en diplomatie. Wanneer we teruggrijpen naar de academische concepten omtrent leiderschap, kunnen we deze evolutie beschrijven als:
  - Van directional naar instrumental leadership
  - Van structural naar directional leadership
  - Van instrumental naar directional leadership
  - Van directional naar structural leadership

- *De nieuwe generatie EU-vrijhandelsakkoorden en de EPAs zijn legitiem volgens het internationaal handelsrecht van de WTO, op twee voorwaarden: (duid het antwoord aan met de twee juiste voorwaarden)*
  - het moet gaan om 'wederkerige' liberalisering van 'nagenoeg alle' handel tussen de EU en de derde partij
  - het moet gaan om 'niet-wederkerige' liberalisering van 'nagenoeg alle' handel tussen de EU en de derde partij
  - het moet gaan om 'wederkerige liberalisering' van 'de meerderheid' van de handel tussen de EU en de derde partij
  - het moet gaan om 'niet-wederkerige liberalisering' van 'de meerderheid' van de handel tussen de EU en de derde partij

- *Van welke auteur komt volgend citaat? "In short, while a collective nationalism will probably be a significant strand of the European mood, its most forthright expression, a policy to found a European superpower, is most unlikely to emerge, because the consensus for it is missing. Vigorous or noisy attempts to raise it from the wrong soil are more likely to make political union impossible and sterilize the European Community at its present stage as a customs union, than to promote a superstate. The European Community may be one of the five major powers of the 1970s, but if so 'major power' must not be identified with 'superpower' and Europe's leverage cannot be exerted along traditional lines."*
  - Charles De Gaulle
  - François Duchêne
  - Hedley Bull

2. Open vraag
   - 4/20 punten
   - Max. 1 bladzijde
   - Algemeen, peilt naar inzicht en kennis
   - Evaluatie criteria
     - Theoretische/conceptuele aspecten 1p
     - Illustraties/empirische aspecten (diverse lessen/thema's) 1p
     - Kritische reflectie 1p
     - Coherentie/focus en conclusies 1p

voorbeelden open vraag

- *Geef een evaluatie van de horizontale coherentie van het extern beleid van de EU*
- *Was 2010 een scharnierjaar voor het extern beleid van de EU?*
- *Het drievoudig analytisch kader voor de studie van de normatieve ethiek van de EU in de wereld: licht toe en geef voorbeelden uit de cursus*
- *'EU "actorness" in de wereld. Licht dit concept toe vanuit theoretisch perspectief en staaf je antwoord met voorbeelden uit de cursus.*
- *Leiderschap van de EU in de wereld. Licht dit concept toe vanuit theoretisch perspectief en staaf je antwoord met voorbeelden uit de cursus.*
- *De visie van Johan Galtung op de rol van de EU in de wereld. Licht toe vanuit theoretisch perspectief en illustreer met voorbeelden uit de cursus.*
- *Geef een kritische evaluatie van de speech van Angela Merkel voor het Europees Parlement (zie apart blad) aan de hand van inzichten en voorbeelden uit de cursus.*

TIPS
- Lees eerst open vraag
- Antwoorden zonder opties te bekijken
- Open vraag maakt het verschil: neem voldoende tijd
- Studeren als echt examen, ook detailvragen maar meestal uit lessen
- Geen strikvragen

3. Presentatie
   - 4/20 punten
   - 10 minuten – per twee
   - Wanneer?
     - Dinsdag 17/12: 13 uur – 16 uur
     - Donderdag 19/12: 13 uur – 16u30
     - Vrijdag 20/12: 14u30 – 18 uur
   - Waar?
     - Aud F
   - Inschrijven?
     - Tegen Vr 18/10, 12u
     - Via doodle https://doodle.com/poll/yebgumphc78zkuxt
   - Bijwonen van twee andere presentaties
     - later meer info
   - Thema binnen het EU extern beleid
   - Evaluatie criteria
     - 1 punt op originaliteit: inzoomen of invalshoek
     - 2 punten op wetenschappelijke inbedding: inzichten uit de les en referenties
     - 1 punt op presentatievaardigheden

Inschrijven via Doodle

Verdere vragen: nathan.vandeputte@ugent.be

sessie over presentatievaardigheden:
maandag 2/12, 11.30-12.45u, Aud C



Structuur lessen

1. Theorie & rolconcepten
2. Toepassingen

- Onderzoek van mezelf en onderzoekers aan Centrum voor EU Studies
- Externe gastsprekers (soms andere momenten: check Ufora)

Voor discussie

***Mijn* insteek in het debat:**

1. Ondanks alles: de EU is en blijft een sterke wereldmacht (via zgn 'zachte' instrumenten)
2. Ze heeft dus ook de machtsmiddelen om een ethisch buitenlands beleid te voeren
3. Maar dat lijkt steeds minder het plan (if it ever was) – uiteenspatten van de liberale droom
4. Neokolonialisme after all

***Hegemonisch* (?) discours:**

1. De EU steeds meer een marginale speler op wereldvlak (en ontbeert 'harde' macht)
2. Ze is dan ook gedwongen om haar normatief beleid achterwege te laten en het realistische machtsspel (mee) te spelen
3. Maar ze weigert te vaak om dit te doen – blijft liberaal en naïef
4. Kolonialisme is geschiedenis

Dekolonisering vak?

- Problematiseren van narratives over EU in de wereld
  - Politiek 'versus' onderzoek?
  - Macht 'versus' normen?
- Aandacht voor niet-Europese stemmen
  - Impact van EU beleid?
  - Gemarginaliseerde stemmen
  - Diversiteit

- **Spreekuur**

  voorlopig via email
  Foto op Minerva aub

Welke rol voor de EU in de wereld?

Inleiding: rolconcepten

Wat vind je hiervan?

European way of life?

Algemeen: 3 rolconcepten

Realistisch (federalistisch)	Liberaal (neofunctionalistisch)	Marxistisch (neogramsciaans)
Europese superstaat	Nieuw soort macht	Uitbuitingssysteem
Politiek-militaire macht	Low politics en soft power	Economische en ideologische macht

Uitleggen, contextualiseren (historisch en wetenschappelijk), verfijnen, problematiseren, toepassen op beleidsdomeinen en actualiteit

Waarom rolconcepten?

(1) empirisch: beschrijvend
- wat voor ding is de EU?
- objectieve criteria voor classificatie



Europa als economische reus – politieke dwerg – militaire worm, civiele macht, Europa als Groot Zwitserland, Groot België, gentle power, Scandinavisch Europa, Europe puissance, kapitalistische supermacht, magnetische kracht, post-modern paradijs, handelsstaat, tranquil superpower, transformatieve macht, Mars-Venus, nieuw-middeleeuws imperium, smart power, of zelfs een metroseksuele macht …?

	normatieve doelstellingen	*materiële belangen*
macht -	Scandinavisch Europa Europese magnetische kracht	Europees Zwitserland Japans Europa
macht +	Normatieve macht	Europese Handelsstaat

Civiele Macht Europa

Grootmacht Europa



(2) theoretisch: verklarend
- structuur: logic of appropriateness
- agency: logic of arguing, retorische actie






- Bv EU rol als bevorderaar van democratie en mensenrechten
  - EU rol tov Oost-Europa → uitbreidingspolitiek (Schimmelfennig)
  - EU uitbreidingspolitiek → globaal extern beleid (Sedelmeier)





"this new situation removed the conditions that had prevented pan-European integration after Second World War and had allowed the Western European states and organizations to use their commitment to a united liberal Europe as **a low-cost legitimacy-enhancing device**."

"the CEE state actors have based their claims to membership on the constitutive values and norms of the European international community: European identity and unity, liberal democracy, and multilateralism. They invoke the community's ceremonialized membership rules and **take its ritualized pan-European liberal commitment at face value**."

"EU enlargement has contributed to the formation of a role of the EU in the promotion and defence of human rights and fundamental democratic principles. In turn a thus concretised identity has the potential to influence European Foreign Policy. It creates a certain bias for, and strengthens the argumentative power of those actors who advocate foreign policy options that can be legitimised with reference to this identity." (Sedelmeier)




Copenhagen criteria 1993



Conclusions of the Presidency - Copenhagen, June 21-22 1993

(iii) The European Council today agreed that the associated countries in Central and Eastern Europe that so desire shall become members of the European Union. Accession will take place as soon as an associated country is able to assume the obligations of membership by satisfying the economic and political conditions required.

Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. Membership presupposes the candidate's ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.

The Union's capacity to absorb new members, while maintaining the momentum of European integration, is also an important consideration in the general interest of both the Union and the candidate countries.

'essential elements' clausule sinds 1995

"[t]he Parties confirm their attachment to democratic principles, human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law. Respect for democratic principles and human rights and fundamental freedoms as laid down in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other relevant international human rights instruments, which reflect the principle of the rule of law, underpins the internal and international policies of both Parties and constitutes an essential element of this Agreement"
(EU-Korea)

"[r]espect for democratic principles and fundamental human rights, as laid down in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and for the principle of the rule of law, underpins the internal and international policies of the Parties. Respect for these principles constitutes an essential element of this Agreement" (EU-Colombia-Peru)

geldt dit verhaal vandaag nog? bv voor EU-Turkije?

ROL

zelf

2000s vandaag

andere

Voor/na eurocrisis, brexit…



(3) normatief: evaluerend
- discursieve strijd om macht
- kritische de-constructie

"EU is a normative power", "climate leader", "promoting fair trade", "principled pragmatism", "largest development actor"…

Dus

Rolconcepten zeggen

–Wat de EU *is* — beschrijvend

–Wat de EU *doet / zal* — verklarend

–Wat de EU *zou moeten doen* — normatief

Wanneer verandert rolconcept?
1. Onzekerheid
2. Identificatie
3. Resonantie

(Folz 2011)

Diverse veranderingen EU rol… vandaag opnieuw 'critical juncture'?!

political science research on Europe's global role at the Centre for EU Studies in the years to come.

Jan Orbie
Ghent University, Belgium

Chapter 1

A Civilian Power in the World? Instruments and Objectives in European Union External Policies

Jan Orbie

'What is Europe's role in this changed world?' Since the European Council asked this question in the 2001 Laeken Declaration, the topic of Europe's global role has become more and more relevant. Policy-makers as well as academics have engaged extensively in debates on the potential and/or desirable contribution of the European Union (EU)[1] to new international challenges that have arisen since September 11 and the new security agenda, the increased salience of climate change and energy dependency, the changing power relations on the international trade front, the enduring development problems in the poorest countries, and the adverse consequence of globalisation in general.[2] Apparently, the widespread malaise in intra-EU politics which has emerged since the referenda on the Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands in 2005, has only served to increase the interest in the Union's international activities.

The contributions to this book analyse Europe's global role, with a particular focus on its various 'first pillar'[3] external policies such as trade, development, humanitarian aid, environment, energy, competition, social issues, and asylum and migration. It also looks at Europe's role in the 'near abroad' through enlargement and neighbourhood policies. The EU is arguably an important international actor in these 'low politics' or 'civilian' domains. But the degree of the Union's power in these areas, as well as Europe's successfulness in reaching the objectives that

1 Throughout the book the terms 'European Union' (EU), 'Union' or 'Europe' are used interchangeably, whereas 'European Community' (EC) is only used when referring specifically to the historical (pre-Maastricht era) or legal (first pillar) dimensions.

2 For excellent recent overviews of the EU's international policies, see Bretherton and Vogler (2006), Elgström and Smith (2006), Lucarelli and Manners (2006), Mayer and Vogt (2006), Hill and Smith (2005), and Marsh and Mackenstein (2005).

3 Since the Maastricht Treaty (Treaty on European Union, signed in 1992) the basic structure of the EU is divided in three 'pillars'. The first pillar can be seen as the successor of the economic community, where the 'Community method' prevails (initiative by Commission, qualified majority voting in the Council, approval by the European Parliament) notwithstanding several exceptions.

are pursued through these external policies, remain to be examined. This book aims to take a step in this direction.

The introductory chapter raises some conceptual issues that will reappear throughout the book, using the concept of the EU as a 'civilian power' in world politics as a leitmotiv. On the basis of the 'civilian power Europe' (CPE) literature, an analytical framework is suggested that will serve as the basis for the study of Europe's external policies in the subsequent chapters.[4] The main argument is that critical studies of Europe's world role should simultaneously consider its power resources and policy objectives. Finally, we will summarise the findings of each chapter and draw some general conclusions. But first, the question arises: why study the EU's global role?

Relevance of European Role Concepts

In the past decade, several role concepts for the EU have been advanced. Each of them suggests that the Union is, and has, a particular kind of power in the world. The idea of Europe as a civilian power underwent a renaissance (Whitman 2002; Telò 2006) but it was joined with other scenarios and ideal types such as a 'magnetic force' (Rosecrance 1998), a 'gentle power' (Padoa-Schioppa 2001), a 'normative power Europe' (Manners 2002), a 'European superpower' (McCormick 2007), a 'quiet superpower' (Moravcsik 2003), a 'Kantian paradise (Venus)' (Kagan 2004), a 'post-modern state' (Cooper 2003), a 'middle power' (Laatikainen 2006), a 'neo-medieval empire' (Zielonka 2006), and a 'responsible Europe' (Mayer and Vogt 2006).[5]

Studying EU role concepts is relevant for both descriptive and explanatory purposes. Most obviously, they constitute a pragmatic and convenient way to come to grips with the Union's international activities. A specific role concept can be assigned to Europe on the basis of the different features in its external relations. This exercise is especially relevant in the case of the EU which is widely considered as a novel and distinctive actor on the world scene. Role concepts have been elaborated for 'traditional' states (e.g. Le Prestre 1997), but classifying the Union's international position is all the more challenging, given its unique institutional nature. Typologies of roles shed light on its international distinctiveness as an 'unidentified political object'.

Besides this classification function, international roles have a broader relevance. As argued by constructivist scholars, the presence of role concepts in the minds of policy-makers may both affect and constrain their definition of interests, and thus shape their policy choices. Within a densely institutionalised environment like

4 An earlier and shorter version was published in Orbie (2006a).

5 See also Hill's (1993) earlier account of the 'capability-expectations gap', where existing and possible future European external roles (for example, managing world trade, principal voice in relations with the South, second western voice in international diplomacy, regional pacifier, bridge between rich and poor, mediator of conflicts) are also described.

the EU, such ideational dynamics may be all the more relevant (cf. Goldstein and Keohane 1995, 23–4). In line with the 'logic of appropriateness', the embeddedness of an 'appropriate' role concept indeed influences how the Union behaves in the world (cf. Harnisch and Maull 2001, 138, 150; Elgström and Smith 2006, 5).

The impact of role conceptions does not only stem from the Union's inter-subjective structure. Agency is also important, more specifically in the form of 'role entrepreneurs'. For example, actors may successfully argue that the EU should pursue ethical foreign policies, appealing to Europe's self-image as an actor which is built on principles of democracy and human rights. Such legitimisation in terms of EU role conceptions could influence external policy decisions, even if this runs counter to Europe's material interests.

