FACULTEIT POLITIEKE EN SOCIALE WETENSCHAPPEN

VAKGROEP CONFLICT & ONTWIKKELING
ONDERZOEKSGROEP CONFLICT RESEARCH GROUP (CRG)

CONFLICT IN HET GLOBALE ZUIDEN

Prof. Dr. Thomas Vervisch (thomas.vervisch@ugent.be)

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A. PRAKTISCHE INFO

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HOE ?

- **Hoorcolleges**
- Gastlezingen
- Individuele taak
- Micro-teaching

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HOORCOLLEGES

HANDBOEK

- Overzicht verklaringsmodellen voor gewelddadig conflict
- Standaard Boekhandel (Kouter)
- 38.20 € (15%)
- + presentaties
- + extra teksten



HOORCOLLEGES

HANDBOEK

- Trends & typologie (Inl)
- Identiteit (H1 + 2)
- Structuur (H3)
- Collectieve actie (H4)
- Rational choice (H5)
- Discours (H6)



HOORCOLLEGES

Hollis Matrix

- Ontologische en epistemologische assumpties





HOORCOLLEGES

Hollis Matrix

- Ontologische en epistemologische assumpties



FIG. 1.1

HOORCOLLEGES

ONTOLOGIE	
STRUCTURALISME (Structuren)	"It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness." (Marx, 1859) → Top-down?
INDIVIDUALISME (Individuen)	There are no societies, only individuals who interact with each other." (Jon Elster, 1989) → Bottum-up?

HOORCOLLEGES

EPISTEMOLOGIE	POSITIVISME	POST-POSITIVISME
	Natuurwetenschappen Determinisme Outside story Verklaren (oorzaken/wetten) → Kwantitatief	Humanities Vrije wil Inside story Begrijpen (betekenis/interpretatie) → Kwalitatief

HOORCOLLEGES

ONT. / EPIST.	POSITIVISME	POST-POSITIVISME
STRUCTURALISME	Primordialisme Social darwinisme Realisme Fascisme	Structuur (marxisme, politieke economie), Discours
INDIVIDUALISME	Rational choice Collective action	Collectieve action Discours

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HOORCOLLEGES

- Presentaties
- Extra literatuur
  - Achtergrond
  - Extra leerstof
  - Lijst op einde van lessen
- Donderdag op Ufora



HOE ?

- Hoorcolleges
- **Gastlezingen**
- Individuele taak
- Micro-teaching

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GASTCOLLEGES



GASTCOLLEGES

- Peru (dr. E. Willems)
- Filipijnen (prof. J. Adam)
- Oekraïne (prof. B. De Cordier)
- Syrië (B. Hermans)
- Mali (doorheen hoorcolleges)

OVERZICHT LESSEN

	DATUM	LES
1	13 februari	Inleiding
2	20 februari	Trends & Typologie
3	27 februari	Identiteit (Hoofdstuk 1 & 2)
4	5 maart	Structuur (Hoofdstuk 3)
5	12 maart	Structuur (Hoofdstuk 3, ctnd.)
6	19 maart	Collectieve Actie (Hoofdstuk 4)
7	26 maart	Rational choice & discours analyse (Hoofdstuk 5 & 6)
8	2 april	Case studie : Oekraïne
PAASVAKANTIE		
9	23 april	Case studie : Peru
10	30 april	Case studie : Filipijnen
11	7 mei	Case studie : Syrië
12	14 mei	Laatste les (individuele taak)

HOE ?

- Hoorcolleges
- Gastlezingen
- **Individuele taak**
- Micro-teaching

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INDIVIDUELE TAAK

- Doel: toepassing van theorie op case-studies
- Kies 1 case studie (niet Mali)
- 2 pagina's

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INDIVIDUELE TAAK

Pagina 1

- Vanuit welk verklaringsmodel(len) wordt gekeken naar conflict (welke bril draagt spreker)? Plaats spreker in de Hollis matrix (3