Roles can also be used instrumentally to advance self-interested objectives. Schimmelfennig's (2003) notion of 'rhetorical action' – the strategic use of norm-based arguments – clarifies the interplay between constructivist and rationalist logics in explaining the relevance of roles. Questioning why the EU decided to expand to Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), he argues that Europe found itself 'rhetorically trapped' by those CEE and EU actors who could justify their interests on the grounds of the Union's self-image as a democratic and liberal community (see also Chapter 11). Sedelmeier (2006) has further elaborated on the relationship between Eastern enlargement and Europe's global role. He shows that EU 'enlargement policy practice' – for example, through political conditionality, discursive acts, and Treaty amendments – stimulated the formation of the Union's role as an international promoter of democracy and human rights.

Analysing the construction and interpretation of EU roles is also interesting because, in a sense, they reflect political preferences and power relations. For example, diverse readings of what exactly the civilian power idea means also reflect a discursive struggle about the desirability of military integration at the EU level. Larsen's (2002) discourse analysis points to both a majority and a minority vision among policy-makers on the interpretation of Europe's 'civilian' behaviour in world politics. As explained below, similar divisions characterise the scholarly work on CPE. The adoption of security and defence competences has not led to a role conflict within the EU, using instead a more flexible interpretation of the civilian power idea. Diez (2005, 614) also draws attention to the political relevance of role concepts in his second-order analysis of the power inherent in the representation of the EU as a normative power. This constructs a particular and non-reflexive self of the Union, against an image of others in the outside word. Again, this suggests a concurrence of academic and political agendas: depiction of the EU as a 'force for the good', in contrast with the US, is nearly consensual among European politicians.

This book pays great attention to discourses constructed by EU policy-makers as regards the Union's civilian or normative global role – for example, the EU as a force for the harnessing of globalisation (Chapter 2), as the most generous development donor (Chapter 3), as a leader in global environmental (Chapter 7) and competition issues (Chapter 8), as an exporter of the European social model (Chapter 6), and as the supporter of a comprehensive approach to asylum and migration (Chapter 5).

In this chapter we expand on the CPE concept. The primary reason for this focus is that the civilian power idea has been central in the political and academic debate about Europe's global role since it was launched by Duchêne in the 1970s. As stated by Nicolaïdis and Howse (2003, 344), it constitutes 'one of the main conceptual anchors for debate over the sources of EU influence in the world'. Second, CPE accounts emphasise Europe's comparative advantage in the 'low politics' dimensions of external relations. Duchêne's concept is often mentioned – but rarely elaborated on and applied – in the context of EU external economic relations (e.g. Holland 2002, 112; Schirm 1998, 76–7; Tsoukalis 2003, 192). Therefore, this book links the EU role literature with research on its international activities under first pillar policies. In the economic domain the Union's 'presence' on the international scene is most tangible and unified (Allen and Smith 1990). In short, we look at Europe's global role in those areas where it is potentially and *prima facie* a powerful actor.

Obviously, it is impossible to make a clear distinction from other aspects of Europe's international policies, including the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Issues on the coherence between the Union's external policies – and their possible securitisation since the development of a more fully-fledged foreign policy – will emerge in several chapters. The demarcation used in this book is rather pragmatic, focusing on those external areas that are usually not considered as 'high politics' in a country's international affairs, and that are understudied in the EU role literature, but that are nevertheless crucially important for Europe's global role.

Delving into the EU role literature, the next section will clarify the meaning of the CPE concept. Although the analysis shows that the civilian power perspective has strongly normative connotations, we will argue that that stimulates a critical analysis of Europe's global role. Not only does the civilian power debate involve a useful reconsideration of the implications of military integration in the EU, but the proposed CPE framework also allows for an examination of the Union's commitment to reach normative (or other) external policy goals.

Civilian Power Europe – After All

Duchêne among the Founding Fathers

Today, the early observation that it is difficult to find out what exactly the supporters of a civilian power have in mind (Everts 1974, 11) still applies. The CPE concept allows much flexibility (Hill 1990), it has 'multiple meanings' (Telò 2001, 250–51) and it 'is inherently complex and multidimensional, bundling several specific and distinctive role concept elements into a whole' (Harnisch and Maull 2001, 139). Although references to Duchêne's articles are pervasive in the literature on EU external relations, these only offer a short and descriptive account of Europe's possible role in the world. 'Duchêne never developed his vision into a detailed and comprehensive scheme' (Zielonka 1998, 226) and his CPE concept 'is most striking for the unsystematic manner in which it was advanced' (Whitman 1998, 11). Even the term 'civilian power Europe' is remarkably absent in the (sub) titles of his book chapters.[6] And notwithstanding the 'CPE renaissance' since the 1990s, Duchêne's most recent book[7] and commentaries[8] did not explicitly mention it.

One reason behind this apparent paradox is that the vagueness of the CPE scenario opens the door for different interpretations by policy-makers and academics. The enduring resonance of the CPE role is thus *because of*, rather than in spite of, the imprecise description by its founding father. Moreover, much detailed analytical work on this concept deals with the role of (West) Germany and hardly makes any reference to the EU (e.g. Harnisch and Maull 2001). In order to clarify the CPE ideal type, we first sketch its position vis-à-vis other foreign policy role concepts that have been applied to Europe since the 1970s. At the same time, the CPE concept is situated within its theoretical and historical context. In the next section, we elaborate on alternative role concepts that could be categorised *within* the pluralist school, which leads to a more precise outlining of the CPE ideal type.

Duchêne (1973; 1972) introduced the term civilian power to characterise (Western) Europe's position in the world.

> Europe would be the first major area of the Old World where the age-old process of war and indirect violence could be translated into something more in tune with the 20th-century citizen's notion of civilised politics. In such a context, Western Europe could in a sense be the first of the world's civilian centres of power. (Duchêne 1972, 43)

Although the 'founding father' of the CPE idea rejected any naïve notion of European superiority, he states that a united and 'civilian' Europe may be well placed to play a stabilising role on the world scene. Europeans are 'one of the most resolutely amilitary populations in the world' and the ongoing European integration process is in itself an example of how cooperation in low politics may have a stabilising influence. Europe does not need to become a military superpower, on the contrary: in an interdependent world the civilian means of power and influence are gaining currency. 'Lacking military power is not longer the handicap it once was' (1972, 47). 'The world is experiencing a 'sea change in the sources of power': the security policy of a state (including the superpowers) is oriented decreasingly towards security *sensu stricto*, and increasingly towards the promotion of a more favourable international environment. Duchêne (1973, 20) also states that Europe should promote social values that belong to its 'inner

6 The titles are respectively 'Europe's Role in World Peace' (Duchêne 1972) and 'The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence' (Duchêne 1973). The 1973 article's subtitles are 'The Ambivalence of Europe', 'A European Super-power?', 'A neutral Community' and 'Europe as a process'. Only this last part describes the CPE idea.

7 Even the chapter on 'Europe in the World 1958–1979' (Duchêne 1994) makes no reference to the CPE concept.

8 E.g. 'Mars, Vénus et l'Olympe' (Commentaire, 100, 2003) and 'Quelle place pour l'Europe dans la politique mondiale?' (Commentaire, 95, 2001).

characteristics' ('equality, justice and tolerance' and an 'interest for the poor abroad').

This line of thinking broadly corresponds with the vision of Jean Monnet and the neo-functionalists on the merits of the European integration project. In fact, Duchêne collaborated closely with Jean Monnet in the 1950s and wrote the biography of 'the first statesman of interdependence'. Since the debacle of the European Defence Community in 1954, most European policy-makers had abandoned the idea of a strong politico-military dimension to the integration project. However, French President De Gaulle did advocate a *Europe puissance*, urging a strong and autonomous military capacity for the EC as a third power between the US and the Soviet Union. Duchêne's articles can be seen as a reaction to De Gaulle's view on Europe's world role. Mirroring the neo-functionalist critique on the federalist view that Europe should acquire state-like features in the political and military domain, Duchêne (1973, 13) warned against a 'collective nationalism ... which aims at a European super state', influenced by 'nostalgia and instinctive ambitions'. He stressed that the EC is about a different kind of power: it 'may be one of the five major powers of the 1970s, but if so 'major power' must not be identified with 'superpower' and Europe's leverage cannot be exerted along traditional lines'.

In the same period, Galtung (1973) also challenged the traditional view that conceptualises the EU as a state under construction. Although the EC may become a military superpower, he considered this as a hypothetical evolution that is actually beside the point. More importantly, he underlines the structural power of Europe through non-military means, especially in Eastern Europe and in the Third World. The European 'Common Market' is more than just a market; it is a 'superpower in the making'. Galtung saw European integration essentially as an international struggle for power, an attempt to restore the '*atimia*' (loss of status of the European continent) and to establish a Euro-centric world and a uni-centric Europe.

Europe derives its structural power, which is far more important than relational power, from its position in the structure of the world system, perpetuating an asymmetrical division of power between the 'centre' and the 'periphery'. European structural power includes three aspects: exploitation (unequal gains following interaction), fragmentation (a *divide et impera* policy of the centre towards the periphery), and penetration (the influence of the centre on the periphery's elite). Galtung applied these aspects of structural power to Europe's external policy and concludes that, in essence, the EC pursues 'old policies with new means' (a neo-colonial policy) towards the Third World. Former colonial powers are engaging in 'an effort to turn history backwards' on a European level. Europe's relationship with the US and other Western countries is characterised by equality and interdependence, as emphasised in Duchêne's work, but Galtung stresses that Europe maintains a strong dependency relationship with the South.

Unique to the EC as a superpower in the making is its 'non-military formula for empire-building'. Galtung considers the ever-expanding and deepening Community as a wolf in sheep's clothing. Precisely thanks to its non-military means, it manages not to be perceived as a classical superpower, which is to its advantage.

Box 1.1 A short period of high ambitions

The beginning of the 1970s proves to be a fascinating time for analysing Europe's international role. This turbulent period – as Duchêne (1973, 1) stated, 'the whole world system appears to be in flux' – coincides with growing scholarly attention and policy initiatives as regards the EC's global role. Both Duchêne and Galtung elaborate their visions on Europe's global role in 1972–73, providing alternative lines of thought to the realist and federalist viewpoints.

In December 1973 – also the year of US President Kissinger's 'Year of Europe' initiative – the nine European Ministers of Foreign Affairs formulated the 'Declaration on European Identity'. The new EPC mechanism had already been introduced in 1970, following The Hague Summit in 1969. The increased Europeanisation of foreign policies under the EPC, although still very modest, became clear in the EC activities within the CSCE conference that was launched in 1973. At the same time, the first enlargement with the United Kingdom (together with Ireland and Denmark) raised the Community's international profile. The first generation of cooperation agreements with the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries, signed in the 1970s, strengthened its clout towards the near neighbourhood. The 1973-75 negotiations on the Lomé Agreement, as well as the establishment of the first Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) in 1971, illustrate Europe's more global and ambitious approach to the international trade and development nexus (cf. Chapter 2). Europe's relations with the developing South were also extended from an exclusive focus on former African colonies to Asia and Latin America. The same period also showed increased European activities in international environmental policies (cf. Chapter 7 on the Paris Declaration).

The changing international climate sheds light on this European proactiveness: increased international interdependency, the oil crisis, growing assertiveness from the Third World, the first signs of declining US hegemonic power, and the détente. Internally, the EC had just finished the Treaty of Rome's main objective – the customs union. However, between the second Cold War and the completion of the internal market Europe's global ambitions faded away.

The civilian power idea lost its attractiveness in the 1980s, during the second Cold War, when 'high politics' received more attention, and realist conceptions à la *Europe puissance* became dominant. This decade saw the breaking of the security taboo and the abandonment of Europe's civilian power posture (Lodge 1993, 227, 231; Tsakaloyannis 1989, 242). Although the European Political

Cooperation (EPC) had started in the 1970s, the pursuits of a bigger political role for Europe in the world became more concrete.[9] In the academic field, the role of Europe in the world was increasingly evaluated through a Gaullist lens. Alternative conceptions, such as civilian power, were fiercely criticised, and the dominant way to analyse (read: criticise) European foreign policy was through the prism of a superstate after the example of the US.

In this context, the authoritative article by Bull (1982; see also Moïsi 1982), who argued that Duchêne's civilian power Europe is in fact a *contradictio in terminis*, is often cited. To the extent that the EC can be a civilian power, is thanks to the military protection of the US – an actor over whom the EC has no power. '"Europe" [that is, the nation states of Western Europe] is not an actor on the international scene, and does not seem likely to become one.' Bull neither urges for Atlanticism, nor for neutrality, but for an autonomous European defence, according to a European strategic vision, based on European interests and values. Such an evolution would be desirable, since Europe has different interests than the US, there is the continuous threat from the Soviet Union, and military independence could restore the European 'self respect'. Just like De Gaulle, he wanted Europe to be a third power, on a par with the US and the Soviet Union.

Such 'realist' opinions on European foreign policy as a failure with a dressing of rhetoric[10] – Hill states the 'Emperor has no clothes school' (Hill 1990, 49) – have become widely held since the 1980s. Bull's critique that it may be fine to be an economic giant, but nevertheless an autonomous European military capacity is indispensable, was 'uncritically accepted' and set the tone for a realist 'security paradigm' (Tsakaloyannis 1989, 245). But by the end of the 1990s the civilian power approach become dominant again, although the focus shifted from civilian means to normative ends.

Between a Scandinavian Europe and a European Trading State

These three early conceptualisations of Europe's world role reflect the classical schools in International Relations theory, pluralism, realism and structuralism respectively (cf. Whitman 1997). Until today, they represent the major visions on the EU's international role.

- For example, Duchêne's argument that the EU is a new kind of superpower – because its distinctive post-national and value-based political system which fits in well with the new situation of international interdependence – basically corresponds to the argument of Leonard (2005) and McCormick (2007). In a sense, constructivist contributions and the normative power Europe school (NPE; see below) can be positioned in this tradition.
- Bull's critique on Europe's putative civilian power posture, through the lens of the *Europe puissance* ideal type, resonates through Kagan's characterisation of Europe as a 'post-modern paradise'. Kagan (2004) forcefully argues that the EU's military weakness explains why it holds a Kantian vision on international politics – in contrast with the US' Hobbesian position. Tensions between idealistic and self-serving motives remain a central theme in work on Europe's external relations (see e.g. Hyde-Price's (2006) neo-realist critique on NPE; and Chapter 9 on energy security).
- Galtung's analysis of the EU as a capitalist superpower largely reflects the view of critical scholars in international political economy who have emphasised the continuing dependency relationship between the EU and the Third World (for example, the neo-Gramscian perspective of Hurt 2003). For example, it might be applied to Europe's new trade agreements with developing countries (cf. Chapter 2) and to its global competition policies (cf. Chapter 8). Critique from historical materialists that constructivist analyses risk reproducing the pitfalls of idealism (cf. Van Apeldoorn et al. 2003, 30–32) echoes Galtung's vision on the positive representation of Europe as a civilian power.

Beyond this basic division, several new role concepts have been advanced since the 1990s. This section gives a short description of some pluralist role concepts, which also clarifies the contours of the CPE idea around the 'means' and 'ends' dimensions.

Scandinavian Europe: nice ideas, but no power Looking at a world map using the Peters projection, Europe is only 'a small far-northern periphery', very much like the Nordic countries on a standard European map. Leaving aside this geographical metaphor, Therborn (2001, 1997) argues that Europe may (or should), in its quest for a role on the world scene, find some inspiration with the Scandinavian countries. He argues that although such an actor exercises no considerable power, it has some influence in the world. More specifically, a Scandinavian Europe would play an active role within international fora, promoting norms and values such as democracy, human rights, and sustainable development. Just like Duchêne, the author describes how Europe's internal experiences with social norms and supranational organisation may be a model for the rest of the world. Therborn (2002, 243) concludes that 'the best Europeans can hope for is to constitute a nice, decent periphery of the world, with little power but with some good ideas', but is uncertain whether the EU is going in this direction:

> There is a basis, in Europe's centrality in current global economic flows and in its long experience of trans-national normativity, for a European role as a 'power seeking to set globalization within a moral framework', as the Laeken Declaration put it. To what extent this basis, which is economic, normative, and institutional rather than political and military, will be actually used is an open question.

9 E.g. the 1981 London Report and the Genscher-Colombo initiative, and the 1986 incorporation of EPC in the Single European Act. The debate on a European Security and Defence Identity was stimulated and the 1985 Rome Declaration reactivated the 'sleeping' Western European Union (WEU).

10 See also Pijpers' (1988) realist account of the limits of a civilian power 'in an uncivil world'.

This scenario does not entirely correspond to what Duchêne envisaged: he argued that Europe should not become a 'neutral community', referring to the Scandinavian countries. According to Duchêne (1973, 14, 20), neutrality is only an option for smaller countries, but a larger group of countries such as the EC – a '*force*' for the international diffusion of civilian objectives – cannot stand aloof from bigger conflicts.

A great Switzerland scenario: rich and selfish An additional distinction can be made between the 'idealistic' neutrality of the Scandinavian countries and the 'indifference' of a 'great Switzerland scenario' (Telò 2002). Moïsi (*De Standaard* 20 November 2002) fears that European politicians, contrary to their rhetoric, do not promote 'European values such as pluralism, reconciliation, humanism and tolerance' in the world, but rather 'dream of a continent such as a great Switzerland: rich, selfish, boring and essentially trivial'. Equally, Baker mentions the scenario of a 'Swissified Europe' in his *Financial Times* (17 October 2002) column. Referring to the German government's role in the Iraq debate, he argues that the EU may well become 'a neutral continent prosperous, peaceful, united – and utterly irrelevant to what is going in the world outside'. This scenario bears resemblance to the idea of a Fortress Europe as regards its external migration and asylum policies (Chapter 5).

Europe's magnetic force Richard Rosecrance's (1998) characterisation of the EU as a 'magnetic force' resembles Therborn's Scandinavian scenario. Both conceptualisations are also complementary in that they stress the normative character of a European non-military foreign policy. But whilst Therborn is looking for this normative influence in the politico-diplomatic sphere, Rosecrance underlines the economic aspects of European foreign policy. Just like his previous work (cf. below), Rosecrance assumes that the economic power of an international actor – in this case the EU – renders a military policy redundant. What is more, by developing a European military capacity, other non-European actors are confronted with the security dilemma. They would increase their defence budgets to preserve the balance of power, which could initiate a military race.

An economic power such as the EU, however, reverses this logic. The Union functions as a magnetic force and the 'web of economic and political associations' that constitutes the Union attracts other countries. Thanks to the quasi-absence of a European foreign security policy, the security dilemma has been avoided. Rosecrance (1998, 20) stresses that the EU, as an 'exclusive club' with 'admission requirements', lays down norms to countries that feel attracted to the Union. 'It is perhaps a paradox that the continent which once ruled the world through the physical impositions of imperialism is now coming to set world standards in normative terms. There is perhaps a new form of European symbolic and institutional dominance even though the political form has entirely vanished.'

Recent EU enlargements, with neighbouring countries accepting the *acquis communautaire* as a condition to become a member of the 'EU club', seem to illustrate the bandwagon effect of the Union. From the perspective of the English School, Whitman (2002, 4) suggests that even countries without any prospect of membership are incorporating the EU's *acquis*. He talks about the 'structural power effect' of the Union over a group of non-Member States, including non-candidate countries which, nevertheless, 'self-identify with the common interests, and common values of the EU and accept common sets of rules in the relations with other members of the society'. But the question arises as to what extent Europe's Neighbourhood Policy will be effective in this respect (see Chapter 10).

A continental European trading state The starting point of Rosecrance's description of 'trading states' is that the acquisition of territory has decreased in importance, while industrial countries increase their welfare through trade and investment. West Germany and Japan are obvious illustrations: after their military defeat they became trading states (Rosecrance 1986). Trading states are not only characterised by their very limited military power, but also by a strongly competitive economy. They are not a protectionist bloc (cf. Chapter 2 on the myth of a protectionist Fortress Europe), but have an open commercial policy in an interdependent world. In the 'trading world', relationships between countries imply a positive-sum game; the 'territorial world' leads to a zero-sum game between nations. Rosecrance admits that his dichotomy between the 'politico-military world' and the 'trading world' is simplifying: from a historical perspective, countries mainly find themselves in-between both sides, albeit they are usually closer to the first ideal type.[11] This implies that trading states also have some military capabilities, although this is undesirable. As for the external objectives, as described by Duchêne (1994, 388), in trading states 'economic interests are in the driving seat'.

Although Rosecrance states that not only West Germany and Japan, but also several other West European countries can be considered as trading states, he makes no explicit reference to the European Community *an sich* in his original work.[12] Telò describes a trading state scenario applied to the EU. Eastern enlargement may imply such an evolution, interrupting the 'traditional positive trade-off between widening and deepening'. This could lead to a 'continental trading state Europe', similar to the first decades of European integration and confirming the EU's image of an economic giant and political dwarf (Telò 2001, 256). More recently, Telò (2007, 214–18) has called this a 'neo-Atlantic, neo-liberal scenario', which is favoured by the Bush Administration in the US, technocratic groups, and transnational interest coalitions. For example, tension between trade-

11 Mid-nineteenth-century Great Britain (until the economic depression) came closest to the trading state ideal type.

12 Rosecrance attaches greater importance to the normative aspects of economic power in his 1998 'magnetic force' article than in his 1986 book on trading states, which partly reflects the evolution in FPA (see below). A similar observation goes for Maull's work: in 1990, he makes clear that a civilian power corresponds to a trading state (referring to Rosecrance's book and writing about 'the trading states Germany and Japan'), albeit with a less economic orientation, whereas a 1999 article explicitly differentiates between both concepts (Maul 1991; Maul 1999, 29).

related and normative objectives arises in Europe's external commercial, social and environmental policies (see Chapters 2, 6 and 7).

Good ideas and a powerful actor This ideal typical overview shows considerable differences between pluralist EU role conceptions. Whereas the trading state emphasises economic power and hardly pays attention to a normative foreign policy, a Scandinavian Europe would concentrate on 'good ideas' and diplomatic initiatives. With a magnetic Europe, the normative aspect is embedded in the economic attraction of the European 'club'. Although the great Switzerland scenario differs from the two latter ideal types in that it has no normative aspirations, equally it has no considerable power on the world stage.

To summarise, two variables can be distinguished (Figure 1.1): whether or not the EU disposes of considerable power on the international scene, and whether normative objectives are prominent in the conduct of external relations. Although such ideal typical depictions may be oversimplifying,[13] this matrix sheds light on two key elements of the CPE concept. Such a depiction also makes clear that a non-military power Europe is not necessarily a civilian power Europe.

	Normative goals	Interest-based goals
Power –	Scandinavian Europe (political) European magnetic force (economic)	Great Switzerland
Power +	Civilian power Europe	Continental trading state

Figure 1.1 Means and ends: pluralist conceptions of Europe's world role

The CPE concept can indeed be seen as combining the normative dimension of the Scandinavian ideal type with the politico-economic power of the trading state. The subsequent sections develop the 'civilian means' (forms and sources of power) and 'civilian ends' ('external policy goals') dimensions of the civilian power ideal type.

CPE and Military Integration: A Contradiction in Terms?

Clearly, a European civilian power distinguishes itself in its vast arsenal of non-military policies, such as external trade relations, development and humanitarian aid, and international initiatives in the environmental and social areas. Europe's effectiveness through non-traditional external instruments is often stressed in relation to its neighbouring regions –in particular via enlargement processes – although the EU is arguably a civilian power on the world stage. Apart from the

13 It is, for example, difficult to imagine that Scandinavian countries would not use their economic power to conduct a foreign policy, or that West Germany's foreign policy has no normative dimension.

question whether Europe relies on these civilian external policy instruments out of necessity or stemming from a genuine attempt to transform traditional foreign policies – civilian power 'by default' or 'by design' (Stavridis 2001a) – there is a consensus that they constitute the main features of the CPE ideal type.

Although the influence of civilian means of power is less tangible than traditional foreign policy measures, and generally underestimated in the realist Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) research (Keukeleire 2002), they are increasingly relevant for the EU's international influence. Moravcsik (*Newsweek* 17 June 2002) questions the Union's need for a 'hard' security policy, and castigates the common description of the EU as an 'economic giant but a political dwarf':

> This is misleading. Europeans already wield effective power over peace and war as great as that of the United States, but they do so quietly, through 'civilian power'. That does not lie in the deployment of battalions or bombers, but rather in the quiet promotion of democracy and development through trade, foreign aid and peacekeeping.

In addition to these 'soft' means of power, a CPE also distinguishes itself in the way that its international power is exerted. Although a civilian power does make use of the 'stick', for instance through economic or diplomatic sanctions, it generally favours using the 'carrot' (cf. Hill 1990, 44–5; Larsen 2002, 289). This implies a preference for incentives through development aid, market access, political dialogue, and persuasion in international affairs. Karen Smith's (2003, 199) research indicates that the distinctiveness of an EU identity is much stronger in terms of *the way* it pursues its objectives – relying on persuasion and positive incentives rather than coercion – than in these objectives themselves.

> What it does is less unique than how it does it. And [this] stems, to a great extent, from the special nature of the EU itself, namely the replacement of power politics with the rule of law between states, and a reconceptualisation of the practice of state sovereignty. The EU's foreign policy reflects the view that the imperatives of cooperation, and of compliance with international law and norms, limit the freedom of states to do whatever they wish domestically and externally.

The contributions to this book examine the nature and extent of the EU's power in these civilian external policies. But first we focus on the most controversial element of Europe's assumed civilian power status: the question of military integration. Is the Union's availability of military capabilities compatible with a civilian power role? If yes; what are the conditions under which European defence schemes can uphold a civilian role; if no, does military integration at the EU level necessarily lead to a *Europe puissance* scenario? What about the Petersberg Tasks[14] and military operations under a mandate of the United Nations (UN)?

14 These tasks were adopted at the Ministerial Council of the WEU in June 1992. They are an integral part of the ESDP and cover humanitarian and rescue tasks (cf. Chapter 4), peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.

The debate can be divided into a majority and a minority view. The former suggests that military means are necessary, but emphasises that two conditions have to be fulfilled: (1) they can only be used as a last resort, when all other 'civilian instruments' have been deployed; and (2) they should be used to uphold 'civilian values' such as democracy and human rights, rather than serving geopolitical and economic interests (see e.g. Stavridis 2001a; Keukeleire 2002, 20; Telò 2007, 57; Schirm 1998; Lagendijk and Wiersma 2004, 96–110).[15] Some (e.g. Hill 1990, 42) also point out that Duchêne himself did not oppose European defence policy integration. Others emphasise that coercive military action by the EU fits in with the CPE role, as a last resort, provided that there is an explicit mandate from the UN Security Council (cf. Biscop 2003, 28–31).

The idea that military means can be embedded in a civilian power context is also dominant among EU policy-makers. Larsen's discourse analysis, based on Council documents and speeches, shows that the prevailing discourse continues to construct the EU as a civilian power. For example, the Union's High Representative Solana declared the following about the Petersberg tasks:

> We are not talking about collective defence. Nor are we talking about building a European army or 'militarising' the EU. But we cannot continue to publicly espouse values and principles while calling on others to defend them … In the final analysis, as a last resort, after all possible instruments had been tried, the Union has to have the capacity to back up its policies by the use of military means. (Larsen 2002, 291)

A minority view among academics and policy-makers, however, suggests that European military integration repudiates Europe's (potential) identity as a civilian power – even if the emphasis remains on diplomatic and economic instruments. It would weaken the Union's credibility and capacity on the international scene and it might even entail a *Europe puissance*. Smith proposes a clear definition and argues that the mere possession of military instruments – even forces for peacekeeping and humanitarian missions, which are frequently considered 'civilian' instruments – precludes a civilian power label. They are still troops who are *also* trained to kill; and the Somalia case shows that they may turn into a war-fighting mission. Therefore, she concludes that 'civilian power EU is definitively dead', and that the EU has discredited its alternative and postmodern vision of international relations (2005, 76–7). In an earlier contribution (Smith 2000, 28) to the debate she had also ventured that:[16]

15 For a similar argument applied to West Germany, see Maull (1990). After Germany's participation in the Kosovo war in 1999 – *nota bene* without UN mandate – Germany was still considered as a civilian power because it used force in order to safeguard solidarity and the promotion of human rights (Maull 1999; Harnisch and Maull 2001).

16 Smith argued that European states could possibly cooperate on the subject of defence, but not in the EU connection. Alternative options are a complete separation of the EU and the West European Union, or the direct participation of EU members in UN missions.

> the stated intention of enhancing the EU's military resources carries a price: it sends a signal that military force is still useful and necessary, and that it should be used to further the EU's interests. It would close off the path of fully embracing civilian power. And this means giving up far too much for far too little.

This civilian power debate has raised several arguments that warrant a critical perspective on the creation of defence instruments for the EU. First, military integration could entail a security dilemma – and thus an arms race with other countries. It would undo the Union's magnetic force – as described by Rosecrance – and restore the traditional balance of power logic between the EU and neighbouring regions. Even if EU policy-makers state that military means will only be used in the last resort and in function of normative objectives, European defence integration may arouse suspicion from non-EU countries. Ultimately, then, the question is to what extent the EU's commitment to play a civilian power role will be *perceived* as credible.

Second, it is argued that European defence schemes distract Europe's attention from its true comparative advantage in the economic and diplomatic domain (cf. Moravcsik in the *Financial Times* 3 April 2003; Zielonka 1998, 195–6, 226–9; Tsoukalis 2003, 199–200; Treacher 2004; Manners 2004, 17–20). The EU would forbear using its assets in the non-military sphere. In addition, the mere availability of defence capacities could increase the temptation for the EU to resort to military force – and to discard more sustainable possibilities.

The securitisation of EU external policies (see also Chapters 3, 4 and 5) would lead to a more reactive role, instead of pre-emptive and structural measures. A civilian power role is arguably based on desecuritisation: avoiding an issue becoming a security problem, rather than solving security problems (cf. Keukeleire 2002, referring to Ole Waever and the Copenhagen School). An often-heard metaphor of this logic is that 'if the only instrument you have is a hammer, all your problems start looking like nails'.

The creation of a military-industrial interest group at the EU level might be functional in this evolution. Ian Manners (2006, 191) refers to the 'military industrial simplex' to describe the coalition between the military-armaments lobby and the technology-industrial lobby at the EU level. He also points out that 'the limited equipment needs of the Rapid Reaction Force have been quickly expanded into a quantitatively different arms dynamic by the activism of a Brussels-based transnational policy network'.

Third, there is the argument of democracy, in relation to decisions about military action at the EU level. There are good reasons to delegate competences in areas such as external trade: even if input legitimacy proves to be more difficult, the EU is usually a more effective actor to deal with collective action problems and complex regulatory issues at the international level (cf. Chapter 2 on trade). But does output legitimacy also justify delegation in the military realm? Defence integration may well be a bridge too far from the perspective of democracy and national sovereignty.

Such considerations are all the more relevant because democratic input in foreign policy is sometimes seen as an essential characteristic of the civilian power

role (cf. Smith 2005, 68). Wagner (2006) makes the point that the Europeanisation of defence leads to a democratic deficit because it weakens national parliaments' capacity to control executive decisions to use military force, and because neither the European Parliament nor the former assembly of the WEU are able to compensate this loss of parliamentary control. But he also adds that other dimensions of democracy besides parliamentary control of deployment decisions, such as transparency and openness of decision-making, may benefit from an EU defence policy.

Indeed, a look at the institutional structure of Europe's foreign and security policy somewhat qualifies the argument of a democratic deficit. Member States are clearly in the driving seat and have at their disposal a veto in important decisions. Given Europe's relatively open decision-making system – at least 27 national governments have to be involved, besides other actors – 'groupthink' is less likely to occur in EU foreign policy compared with more hierarchical decision-making systems. Similarly, Hazel Smith (2002, 271) suggests that 'the particular and unique nature of European Union foreign policy' – in particular, the visibility of its decision-making system – makes it difficult to 'engage in the worst types of foreign policy realpolitik'.

> Such actions require secrecy and activity by small groups of people who are protected from public scrutiny – often through claims that such clandestinity is in the national interest. In addition, the necessity for the Union to be accountable to and maintain support from 15 sets of public opinion and 15 governments and Parliaments and 15 sets of national media precludes any foreign policy activity that is not underpinned by a very broad level of public consensus. It is in the end the pressure of public opinion that tends to keep European Union foreign policy activity at least relatively 'clean'.

Thus, the EU's institutional features are linked with the influence of public opinion. This brings us to the final point, namely that the European public opinion would be 'one of the most resolutely amilitary populations in the world' (Duchêne 1972, 19). The argument is that Europeans are pacifistic because of their relatively recent experiences with two world wars. Moreover, the European integration project itself constitutes a reaction to the devastation of war-making.

Hopefully, the debate on the implications of Europe's defence capacities for its international role will continue in the coming years. The role of the CPE, and its divergent interpretations, induce us to reflect on the merits of military integration. Through its fuzziness and the inevitable definition discussions, it stimulates thinking on the added value of the EU as a state writ large. But besides theoretical arguments interlarded with anecdotal evidence, a more systematic study of EU discourse and policies would be useful. In his reconsideration of Europe's 'normative power' role, Manners (2006) gives an interesting impetus.

He argues that European military tasks may be consistent with a post-national normative power posture (cf. below) – under a UN mandate as part of a wider peace-building solution, and in a critically reflexive context. But his analysis shows that, instead, the EU has engaged in an 'unreflexive militarisation' since the 2003 European Security Strategy. Stimulated by a Brussels-based transnational policy

network – what he calls the European military-industrial simplex – the Union's 'drive towards martial potency' has 'passed beyond the crossroads'. Looking at the short-term operation Artemis (Bunia, Democratic Republic of Congo) and the long-term operation EUFOR Althea (Bosnia and Herzegovina), Manners describes the EU's institutional prioritisation of short-term military responses over long-term civilian objectives of structural conflict prevention. In line with the concerns that were raised by Monnet and Duchêne, he warns that the seduction to become a great nineteenth-century power through militarisation will only replicate the problems of interstate politics. At the same time, this undermines the diffusion of Europe's normative objectives in the world.[17]

This book looks at Europe's global civilian power role from a different perspective. Although questions of securitisation and cross-pillarisation emerge in several chapters, we mainly focus on the EU's international activities under first-pillar domains. Derived from the civilian power literature, our analysis of the Union's world role is structured around the means-and-ends dimensions.

Linking Means and Ends: CPE as an Analytical Framework

More specifically, this approach simultaneously considers the Union's external policy instruments and its pursued objectives. Thereby we attempt to add to the existing literature on Europe's global role. On the one hand, the civilian power debate has mostly focused on the EU's power instruments, and more specifically on the question of military integration. Research then resolves around Europe's civilian and post-national versus state-like and defence instruments, as sketched above. Although (normative) objectives such as conflict prevention and sustainable development are included, these 'milieu goals'[18] are scarcely addressed and problematised in the civilian power literature. Stavridis (2001a) makes a similar point when he states that the 'normative' dimension of civilian power analyses has been overshadowed by the 'descriptive' dimension (see also Holden 2003). He quotes Duchêne's above-mentioned remarks that Europe 'must be a force for the international diffusion of civilian and democratic standards', promoting values that belong to its 'inner characteristics'. Stavridis' (2001b, 97–8, emphasis added) case study on the EU's putative civilian power approach policy towards Cyprus and Turkey illustrates the importance of civilian goals:

17 See also Diez's (2005) analysis on the tension between military and normative power – referring to the evolution of the US and potentially the EU, too.

18 The normative objectives of a CPE correspond to what Wolfers (1962) called 'milieu goals' – as against 'possession goals'. States pursuing milieu goals 'are out not to defend or increase possessions they hold to the exclusion of others, but aim instead at shaping conditions beyond their national boundaries'. This does not exclude an 'element of national self-interest, however far-sighted, that leads nations to improve the milieu by rendering services to others'.

> *Even without the defence dimension* ... the discrepancy between the EU's rhetoric and reality is such that it does not deserve the label of a civilian power. In particular, the de facto continued support or a non-democratic regime and its military occupation of a third country (which is a democracy) by many EU member states confirms that the EU, despite the many civilian means at its disposal, is not promoting civilian values. The fact that this is happening in an 'ideal' case scenario, because of the many civilian means at the EU's disposal, including a legal enforcement regime (within the EU thanks to the ECJ and outside it thanks to the Council of Europe), renders this analysis all the more important.

This volume also takes up the last remark on the 'ideal' case study, given its demarcation to external domains where the EU is *prima facie* a powerful actor.

Partly in reaction to the overemphasis on civilian instruments, Ian Manners (2002) pioneered the concept of Normative Power Europe (NPE) in his case study on the EU's international pursuit of the abolition of the death penalty. This role encompasses three characteristics, each of them suggesting that the EU is normatively different and that material interests alone cannot adequately account for Europe's external action: (1) the EU itself is a normatively constructed polity; (2) this predisposes it to act in a normative way in world politics; and (3) a NPE diffuses these norms internationally without resorting primarily resorting to coercion and military means, but by the ability to shape conceptions of 'normal' in international relations. Manners makes a distinction between Europe's 'core norms' such as liberty, democracy, respects for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and rule of law; and 'minor norms', such as social solidarity, non-discrimination, sustainable development and good governance (2002, 242–3). EU norm diffusion is shaped by six factors – contagion, informational diffusion, procedural diffusion, transference, overt diffusion and the cultural filter. Given the relative absence of physical force and the importance of cultural diffusion, the author argues that 'the most important factor shaping the international role of the EU is not what it does or what it says, but what it is' (cf. Manners 2006, 184).

In recent years the notion of a NPE has come to dominate scholarly discussions about Europe's global role. It has provoked several specific applications on cases in EU external policies (e.g. Lightfood and Burchell 2005; Szymanski and Smith 2005). This increased emphasis on the ideational factor reflects a broader evolution in political science and FPA since the 1990s. As pointed out by Manners and Whitman, more and more academics are distancing themselves from the 'hegemonic US discourses' that have dominated FPA, to develop a 'distinctive European FPA'. They observe a third FPA 'category', after the rational actor-model and decision-making models, concerning a whole spectrum of recent studies that take account with the 'less tangible', 'societal' aspects of foreign policy, such as ideology, role conceptions, ethical considerations, and public opinion (Manners and Whitman 2000, 4, 6; see also Carlsnaes 2002, 343; Goldstein and Keohane 1995).

But today the scales may be tilting towards the other extreme. While the EU's normative and value-driven aspirations are ubiquitous in the literature, the power instruments (if any) underpinning these international goals are often less clear-cut.

As underlined in Youngs' (2004, 415) literature review, many scholars 'have come to posit a pre-eminence of ideational dynamics as key to the EU's distinctiveness as an international actor'. Although the new NPE literature pays much attention to the ideational ends component of EU external action, it somehow neglects the linkage with Europe's instruments for achieving these objectives.

This book proposes a more explicit and systematic linkage between the Union's power and goals on the international scene. Rather than examining the famous 'capability-expectations gap' (Hill 1993), it studies the relation between Europe's international capabilities and objectives. Starting from the widespread suggestion that the EU is a 'force for the good', each contribution explores both the 'force' *and* the 'good'. The question then raises to what extent the EU make use of its available means of power *with a view to* achieving a CPE's objectives; or shortly, what about Europe's *commitment* to these normative goals? Equally, it should allow us to draw conclusions on the distinctiveness of the EU on the world scene – both in terms of instruments and objectives.



Figure 1.2 The EU's role in the world: analytical framework

By deliberately demarcating this research to the external dimension of first pillar – and thus supposedly the most important areas of the EU's global role – we also attempt to meet the criticism that the empirical grounding of the civilian/normative power literature is insufficient (cf. Sjursen 2006, 177). Rather than elaborating on Europe's role at an abstract level, the contributions can provide an added value at the empirical level. This approach is in line with Smith's (2005) call that we should no longer focus on what the EU *is*, but on what it does; it also

tries to combine the normative focus of the NPE literature with the empirical bias of the CPE approach (cf. Manners 2005).

The discussion of the EU's external powerful resources (see Figure 1.2) typically includes an analysis of the institutional dimension. Here questions in relation to the EU's competences and decision-making procedures are raised. To a large extent this dimension focuses on the relative power between the EC and the Member States in a particular external policy domain. The budget constitutes another important means of power: how relevant is the EU's power of the purse? Finally, the contributors to this volume look at Europe's relative power compared with other international actors such as the United States, the near abroad, and the countries in the developing world.

Then the EU's external policy goals are discussed, with particular attention to the normative aspects. The latter are identified in EU discourse and critically considered in relation to their coherence with other objectives – 'milieu goals' as well as 'possession goals'. In doing so, the chapters do not only analyse Europe's declared intentions, but they also turn to the Union's policy practice and the level of implementation. For each particular external policy domain, the question raises whether, how, and to what extent the Union's power instruments (for example, disposal of budgetary resources, or large competences) help of hinder the achievement of normative objectives.

Ultimately, this linkage between means and ends allows us to make an assessment of the EU's international relations, including policy-makers' discourse on Europe's world role. A main objective of this volume is to provide a critical and profound evaluation of Europe's external policies, with particular attention to those areas (for example, humanitarian aid, social policies, competition, and development aid *sensu stricto*) that are often overlooked in political science, but that form vital dimensions of Europe's global role. Another objective is to present a comprehensive overview of the Union's first pillar external activities. From this perspective, the means-end distinction forms a pragmatic toolkit to structure an increasingly complex are of research. It is hoped that the volume will be useful reading for students and scholars who are interested in the EU's role on the international scene.

Book Structure and Summary

The first chapter after this introduction examines Europe's most powerful external policy domain: trade policy. It starts with an examination of the power resources of Europe's common commercial policy, addressing the relevance of EC competences, decision-making procedures, and the level of technicality/politicisation, Europe's trade relations with third actors, and its ability to project the internal market model to the international trade scene. Although in general the EU's power and the Commission's autonomy in this area are substantial, this section concludes that any evaluation should also look at Europe's successfulness in achieving trade policy objectives.

The next section then proceeds to analyse these goals, as summarised in the 'harnessing globalisation' motto since the second half of the 1990s. At one level, trade politics are obviously driven by (offensive and defensive) economic interests. These generally translate into the debate between Northern free traders and the Southern 'Club Med', and the question whether European protectionism has led to a Fortress Europe. It is argued that a Fortress Europe has not materialised, but also, that another goals-related dimension of trade politics has surfaced in the past decade. The growing emphasis on pursuing normative objectives through trade constitutes an analytically distinct political cleavage which cannot simply be translated into the protectionist-free trade dichotomy. After presenting some theoretical reflections on the relevance of normative objectives such as human rights, democracy, environment, social standards and development in EU trade policy, the chapter raises the questions to what extent these are effectively pursued. Then, Europe's stance in some recent multilateral, bilateral and unilateral trade issues is evaluated through an analysis of two case studies related to 'economic development of the South' and 'core labour standards'.

The chapter concludes that the EU's commitment to realise these objectives through trade is subordinated to the pursuit of market enhancing initiatives, where the Union has been more successful. It is argued that this stems not only from ideological factors, but also from the hybrid institutional setting (community competences and budgetary powers) of Europe's trade architecture. Whereas the EU has become a multilateral and liberal actor in world trade, the asymmetrical state of European integration constrains its capacity to advance ambitious normative objectives through trade.

The next chapter also analyses the Union's relations with developing countries, but not through the lens of trade politics. In contrast with trade, development policy *sensu stricto* is only a recent and a shared competence of the EU. In terms of budget, on the other hand, the Union seems to have more clout in the domain of development policy. The first section of this chapter pays particular attention to this power resource, focusing on the evolution of the Union's development aid budgets and on the role of the Commission in this regard. Jan Orbie and Helen Versluys draw two remarkable conclusions from this analysis: the EC's development assistance has systematically increased in accordance with a concrete schedule, and the Commission played a catalysing role in this 'soft' coordination process.

After elaborating on explanations for this trend, the question is raised whether 'more aid' and 'more Europe' also implies 'more development'. The section on the objectives of Europe's development policy first lists the official goals – in particular poverty reduction – and then makes an assessment of Europe's commitment to these aims by analysing the way in which its aid budgets are actually spent. The analysis makes clear that increased expenditures largely stem from debt relief initiatives – although this applies to Member State rather than Community funding. In addition, it appears that Europe, and in particular the EC, spends a relatively small part of its aid budget on the poorest countries. Financial resources have been (re)allocated to regions that are important for Europe's foreign and security policies.

This is indicative of a more general securitisation trend in the EU's relations with the South. Whereas coherence with non-development policies such as trade, agriculture and fisheries continues to be problematic, Europe's aid policy is more and more linked to broader foreign policy considerations. This also increases the EU's international profile – arguably a main objective of European development policy.

Although these trends have not yet crystallised, the final section of this chapter outlines a number of future scenarios. The main conclusion reads that the Union's first role – providing aid according to its assumed comparative advantage – is becoming less relevant; whereas it is increasingly involved in its second role – coordinating Member State development policies. Therefore the authors argue that the EC is moving towards an 'OECD scenario'. The EU used to be a norm-taker in development, but more recently it is evolving towards a norm-setter in its own right (for example on aid effectiveness, on untying of aid, on conditionality for international loans). This is in line with Europe's nature as a 'regulatory state' – also in development.

In Chapter 4 Helen Versluys examines a distinctive aspect of Europe's action towards the developing South: humanitarian aid policy. Here too the Union's competences are shared, relatively recent, and backed with substantial financial resources. Given the visibility of humanitarian interventions in third countries affected by disaster or conflict, the legitimizing function of this external policy domain may even be greater than in traditional development assistance. But in contrast with the previous chapter, the Community's autonomy is relatively large and insulated from Member State influence. The specialised agency 'ECHO' enjoys a larger degree if autonomy than its development counterpart 'EuropeAid'. The Union's Humanitarian Office forms an administrative structure exclusively dedicated to the management of humanitarian assistance – although its influence is constrained by the presence of competing donors and by its lack of implementation capacity. Another difference with development aid relates to the objectives dimension: the pursued goals are explicitly non-political and non-economic, in accordance with the 'humanitarian imperative' endorsed by the EU.

The question is then raised as to whether European discourse on needs-based and apolitical humanitarian aid is actually being adhered to. The analysis addresses the possible 'securitisation' and 'developmentalisation' of Europe's humanitarian aid activities, which refer to the interlinking with respectively crisis management and sustainable development goals. Until the end of the 1990s, ECHO sometimes engaged in activities which, strictly speaking, went beyond humanitarian assistance and were more oriented towards conflict resolution or development. But from 1999/2000 onwards, and in contrast with the findings in the previous chapter on development, a move away from both the securitisation and developmentalisation can be noted. This relates to the establishment of other European instruments in the security realm – which has allowed ECHO to focus on core humanitarian tasks and on forgotten crises; but also to the institutional autonomy of ECHO and to the preferences of the (large) Member States. To some extent ECHO has managed to use the power of the purse to push implementing

partners in the direction of the impartial humanitarian aid philosophy. Equally, the introduction of the LRRD (linkage between relief, rehabilitation and development) concept has prevented the developmentalisation of humanitarian aid – although the Commission's commitment to engage in the development side of protracted crises remains unclear.

Questions of coherence in EU relations with developing countries are also central in Chapter 5, written by Steven Sterkx, on the EU's so-called 'comprehensive approach' to asylum and migration. The external dimension of this policy has become increasingly important since asylum and migration was transferred to the first pillar under the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997). As in development policy, the author points to problems of vertical (between the Member States and the EC level) and horizontal coherence (within the Council and the Commission). In addition, the trend of securitisation also emerges in this area, and the author concludes that migration is increasingly seen as a significant security threat by the Member States.

The chapter starts with an overview of the range of instruments that the Union has at its disposal to address migratory issues in its relations with third countries. These include the Action Plans of the High-Level Working Group on Asylum and Migration, clauses on migration management and dialogue in Europe's bilateral and inter-regional agreements, cooperation in the context of enlargement and neighbourhood policies, and assistance for capacity- and institution-building in third countries. Interestingly, the EU also gradually acquired budgetary means in this domain, with the creation of a new budget line in 2001 and a more extensive multi-annual financial framework in 2004. This provides the Union with considerable leverage in external negotiations on migratory issues. However, the debate on budgetary priorities is indicative of diverging views on the interpretation of a 'comprehensive approach' to asylum and migration. In this context the chapter describes the struggle for ownership between, on the one hand, the Member States and DG Justice and Home Affairs, and DG External Relations and DG Development, on the other. The former want to make use of development and external relations budgets, whereas the latter insist on a separation between these external policy fields.

Although the Union's discourse envisages a balance between internal and external policies, and between proactive and repressive measures, the critical policy analysis shows that in practice these objectives became 'off-balanced'. Broader questions regarding the so-called root causes of migration and the development of countries of origin have been subordinated to measures aimed at controlling and preventing migration into the EU territory. In the area of migration, priority is given to readmission, return and the fight against illegal immigration; in the field of asylum, the main priority is increased reception in the region of origin. Budget allocations illustrate these trends. Migration goals are also increasingly incorporated in the Union's cooperation and development programmes. Sterkx concludes that Europe's 'strategy of externalisation', involving capacity building, remote control, and remote protection, is functional for strengthening Europe's internal area for freedom, security and justice. It shifts responsibility to countries of origin and transit, and can hardly be seen as a normative external project. Thus,

Fortress Europe is expanding: access is not only being restricted on the Union's territory and borders, but also through external action.

The linkage between the internal integration project and the external projection of Europe's putative model is also central in the three subsequent chapters on the EU's global role in social, environmental, and competition policies. In Chapter 6, Tonia Novitz questions whether the Union can be seen as a normative actor in international social affairs. Although the European Commission's capacity to act in the International Labour Organisation (ILO) is limited – the EU's internal role in the ratification and coordination of ILO Conventions is also confined – the author notes that the EU has pursued social objectives through its external trade and development objectives. As for the objectives, the chapter focuses on the international promotion of the Core Labour Standards (CLS) – which are widely considered to be human rights.

The central question reads whether the Union is seeking to export an 'EU social model', or whether it wants to promote the ILO agenda of 'Decent Work'. European discourse seems to suggest the latter option, given the EU's emphasis on the partnership with the ILO and on the promotion of CLS as part of the Decent Work idea. Two case studies in distinctive areas of social policy are examined: collective labour law (cf. ILO Conventions 87 and 98) and gender equality (cf. ILO Conventions 100 and 111). Each time the relevant ILO Conventions are part of Europe's aid and especially trade conditionality. In her analysis of the first case, Novitz points to the failure of the Member States to comply with the relevant obligations, the lack of EU internal competences in collective labour law, and the potential for European law to undermine national systems of industrial relations. Although at first sight this seems incompatible with the EU's trade conditionality, this might not be the case. On the one hand, violators of these ILO norms have been rewarded; on the other, the trade sanctions against Belarus are consistent with a liberal view of freedom of association which values 'freedom' of individual choice rather than the strength of collective voice. The second case elaborates on the Union's extensive legislation in the area of gender, and then notes that gender considerations have not played a role in trade conditionality, but that the Union has pursued a soft developmental agenda in this area. But here too the consistency between Europe's internal and external approach is larger than it seems: internally the Union's gender equality policies are driven by a desire to build productive labour markets and enhance economic activity, whereas the EU has less incentive to enforce this labour standard abroad.

In other words, both case studies indicate that the EU is promoting externally social policy norms tied more closely to ILO standards than its own, but which are certainly not inconsistent with its own market-led agenda. However, in conclusion, the author casts doubt on the new partnership between the EU and the ILO. For one thing, it belies the limited competences of the Union as regards the role it can play in the ILO. Moreover, Novitz points to the incompatibility between the Union's market-driven and the ILO's social mandates, and to the dominant position of the EU in this relationship, potentially influencing the content and relevance of international social standards.

Tensions between Member State and Community competences on the one hand, and between market-oriented and value-related objectives on the other, also emerge in the next section on environmental policies. The chapter starts with a historical overview of the Union's internal power resources and policy goals in this area, arguing that today EU environmental policy is at a new crossroads: either it will become a 'normal' policy domain alongside other areas, or sustainable development will be the next 'big idea' (Lenschow 2004, 140). Then Edith Vanden Brande looks more closely at the Union's international power in this area, focusing on the power base of Europe's vast internal market, the complex institutional setting of competences and decision-making, the changing international context, and the relationship with the EU and developing countries. Cases on chemicals regulation and climate change show that a strong connection between internal and external power aspects enhances the Union's clout in environmental issues.

Subsequently, the chapter scrutinises the EU's international goals in this area – a dimension that is overlooked in the dominant actorness/presence framework. It appears that there is a growing conflict between the different faces of civilian power Europe, where free trade often receives a higher ranking than environmental protection. Although sustainable development should avoid the tension between economic and environmental goals, the author suggests that Europe's commitment to this objective is often undermined by a more market-oriented approach. The EU also pursues global leadership ambitions through environmental policy, but when it comes to implementation, the results are far behind the rhetoric. Moreover, the securitisation of the climate change debate may hinder a European leadership role. Despite these critical observations, Vanden Brande concludes that the legitimising function of the EU's image as a global green civilian power may become a self-fulfilling prophecy. In fact, recent evolutions seem to confirm this hypothesis.

Angela Wigger's contribution on competition policy also starts with a historical analysis of the EU's actorness. Here too the Commission's power has expanded since the Treaty of Rome, with the single market project as a hinge point. After describing the growing role of competition in the EU's internal 'globalisation', the author turns to Europe's international influence. Since the 1990s the Union has successfully pursued the convergence of its competition laws and practices through enlargements and through bilateral agreements. At the same time the EU has advocated global competition rules in the World Trade Organisation (WTO). However, as in international environmental regulation, opposition from the developing world and from the United States has hindered the realisation of Europe's global ambitions.

Then the chapter addresses the Union's objectives pursued through competition policy. Interestingly, the shift within competition policy from a solely intra-Community towards an extra-Community dimension parallels the evolution in ideological thinking from 'ordoliberalism' to neoliberalism. Whereas the Commission was not too intrusive in competition matters during the 1960s and 1970s, and even supported neo-mercantilist initiatives such as the creation of 'Eurochampions', since the end of the 1980s the EU has enthusiastically embraced a neoliberal competition enforcement philosophy, both internally and

at the global level. This section also elaborates on explanations for this shift and for Europe's insistence on a worldwide competition regime in the WTO. More specifically, Wigger emphasises the role of the Commission, the influence of the transnational business community, and the catalysing effect of the single market project.

Following the downfall of the EU's multilateral competition project, the alternative route came to be labelled with the catchword 'convergence'. EU and US competition officials alike were captivated by the convergence discourse, which led to the establishment of the International Competition Network in 2001. This network offers a perfect means for the diffusion of norms and regulatory converge in competition matters, formulated by a duopoly of the two major protagonists, the EU and the US.

The external effects of market liberalisation in the EU are also a central theme in the subsequent chapter on energy. Although energy issues were at the origin of the European integration project, paradoxically, the Union's role is still relatively limited. Emphasising the uneven integration pattern between geopolitical goals on the one hand, and energy market liberalisation on the other, Andrei Belyi first elaborates on the Union's power and objectives in this area. Turning to the EU's international role, he states that Europe's stance is not always supported by the political values of liberal democracy. The EU's success in exporting its (unfinished) model of energy markets in the neighbourhood is also highlighted, for instance through the Barcelona process and the Energy Community Treaty of South-eastern Europe. By contrast, the Union's influence in energy issues within the WTO framework and the Energy Charter Treaty has been limited, which partly stems from the particular status of the EU regime in the international legal regimes of energy trade.

The conclusions link the complex and hybrid nature of European integration, on the one hand, and the EU's external energy policies, on the other. Realist and intergovernmental logics still apply in the area of energy security – despite Commission attempts to coordinate this; functionalist and integration dynamics emerge in the economic realm – although regulatory harmonisation is still embryonic because of Member State sensitivities; and the Union's normative influence as a postmodern empire has appeared – although values of liberal democracy have not always taken priority to security of supply.

Energy is also a prominent topic in the chapter on the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). In their description of this new external policy area – the EU's self-declared priority since the 2004 enlargement – Viktoriya Khasson, Syuzanna Vasilyan, and Hendrik Vos emphasise the ENP's comprehensiveness and ambiguity. Starting with the Union's pursued goals, the authors elaborate on the role of market integration, political values, and regionalism, as well as (new) security issues and energy supply. The ambiguity about priorities among these objectives also gives the Union some room of manoeuvre in dealing with its neighbours. The analysis of the instruments that the EU is employing in this relatively new external policy area does not bring much more clarity: here too much will depend on the actual implementation. It is clear, however, that the Union has a considerable power in the hub-and-spoke pattern of the ENP. Political dialogue, the internal market carrot, financial assistance, and conditionality in general, all contribute to the Union's influence in the 'near abroad'.

The authors conclude state that EU priorities through ENP are inspired largely by soft security considerations, such as migration and energy issues, rather than topics such as the free movement of persons and trade in agricultural products. The importance of security and geopolitical considerations may also compel the Union to engage in Realpolitik rather than normative aspirations. Finally, the authors reflect on some future scenarios. The ENP might become void yielding to emergence of a multiplicity of bilateral cooperations. Even the accession of new Member States cannot be excluded, given the Union's ambivalence around the 'hidden objective' of avoiding further enlargement.

Of course, the 'golden carrot' of membership constitutes the main difference with the Union's enlargement policies. Therefore, it may be expected that the EU's relations with candidate countries constitutes a civilian power policy *par excellence*. However, in the final chapter, Eline De Ridder, An Schrijvers and Hendrik Vos argue that the accession procedure has brought unexpected effects on democracy in the new Member States – at least in the short run.

This chapter starts with the rationale behind enlargement with CEE, describing rationalist and constructivist perspectives. Then the instruments that the Union has at its disposal are sketched: besides the general impact of the EU's magnetic force and the membership carrot, the authors look more closely at the role of conditionality and financial assistance. Finally, an assessment is made of the Union's impact through enlargement policies, which puts the distinct EU factor into perspective. The authors emphasise the relevance of the international as well as the domestic context in explaining recent reforms in CEE. Moreover, they point to unanticipated consequences that have accompanied the EU's shifting approach from '*acquis* conditionality' to 'democratic conditionality'. The Polish case illustrates that Europeanisation may have potentially perverse consequences for democracy in acceding countries. One lesson from this is that, in the future, the Union might have to adopt a development agency role, rather than the regulatory role it took on during the accession process.

From Regulatory State to Civilian Power Europe?

In general, the book shows the diversity of the EU's 'first pillar' external policies, both in terms of instruments and objectives. The division of the Union's international relations into two pillars is often, and justifiably, criticised for being artificial. The contributions to this publication make clear that *within* the so-called 'soft' areas of the Union's first pillar, too, the strength and nature of the Union's international activities vary significantly. Europe's vast internal market constitutes a power resource in all the external policy domains that have been discussed. Hence the importance of the single market project for the EU's increased proactivity in international politics since the 1990s – a trend that has been confirmed in most chapters.

But besides this general economic basis of Europe's international 'presence', great diversity in the Union's power resources for external relations can be discerned throughout the contributions. Whereas the EU has at its disposal extensive (yet not undisputed) legal competences in areas such as trade and competition, its capacity to act internationally is usually more constrained. In development and humanitarian aid policies, the Union has a shared competence with the Member States which hold the majority of the budgets. The distribution of competences is more complex and patchy in social and environmental matters. In international energy policies, the Member States are clearly in the driving seat – despite the Commission's attempts to play a larger role in this area. But although issues of coordination and complementarity between the EC and the Member States, as well as intra-EU divergences on the contents of external policies, arise in all the chapters, the Union usually acts in a concerted way on the international scene.

The budgetary dimension of Europe's external relations proved important for determining the Union's power in the world, and for assessing the normativity of its international activities. The disposition of finances varies considerably, from extensive (albeit decreasing) budgets in development affairs, to purely regulatory functions in trade, competition and environment. In contrast, Europe's policies towards the neighbourhood and candidate countries have included large financial aid programmes, linked with political and economic conditionality, although the suggestion has been made that the EU should behave more like a 'developmental state' and less like a 'regulatory state' in this area. The Union's international activities in social and environmental issues are hardly buttressed by European budgets, even though the EU aims to mainstream these issues in its development programmes. In recent years, the Union's budget for external asylum and migration policies has been growing – which has given rise to conflicts within the Commission about the allocation of money.

More fundamentally, bureaucratic competition also reveals divergent visions on Europe's global role. Over the past decade, policy-makers have converged around the idea that the EU should play a normative role in the world, in the sense of promoting 'milieu goals' or 'far-sighted self-interests'. Even external policies which are traditionally seen as favouring European interests, such as trade and competition, have been involved in Europe's normative discourse. Development of the Third World figures high on the Union's external policy agenda, alongside other objectives such as human rights, democracy, and sustainable development. The dominant vision of the EU's global role as a 'force for the good' successfully surpasses the 'pillarisation' and institutional complexities of Europe's international policies.

However, concerns have been expressed that increased coherence as regards the Union's global orientation – both at the discursive and at the institutional level – has, in fact, entailed the subordination of external policies to Europe's broader ambitions in the foreign policy and security realm. Then, the normativity of Europe's international role can be questioned, in line with the civilian-military power discussion sketched at the beginning of this chapter. For example, the chapters on development aid and on the external dimension of asylum and

migration advocate that the importance of security considerations is growing in the post 9/11 climate, to the detriment of a more far-sighted and normative role. The ENP contribution also hinted at the priority of geopolitical and security considerations in the near neighbourhood. On the other hand, the development of fully-fledged security capabilities might facilitate the pursuit of an apolitical humanitarian aid policy. Since the importance of geopolitical and security considerations will probably increase – in the chapter on energy, it is stated that Europe's (limited) role in providing energy security already takes precedence over normative goals – one main challenge for the Union will be to generate coherent *and* normative external policies. Both aspects do not always go together.

Our analysis of the Union's external objective is not only concerned with the civilian 'versus' security debate. The military dimension apart, several chapters highlight the difficulties to pinpoint the so-called 'civilian' or 'normative' goals, and the need for explicit standards to evaluate Europe's normative objectives (cf. Sjursen 2006, 173). More specifically, this book illustrates that ideological factors quickly arise when examining the normative content of first-pillar external policies. To a large extent, the discussion on *the way that* normative objectives such as human rights and sustainable development can be promoted through EU external relations, boils down to the ideological left-right cleavage. For example, the chapters on trade and competition policies suggest a correspondence between normative power Europe and the promotion of 'embedded liberalism' or 'ordoliberalism'. Similarly, the chapters on the Union's international social and environmental activities point to Europe's market-oriented approach, questioning whether this is sufficient to act as a real civilian or normative power.

Ultimately, this links to the EU's nature as a regulatory state. Community competence tends to be greater in the area of regulatory policies – the costs of which are borne by those who have to comply with the regulatory rules (individuals, firms, and so on) – than with regard to distributive policies – the costs of which are borne by Member State governments themselves via their obligatory contributions to the budget. Regulatory policies are usually market-enhancing, aiming to correct market failures that accompany liberalisation (cf. Majone 1994). The Union's external activities basically reflect this focus on regulatory tasks. Even in the area of development policy, the EU's own budgets are becoming less extensive, whereas the Commission is playing an increasingly important role in standard-setting.

Much of the current criticism against the European integration project can be ascribed to the EU's regulatory state image: its activities are seen as overly technical and too market-oriented. Interestingly, several chapters (development, humanitarian aid, and environment) make a link between the Union's internal legitimacy problems and its global role. It is suggested that the EU's ambition to play a more global and normative role on the world stage could enhance its internal credibility. It is, however, questionable whether the Union's equipment as a regulatory state (the means dimension) will be sufficient to act as a real civilian or normative power (the external goals) on the international scene. Building on these observations, further research could elaborate on this more systematically, with specific attention to the budgetary resources of the Union's external policies

and the ideological dimension of its international activities. Both aspects are insufficiently studied in the existing literature, although vital in evaluating Europe's global role.

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The normative ethics of the European Union

IAN MANNERS*

Creative efforts: the normative power of the European Union

World peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it.

Robert Schuman, declaration of 9 May 1950, Paris

The creative efforts of the European integration process have changed what passes for 'normal' in world politics. Simply by existing as different in a world of states and the relations between them, the European Union changes the normality of 'international relations'. In this respect the EU is a normative power: it changes the norms, standards and prescriptions of world politics away from the bounded expectations of state-centricity. However, it is one thing to say that the EU *is* a normative power by virtue of its hybrid polity consisting of supranational and international forms of governance; it is another to argue that the EU *acts* in a normative (i.e. ethically good) way. The focus of this article will be on the ways in which we might judge the normative ethics of the EU in world politics by critically discussing the principles that it seeks to promote, the practices through which it promotes them, and the impact they have.[1]

The EU has been, is and always will be a normative power in world politics. This is a strong claim with a critical aim: to promote normative approaches to the study of the EU in world politics. This aim is built on the acknowledgement in critical theory that 'theory is always for someone and for some purpose', since 'theory constitutes as well as explains the questions it asks (and those it does not ask)'.[2] There is a simple temptation to attempt to analyse EU policy and influence in world politics empirically without ever asking why the EU is or is not acting, or how we might best judge what the EU should be doing in world politics. A

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[1] My focus of analysis is a holistic approach to the EU in world politics, including the international dimensions of internal policies, enlargement and external actions, rather than an exclusive focus on the EU's 'weakest link', the CFSP/CSDP.

[2] Robert Cox, 'Social forces, states and world order: beyond international relations theory', *Millennium* 10: 2, 1981, p. 128; Catharine Hoskyns, 'Gender perspectives', in Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez, eds, *European integration theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 224; Ian Manners, 'Critical perspectives on European Union politics', in Knud Erik Jørgensen, Mark Pollack and Ben Rosamond, eds, *Handbook of European Union politics* (London: Sage, 2007), p. 78.

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normative power approach rejects such temptations to unreflective and uncritical analysis. Instead it aims to contribute to a better understanding of what principles the EU promotes, how the EU acts, and what impact the EU has by attempting both to analyse and to judge the EU's normative power in world politics.

The idea that a political union could be both normative and powerful at the same time may strike many as a contradiction in terms, if one reads normative power as a primarily self-empowering exercise. Over the past eight years I have attempted to develop an argument that normative power in general, and the EU's normative power in particular, is sustainable only if it is felt to be legitimate by those who practise and experience it.[3] At the same time, a number of scholars have explored the EU's ethical dimension in foreign policy; but I consider it important to use the term 'normative power' to describe the EU's principles, actions and impact in world politics, rather than to conflate this with the idea of an ethical foreign policy.[4]

In arguing that the EU is a normative power in world politics, I mean that the EU promotes a series of normative principles that are generally acknowledged, within the United Nations system, to be universally applicable. As discussed in the next section, the nine substantive normative principles which both constitute, and are promoted by, the EU are sustainable peace, freedom, democracy, human rights, rule of law, equality, social solidarity, sustainable development and good governance.[5] But in propounding the normative power of the EU in this article, I shall also focus on the *way* in which the EU promotes such substantive principles by virtue of the principles of 'living by example'; by duty of its actions in 'being reasonable'; and by consequence of its impact in 'doing least harm'. As discussed in the third section, these three procedural normative ethics help us make sense of, and judge, the way in which normative power is exercised.[6]

[3] Ian Manners, 'Normative power Europe: a contradiction in terms?', Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, working paper 38, 2000; Ian Manners, 'Normative power Europe: a contradiction in terms?', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40: 2, 2002, pp. 235–58; Ian Manners, 'The constitutive nature of values, images and principles in the European Union', in Sonia Lucarelli and Ian Manners, eds, *Values and principles in European Union foreign policy* (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 19–41; Ian Manners, 'Normative power Europe reconsidered: beyond the crossroads', *Journal of European Public Policy* 13: 2, 2006, pp. 182–99; Ian Manners, 'The European Union as a normative power: a response to Thomas Diez', *Millennium* 35: 1, 2006, pp. 167–80; Ian Manners, 'The symbolic manifestation of the European Union's normative role in world politics', in Ole Elgström and Michael Smith, eds, *New roles for the European Union in international politics* (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 66–84; Ian Manners, 'European Union "normative power" and the security challenge', *European Security* 15: 4, 2006, pp. 405–21; Ian Manners, 'European Union, normative power and ethical foreign policy', in David Chandler and Volker Heins, eds, *Rethinking ethical foreign policy: pitfalls, possibilities and paradoxes* (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 116–36; Ian Manners, 'L'identité internationale de l'Union européenne: un pouvoir normatif dans le jeu politique mondial', in Bernard Adam, ed., *Europe, puissance tranquille? Rôle et identité sur la scène mondiale* (Brussels: Editions Complexe, 2007), pp. 33–49; Ian Manners and Richard Whitman, 'The "difference engine": constructing and representing the international identity of the European Union', *Journal of European Public Policy* 10: 3, 2003, pp. 380–404; Ian Manners and Sonia Lucarelli, 'Conclusion: valuing principles in European Union foreign policy', in Lucarelli and Manners, *Values and principles*, pp. 201–15; Ian Manners and Thomas Diez, 'Reflecting on normative power Europe', in Felix Berenskoetter and Michael J. Williams, eds, *Power in world politics* (London: Routledge, 2007), pp. 173–88.

[4] See discussion in Manners, 'Normative power and ethical foreign policy', pp. 116–17.

[5] Manners, 'Normative power Europe' (COPRI); Manners, 'Normative power Europe' (*JCMS*); Manners, 'The constitutive nature'.

[6] Ian Manners, 'Normative power Europe: a transdisciplinary approach to European studies', in Chris Rumford, ed., *Handbook of European studies* (London: Sage, 2008).

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The ethics of the EU's normative power are located in the ability to normalize a more just, cosmopolitical world. Catarina Kinnvall and Paul Nesbitt-Larking argue, drawing on Cheah and Robbins, Archibugi and Calhoun, that 'cosmopolitics is about empowering people in the actual conditions of their lives'.[7] Attempting to normalize a more just, cosmopolitical world 'can thus be seen as an approach trying to combine communitarianism with cosmopolitanism … Traditional cosmopolitanism … relies on a discourse of individual rights; while communitarianism is based on a discourse of social rights which is often expressed in exclusive localism. Both run the risk of substituting ethics for politics.'[8] As Pascal Lamy has put it, 'the notion of cosmopolitics describes a new world that is coming into being … More generally, cosmopolitics may simply be about thinking globally and acting locally.'[9] Thus a more just, cosmopolitical world would be one in which communitarian, social rights of the self accommodate cosmopolitan, individual rights of others; where local politics and global politics commune.

The rest of this article will explore both the EU's substantive normative principles and its procedural normative ethics. The article will first look at the nine substantive normative principles promoted by the EU. It will then use an original tripartite analytical method in order to suggest how to judge the EU's principles, actions and impact by using three major approaches to procedural normative ethics: virtue ethics, deontological ethics and consequentialist ethics.[10] Finally, it will conclude by arguing that we must judge the EU's creative efforts to promote a more just, cosmopolitical world in terms of its principles, actions and impact. These three approaches provide the EU with maxims which should shape the EU's normative power in world politics: live by example; be reasonable; and do least harm.

Substantive normative principles

The Union's objectives

In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter.[11]

[7] Catarina Kinnvall and Paul Nesbitt-Larking, *The political psychology of globalisation: Muslims in the West* (forthcoming). See also Pheng Cheah and Bruce Robbins, eds, *Cosmopolitics: thinking and feeling beyond the nation* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1998); Craig Calhoun, 'The class consciousness of frequent travellers: towards a critique of actually existing cosmopolitanism', in Daniele Archibugi, ed., *Debating cosmopolitics* (London: Verso, 2003), pp. 86–116.

[8] Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larking, *Political psychology of globalisation*.

[9] Pascal Lamy, 'Europe and the future of economic governance', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 42: 1, 2004, pp. 13 and 20; Manners, 'The constitutive nature', p. 28.

[10] See Manners, 'Normative power Europe' (*JCMS*), p. 252 for the origins of this tripartite analytical method based on comparing and contrasting what the EU 'is' (its aims and principles); what the EU 'says' (its policies and actions); and what the EU 'does' (its outcomes and impact). See also the discussion of the constitution/institutionalization, performance and impact of the EU's normative role in world politics in Manners, 'The symbolic manifestation', pp. 69–81.

[11] Article 3–5, Reform Treaty 2007.

General provisions on the Union's external action

The Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law.[12]

Articles 3-5 and 10-1 of the Reform Treaty (amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community) illustrate the values and principles the EU seeks to promote in the wider world.[13] In addition to these two articles the preamble and the statement of the Union's values (article 2), alongside the recognition of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (article 6-1), suggest that a series of principles can be identified which shape what the EU is and should be promoting in world politics. From a cynical viewpoint it might be suggested that such treaty articles and the policies they drive are at best unimportant, or at worst provide cover for more covert commercial interests. In contrast I argue that the constitutionalization of these normative principles in the highly contested Lisbon Reform Treaty marks the crystallization and culmination of norms and practices which have been evolving over the past 15 years.

In the rest of this section I shall discuss the nine normative principles which are substantiated in EU law and policies, and which it seeks to promote in world politics. I shall discuss all nine principles with brief references to the Reform Treaty as a means of marking the extent to which such norms have been given concrete form in the face of Eurosceptical opposition. In this respect the nine normative principles are those which EU member states, institutions and citizens are willing to stand up for, or at least not knock down. Thus, the Reform Treaty marks the most recent stage in a process that is constitutive of the EU's normative power in world politics, regardless of its ratification.

Sustainable peace

The Union's aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples.[14]

The prime EU normative principle of sustainable peace addresses the roots or causes of conflict, mirroring the European experience of ensuring that war 'becomes not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible'. The EU policy emphasis is placed on development aid, trade, interregional cooperation, political dialogue and enlargement as elements of a more holistic approach to conflict prevention.

[12] Article 10–1, Reform Treaty 2007.

[13] I use the term 'Reform Treaty' to refer to the Lisbon Treaty Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community, even when no amendment takes place. I use the term 'Functioning Treaty' to refer to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union which replaces the Treaty Establishing the European Community. All treaty articles refer to the Reform Treaty unless stated otherwise.

[14] Article 3–1, Reform Treaty 2007.

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However, the EU's growing civilian and military operational capacities also have a sustainable peace mission with a focus on 'peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter'.[15]

As the extract from the Reform Treaty illustrates, the first objective of the Union is to promote peace (article 3-1). But the rest of the treaty suggests that such an objective is to be achieved in at least three different ways. First, peace between European states is achieved through membership of the EU itself, intended to ensure that the peace in Europe of the last 50 years is sustained into the foreseeable future. Second, close and peaceful relations based on cooperation with neighbouring countries are promoted through special relations with the Union's neighbours (article 7a-1). Third, peace and international security are generally promoted through the EU's external actions, including the provisions on the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) such as 'joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation' (articles 27-1 and 28-1).

Social freedom

The Union shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers, in which the free movement of persons is ensured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime.[16]

The second EU normative principle is social freedom. Freedom in the EU operates within a distinctive socio-legal context. Thus, freedom is always just one of several rights, held alongside other equally important principles such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Within the EU social freedom is circumscribed by the need to ensure that other normative principles are not compromised by unwarranted freedoms, such as anti-social behaviour, hate crimes, inflammatory speech or pornography. The wider implications of EU social freedom are significant, not least in references to 'protection of children's rights' as a foreign policy objective, as EU extraterritorial legislation on 'sex tourism' illustrates.

As the extract from the Reform Treaty illustrates, the second objective of the Union is to offer its citizens freedom (article 3-2). However, the rest of the treaty sets out the extent to which the promotion of freedom goes beyond the bounds of the area of freedom, security and justice. First, the five freedoms of persons, goods, services, capital and establishment are promoted within the EU (articles 39–60, Functioning Treaty). Second, freer trade and market access are promoted through trade liberalization agreements with partner countries in the form of the European Economic Area, customs unions, association agreements,

[15] Sonia Lucarelli and Roberto Menotti, 'The use of force as coercive intervention: the conflicting values of the European Union's external action', in Lucarelli and Manners, *Values and principles*, pp. 147–63; Michael Merlingen and Rasa Ostrauskaitė, *European Union peacebuilding and policing* (London: Routledge, 2006).

[16] Article 3–2, Reform Treaty 2007.

stabilization and association agreements, partnership and cooperation agreements, and economic partnership agreements. Third, fundamental freedoms such as freedom of thought, expression, assembly and association are promoted through the 14 articles of the freedom title of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and EU accession to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (article 6, Reform Treaty 2007).

Consensual democracy

> The Union shall define and pursue common policies and actions, and shall work for a high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order to … consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law.[17]

The third EU normative principle is consensual democracy. Consensual democracy is the operating principle within the majority of EU member states and includes proportional representation (PR) electoral systems, coalition governments and power-sharing among parties. Similarly, the EU itself is a consensual form of polity, with PR and power-sharing in the European Parliament, non-majoritarian voting (either qualified majority voting or unanimity) in the Council, and power-sharing among all the member states. The EU has helped to spread consensual democracy into Central and Eastern Europe as part of the transition and accession processes.[18]

The trinity of democracy, human rights and rule of law, as article 10a of the Reform Treaty suggests, is to be consolidated and supported in the EU's external action. The treaty indicates at least three ways in which democracy is to be promoted: first, internally, through the provisions on democratic principles set out in article 8, including democratic equality, representative and participatory democracy, and the role of national parliaments; second, through the solidarity clause, which the EU and its member states can invoke to protect democratic institutions from any terrorist attack (article 188r-a); and third, through enlargement and accession, as well as neighbourhood and development policies.

Associative human rights

> The Union shall accede to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR). Such accession shall not affect the Union's competences as defined in the Treaties.[19]

> Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute general principles of the Union's law.[20]

[17] Article 10a-2(b), Reform Treaty 2007.
[18] Rosa Balfour, 'Principles of democracy and human rights: a review of the European Union's strategies towards its neighbours', in Lucarelli and Manners, *Values and principle*, pp. 114–29.
[19] Article 6–2, Reform Treaty 2007.
[20] Article 6–3, Reform Treaty 2007.

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The fourth EU normative principle is associative human rights. Associative human rights include both individual human rights and collective human rights. These are associative because they emphasize the interdependence between individual rights, such as freedom of expression, and group rights, such as religion or belief. The associative nature of EU human rights has developed since the 1973 Declaration on European Identity through the 1986 Declaration of Foreign Ministers of the Community on Human Rights and the 1991 Resolution of the Council on Human Rights, Democracy and Development.[21] All of these documents emphasize the universality and indivisibility of these associative human rights with consensual democracy, the supranational rule of law and social solidarity.

The article of the Reform Treaty dealing with fundamental rights, article 6, illustrates the way in which human rights developments within the Union contribute to its external actions. The first aspect of this is the inclusion of human rights as general principles of the Union's law, emphasized by the Charter and the planned accession to the ECHR. The second aspect is the extent to which the five articles in the dignity title of the Charter both reflect and are reflected in the promotion of human rights. The third aspect is the extent to which human rights provisions are promoted through the interdependent external actions of trade and aid, humanitarian and migration issues.

Supranational rule of law

> The Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with third countries, and international, regional or global organisations which share the principles referred to in the first subparagraph. It shall promote multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in the framework of the United Nations.[22]

The fifth EU normative principle is the supranational rule of law.[23] The EU principle of the rule of law is supranational in three senses—communitarian, international and cosmopolitan. First, the EU principle of communitarian law promotes the pooling of sovereignty through the *acquis communautaire*—the supranational rule of law within the EU. Second, the EU principle of international law encourages participation by the EU and its member states in supranational law above and beyond the EU.[24] Third, the EU principle of cosmopolitan law advances the development and participation of the EU and its member states in humanitarian law and rights applicable to individuals.[25]

As the extract from the Reform Treaty illustrates, one element of the general provisions of the Union's external action is to promote multilateral solutions to

[21] Elena Jurada, 'Assigning duties in the global system of human rights: the role of the European Union', in Hartmut Meyer and Henri Vogt, eds, *A responsible Europe? The ethical foundation of EU external affairs* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).

[22] Article 10a-1, Reform Treaty 2007.

[23] From the perspective of member states, the promotion of the rule of law has come to be viewed as the 'first among equals' in the post-2003 era of 'effective multilateralism'. My thanks to Elizabeth Burdett for this point.

[24] Manners and Whitman, 'The "difference engine"', p. 399.

[25] Manners, 'Normative power Europe' (*JCMS*), p. 241.

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common problems, in particular through the development of the supranational rule of law (article 10a-1). As the third part of the trinity the EU seeks to promote, the rule of law joins democracy and human rights as an essential element in EU agreements with third countries (article 10a-2b). Alongside freedoms, dignity and citizens' rights, the four articles in the justice title of the Charter both reflect and are reflected in the promotion of the rule of law. The promotion of the rule of law both within and between states is part of the EU's declared commitment to 'effective multilateralism' involving 'well functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order':[26]

> Sometimes voluntarily, sometimes through gritted teeth and sometimes without even knowing, countries around the world are importing the EU's rules … They all know that Brussels is slowly but steadily emerging as the regulatory capital of the world. As much as some loathe it, it is a trend that business leaders and policymakers from Tokyo to Washington feel they cannot afford to ignore.[27]

Inclusive equality

> It shall combat social exclusion and discrimination, and shall promote social justice and protection, equality between women and men, solidarity between generations and protection of the rights of the child.[28]

The sixth EU normative principle is inclusive equality, involving a more open-ended and uninhibited understanding of which groups are particularly subject to discrimination than article 3-3 suggests.[29] Hence, the 2000 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union included references to the prohibition of '*any discrimination* based on *any ground* such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation' (article 21, emphasis added). One weakness with the implementation of this principle is the extent to which discrimination based on nationality is still widespread in a majority of member states. This is particularly true of employment practices in consensual societies that promote homosociality.[30]

The third objective of the Union involves combating discrimination and promoting equality, as illustrated by article 3-2 of the Reform Treaty. The promotion of equality in Europe and the world has at least three dimensions emphasizing the equality of citizens and member states, as well as identifying the types of discrimination to be targeted by its policies. First, the treaty identifies the principle

[26] Commission of the European Communities, 'The European Union and the United Nations: the choice of multilateralism', Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, COM(2003) 526 final (Brussels, 10 Sept. 2003), p. 3; Javier Solana, 'A secure Europe in a better world: the European Security Strategy', approved by the European Council 12 Dec. 2003, p. 9.

[27] Tobias Buck, 'Standard bearer: how the European Union exports its laws', *Financial Times*, 10 July 2007, p. 9.

[28] Article 3-3, Reform Treaty 2007.

[29] Andrea Pető and Ian Manners, 'The European Union and the value of gender equality', in Lucarelli and Manners, *Values and principles*, pp. 97–113.

[30] Michael Roper, 'Seduction and succession: circuits of homosocial desire in management', in David Collinson and Jeff Hearn, eds, *Men as managers, managers as men* (London: Sage, 1996), pp. 210–26.

of equality of its citizens as being a fundamental democratic principle (article 8) and recognizes the equality of its member states as being a fundamental principle of union (article 4). Second, as discussed above, the treaty and Charter identify particularly common forms of discrimination to be combated, with a particular emphasis on gender equality across EU policies. Third, the seven articles in the equality title of the Charter emphasize the promotion of equality with attention to cultural diversity, gender, the rights of the child and the elderly, and the integration of persons with disabilities.

Social solidarity

> The Union shall establish an internal market. It shall work for the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress, and a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment.[31]

The seventh EU normative principle is social solidarity. The extensive understanding of social solidarity becomes clear in references in the objectives of the draft Reform Treaty to 'balanced economic growth', 'social market economy', 'full employment' and combating 'social exclusion', as well as promoting 'social justice and protection', intergenerational solidarity, and social solidarity among (and between) member states. The principle of social solidarity goes beyond intra-EU relations to inform and shape EU development and trade policies, as the draft treaty suggests with its references to the Union's contribution to 'solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty'.[32]

In addition to promoting equality, the third objective of the Reform Treaty is to promote social solidarity through a variety of treaty areas, including intergenerational solidarity, interstate solidarity and labour solidarity. Intergenerational solidarity emphasizes the role of families and the state in providing practical, financial and social support across the generations. Interstate solidarity involves a spirit of mutual solidarity between member states in order to promote economic, social and territorial cohesion, as well as in response to terrorist attack or natural or human-induced disaster (articles 3-3 and 188r-1 in particular). Labour solidarity is concerned with the promotion of labour rights and protection, including core labour standards and fair trade, and can be found entrenched in the twelve articles in the solidarity title of the Charter, as well as in the reference to 'free and fair trade' in article 3-5 of the Reform Treaty.

Sustainable development

> The Union shall define and pursue common policies and actions, and shall work for a high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order to … help develop international measures to preserve and improve the quality of the environment and the

[31] Article 3-3, Reform Treaty 2007.

[32] See Federico Bonaglia, Andrea Goldstein and Fabio Petito, 'Values in European Union development cooperation policy', in Lucarelli and Manners, *Values and principles*, pp. 164–84.

sustainable management of global natural resources, in order to ensure sustainable development.[33]

The eighth EU normative principle is sustainable development, which places an emphasis on the dual problems of balance and integration. The EU principle of sustainable development is intended to provide a balance between uninhibited economic growth and biocentric ecological crisis: the Union 'seeks to promote balanced and sustainable development' (preamble to the Charter) and 'shall work for the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth' (article 3-3). In parallel, the principle also involves the integration, or mainstreaming, of sustainable development into the policies and activities of the Union.[34] The EU seeks to promote these principles of sustainable development beyond Europe through its enlargement, development, trade, environmental and foreign policies.

As article 10a-2f of the Reform Treaty illustrates, the Union promotes sustainable development through encouraging international environmental protection and the sustainable management of global natural resources. As discussed, this first involves balancing internal economic growth with protecting and improving the quality of the environment (article 3-3). Second, such promotion involves the relatively unusual Charter article integrating environmental protection into the policies of the Union in accordance with the principle of sustainable development. Third, the Union's promotion of sustainable development extends to fostering 'the sustainable economic, social and environmental development of developing countries, with the primary aim of eradicating poverty' (article 10a-2d).

Good governance

> The Union shall define and pursue common policies and actions, and shall work for a high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order to … promote an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance.[35]

The ninth EU normative principle is good governance, emphasizing quality, representation, participation, social partnership, transparency and accountability in 'the democratic life of the Union' (Reform Treaty). The EU principle of good governance has two distinctive elements, both of which have significant internal and external consequences: namely, the participation of civil society and the strengthening of multilateral cooperation. Since the Commission presidency of Romano Prodi (1999–2004) significant emphasis has been placed on the promotion of good governance through the participation of civil society in order to encourage openness and transparency, as well as to facilitate democratic participation (articles 21a and 8b). In parallel, the unilaterally led invasion of Iraq has ensured that member

[33] Article 10a-2f, Reform Treaty 2007.
[34] Susan Baker, 'Environmental values and climate change policy: contrasting the European Union and the United States', in Lucarelli and Manners, *Values and principles*, pp. 77–96.
[35] Article 10a-2h, Reform Treaty 2007.

states have strengthened their commitments to the promotion of 'an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance', as the extract from the Reform Treaty illustrates.[36] The treaty also suggests that the promotion of good governance is to be achieved through as least three different practices involving participatory democracy, openness and transparency; multilateralism; and good global governance (see articles 8b, 10a, 21a, and the right to good administration in the citizen's rights title of the Charter).

Procedural normative ethics

> Over the years we have accomplished a great deal together. The single market, the euro and enlargement, which has been a tremendous success in spreading democracy and prosperity across our continent. We do system change, not regime change. We do it slowly and on a basis of partnership.[37]

As a second step towards assessing whether the EU engages in normative practices, I will look at the way different approaches to normative ethics help us make sense of normative power. As the extract from Javier Solana's speech suggests, it is not just substantive normative principles such as democracy that are important, but the *way* in which the EU promotes such principles—here described as 'slowly and on a basis of partnership'.

The study of normative ethics involves asking what principles and practices are considered important, by whom and why. Normative ethics focuses on the impact these beliefs have on actions taken by groups and societies in order to understand which actions are considered right or wrong. In this respect it is usual to distinguish three approaches to normative ethics—virtue ethics, deontological ethics and consequentialist ethics—each of which I shall briefly consider within the context of my discussion of EU normative ethics. Here I use an original tripartite analytical method based on bringing the EU's principles, actions and impact together with three approaches to normative ethics in order to help us make sense of, and judge, the EU's normative power in world politics.

EU principles and virtue ethics

The first part of the tripartite analysis is to examine the constitutive principles of the EU and how these become promoted as aims and objectives of the EU in world politics. As discussed in the previous section, the EU's nine substantive principles are being constitutionalized as principles and objectives of external action, regardless of the ratification of the Reform Treaty. One path to judging the EU's principles is through reference to wider discussions of neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics in philosophy: 'Virtue ethics is currently one of the three major approaches in normative ethics. It may, initially, be identified as the one that emphasizes the

[36] See Adrian van den Hoven, 'European Union regulatory capitalism and multilateral trade negotiations', in Lucarelli and Manners, *Values and principles*, pp. 185–200.

[37] Javier Solana, 'Europe's answers to the global challenges', speech to the University of Copenhagen, 8 Sept. 2006.

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virtues, or moral character, in contrast to the approach which emphasizes duties or rules (deontology) or that which emphasizes the consequences of actions.'[38] Virtue ethicists such as Philippa Foot and Rosalind Hursthouse draw on Aristotle's notion of virtue in terms of character traits or dispositions.[39] This tends to put the emphasis on teaching and education as part of the social and personal development of moral virtue. In terms of thinking about normative power, virtue ethics encourages us to look at the character or traits which guide the EU and its member states in their pursuit of external actions.

Virtue ethics and its emphasis on the moral character of social groups encourage a focus on the interpretation of virtues such as 'benevolence', 'generosity' or 'justice'. Such an interrogation inevitably involves examining the means through which such virtues become established and the extent to which a group shares them. The establishment of virtues through education, religion or other social practices clearly forms an important part of understanding the shared basis of the common good. General examples of such virtues might include classical merits such as temperance, prudence, fortitude or justice. More religious virtues such as faith and charity entered the catalogue of valued qualities at a later stage. It is also worth considering the way in which derivations of such virtues entered the discourses of European Enlightenment in modern times. Hence the French Revolution championed the virtues of liberty, equality and 'fraternity' (solidarity), while the EU seeks the virtues of unity and diversity.

Drawing on the discussion of virtue ethics, it might be suggested that any EU normative ethic should be based on 'living by virtuous example'.[40] 'Living by example' involves ensuring that the EU is both normatively coherent and consistent in its policies. Coherence entails ensuring that the EU is not simply promoting its own norms, but that the normative principles that constitute it and its external actions are part of a more universalizable and holistic strategy for world peace. Here references to the UN's Charter, Bill of Rights and additional protocols become important as all nine substantive normative principles can be found in these instruments of the UN system (including the International Labour Office and the Framework Convention on Climate Change).[41] Consistency means ensuring that the EU is not hypocritical in promoting norms which it does itself not comply with; as Kalypso Nicolaïdis and Dimitri Nicolaïdis have put it, 'Fundamentally, normative power can only be applied credibly under a key condition: consistency between internal policies and external prescriptions and actions.'[42]

[38] Rosalind Hursthouse, 'Virtue ethics', *Stanford encyclopaedia of philosophy*, 18 July 2003, p. 3, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue/, accessed 13 August 2007.

[39] Philippa Foot, *Virtues and vices and other essays in moral philosophy* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1978); Rosalind Hursthouse, *On virtue ethics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

[40] See David Coombes, 'Leading by virtuous example: European policy for overseas development', in Bill McSweeney, ed., *Moral issues in international affairs: problems of European integration* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998), pp. 221–45.

[41] See discussions in Manners, 'Normative power Europe' (*JCMS*), p. 241; Manners, 'A response to Thomas Diez', pp. 170–3.

[42] Kalypso Nicolaïdis and Dimitri Nicolaïdis, 'The EuroMed beyond civilisational paradigms', in Emanuel Adler, Federica Bicchi, Beverly Crawford and Raffaella Del Sarto, eds, *The convergence of civilisations: constructing a Mediterranean region* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006), pp. 348–9.

EU actions and deontological ethics

> [W]e rely on moral persuasion, the power of argument, and the power of shaming … Other factors in these circumstances of voluntary compliance are also important, such as the domestic salience of the norm, its legitimacy and coherence, and the extent to which it fits with other prevailing and well-established standards; but norms are expressed through language and the process of argumentation and debate can shape what is said subsequently in both domestic and international venues.[43]

The second part of the tripartite analysis is to look at how the EU promotes its constitutive principles as actions and policies in world politics. As Rosemary Foot suggests, in its most general form normative power relies more on persuasion, argument and shaming than on illegitimate force to shape world politics. Building on the virtue ethics of coherence and consistency, such normative actions rely on engagement and dialogue as the means of external action. A path to judging the EU's actions is through reference to wider discussions of neo-Kantian deontological ethics in philosophy:

> The central thought of Kant's account of public reason is that the standards of reason cannot be derivative. Any appeal to other, external authorities to buttress our reasoning must fail. Just as a learner cyclist who clutches at passing objects and leans on them for balance thereby fails to balance at all, so a would-be reasoner who leans on some socially or civilly constituted power or authority which lacks reasoned vindication fails to reason.[44]

Deontological ethicists such as Onora O'Neill draw on Immanuel Kant's notion of public reason in terms of duties and rules governing action.[45] As the passage quoted above illustrates, a deontological approach involves reasoning the merits of action without reference to, or derivation from, an external authority. In contrast to virtue ethics, a deontological approach to normative power emphasizes the rationalization of duties and rules which guide the EU in its external actions.

Deontological ethics moves the focus beyond the character of social groups towards an understanding of group actions and inactions. O'Neill and other neo-Kantians seek to emphasize the progressive and expansive role of public debate and reasoning in creating the rights and duties held to be important within a group. An awareness of the promotion of such rule-governed behaviour through domestic and international law is central to making sense of this shared idea of the common good. Unlike virtue ethics, deontological ethics provides few absolute merits which might be pursued; rather, the approach emphasizes the means through which actions are motivated and practised. In this respect, much weight is placed on the establishment of law, including both rights and duties, in the pursuit of the common good. Both supporters and detractors of the EU have argued that it has become a 'Kantian paradise' governed by domestic and international law such as the *acquis communautaire*.[46]

[43] Rosemary Foot, *Rights beyond borders: the global community and the struggle over human rights in China* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 9.
[44] Onora O'Neill, 'Bounded and cosmopolitan justice', *Review of International Studies* 26, 2000, p. 52.
[45] Onora O'Neill, *Bounds of justice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Hans Reiss, *Kant: political writings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
[46] Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, 'Looking to Europe: American perceptions of the Old World', *Cooperation and Conflict*

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Going beyond virtue ethics and drawing instead on the discussion of deontological ethics, it could be argued that any EU normative ethics should based on 'being reasonable' in world politics. 'Being reasonable' involves ensuring that the EU reasons and rationalizes its external actions through processes of engagement and dialogue. Engagement entails initiating and institutionalizing regular and transparent patterns of communication or partnership, for example through accession procedures, stabilization and/or association agreements, the European Neighbourhood Policy, African, Caribbean and Pacific relations, and Generalized System of Preferences 'Plus' arrangements. Dialogue means engaging in two-way deliberation and discussion as part of reasoning the merits of external actions, for example through association councils and the negotiation of action plans. Both engagement and dialogue provide a means for reasoning with others implicated in EU external actions, whether members, partners or targets through persuasion, argument or shaming.

EU impact and consequentialist ethics

The third part of the tripartite analysis is to consider the impact and outcomes of EU actions taken to promote its constitutive principles in world politics. Whereas analysis of principles and actions focuses on the origins and practices of EU external actions, an emphasis on impact requires wider reading of the way in which policies change and shape the partners and targets of such actions. A final path to judging the EU's impact is through reference to wider discussions of neo-utilitarian consequentialist ethics in philosophy:

> It is a necessary feature of consequentialism that it is a shallow philosophy. For there are always borderline cases in ethics. Now if you are an Aristotelian … you will deal with a borderline case by considering whether doing such-and-such in such-and-such circumstances is, say, murder, or an act of injustice; and accordingly you decide it is or it isn't, you judge it to be a thing to do or not … The consequentialist has no footing on which to say 'this would be permissible, this not'; because by [their] own hypothesis, it is the consequences that are to decide.[47]

Consequentialist ethicists such as Elizabeth Anscombe draw on and develop the utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill in order to argue for normative ethics based on the outcomes of actions.[48] In contrast to the neo-Aristotelian or neo-Kantian approaches, Anscombe argued that a consequentialist approach did not judge ethical cases on their own merit, but looked towards the consequences of action or inaction for guidance. Unlike virtue and deontological ethics, which focus on motivations, theorizing normative power using a consequentialist approach involves analysing the impacts of EU actions and their implications for others.

39: 1, 2004, pp. 71–3; Anand Menon, Kalypso Nicolaïdis and Jennifer Walsh, 'In defence of Europe: a response to Kagan', *Journal of European Affairs* 2: 3, 2004, p. 9.

47 Elizabeth Anscombe, 'Modern moral philosophy', *Philosophy: the Journal of the Royal Institute of Philosophy* 33: 124, 1958.

48 Mary Geach and Luke Gormally, eds, *Human life, action and ethics: essays by G. E. M. Anscombe* (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2006); Stephen Darwall, ed., *Consequentialism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002).

Although consequentialist ethics shares an emphasis with deontological ethics on the rights and wrongs of group actions, the focus of this approach is on the interplay between actors and consequences. The implications of this approach are significant for debates regarding the relationships between the EU and the rest of the world, for example raising questions about the merits of EU aid and trade. This also introduces the problem of value pluralism and the extent to which the merits of differing consequences may themselves be moral choices.[49] This problem has become widespread in debates regarding the relative merits of pursuing simultaneously the sustainable development agenda propounded in 1992 at Rio and in 2002 at Johannesburg, the 2000 UN Millennium Development Goals, the 2001 Doha Declaration and the 2002 Monterrey Consensus, with their very different consequences.[50]

Consequentialist ethics leads to the suggestion that the EU should 'do least harm' in world politics. 'Doing least harm' involves ensuring that the EU thinks reflexively about the impact of its policies on partner countries and regions, in particular through encouraging local ownership and practising positive conditionality. Local ownership is crucial in ensuring that relationships are 'other empowering', in contrast to the self-empowering actions of much foreign, development and humanitarian policy. Positive conditionality is also a factor in assessing whether the EU is 'doing least harm' in the places it is trying to act by ensuring that 'progress is rewarded with greater incentives and benefits [and] an even deeper relationship'.[51]

Conclusion: a more just, cosmopolitical world

> In terms of normative power, I broadly agree: we are one of the most important, if not the most important, normative powers in the world. Look, for instance, even beyond this case that he talks about: the death penalty … Even foreign policy. Yes, it gets the media's attention when we are divided. But most member states of the EU vote the same way in the United Nations. The pattern is impressive. There is not any group of countries in the world that have the same degree of homogeneity … Why is that? It is because we have been successful in establishing norms, and applying them to different realities … It is in fact the EU that sets the standards for others much of the time.[52]

I have attempted to suggest that normative ethics provides us with a means of assessing whether the EU is acting as a normative power in world politics. I have further suggested that we can ask some pretty difficult questions about EU relations with the world by deploying a tripartite analytical method based on judging its principles, actions and impact. The final step is to apply this framework to a series of

[49] Soran Reader, 'New directions in ethics: naturalisms, reasons and virtue', *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 3, 2000, p. 356.

[50] Manners, 'European Union "normative power" and the security challenge', pp. 412–16.

[51] Benita Ferrero-Waldner, 'The European Neighbourhood Policy: the EU's newest foreign policy instrument', *European Foreign Affairs Review* 11, 2006, p. 140.

[52] John Peterson, 'José Manuel Barroso = political scientist: John Peterson interviews the European Commission President', 17 July 2007, pp. 4–5, complete transcript, EU-Consent: Constructing Europe Network, http://www.eu-consent.net/library/BARROSO-transcript.pdf, accessed 13 Aug. 2007.

case-studies representing a broad cross-section of EU external actions by comparing and contrasting these three analytical parts. Such a comparative analysis is likely to raise questions about the relative importance of principles, actions and impact in some of the EU's most difficult policies with the rest of the world, including those with the 'axis of ego' (United States, China, Russia); with difficult regimes (e.g. Belarus, Burma, Iran, Zimbabwe); with transnational actors (e.g. transnational capital/companies, Wahhabi jihadists); and in conflict regions (e.g. Somalia, Congo, Sudan, Afghanistan, Iraq).

As José Manuel Barroso argued when asked to comment on my normative power approach, the EU might be one of the most important normative powers in the world because of its ability to establish normative principles and apply them to different realities. It is this application of normative principles to different realities that is central to the EU's normative ethics—it should 'live by example', 'be reasonable' and 'do least harm' whether it is acting alone or in partnership, whether its partners are in Europe or the Pacific, and whether it is dealing with global warming or counterterrorism. Ultimately, as Javier Solana's comments quoted above suggest, it may be simply too early even to contemplate the extremely long-term vision of an EU that is a normative power: system change from Westphalian self-regarding to post-Westphalian other-regarding is slow and needs partners. In this respect the long-term diffusion of ideas in a normatively sustainable way works like water on stone, not like napalm in the morning.

> I am becoming more and more convinced that a foreign policy which is based solely on interests, whether on a national or a regional perception thereof, is no longer sustainable. In my view Europe needs a foreign policy firmly anchored in ethics, and based on universally accepted values and principles. What we need are transparent political choices that can be explained to our national parliaments, public and media.[53]

The creative efforts and longer-term vision of EU normative power towards the achievement of a more just, cosmopolitical world which empowers people in the actual conditions of their lives should and must be based on more universally accepted values and principles that can be explained to both Europeans and non-European alike. In this respect I share the commitment of former Commissioner Emma Bonino to ensuring that the EU's relations with the rest of the world are based on more transparent normative ethics that accommodate the social rights and perceptions of the member states with those of the EU and its citizens, together with the universal individual rights of non-Europeans, no matter where one might live.

[53] Emma Bonino, 'Principled aid in an unprincipled world', speech delivered to ECHO/Overseas Development Institute (ODI) Conference by European Commissioner for Humanitarian Affairs, speech/98/69, 7 April 1998.

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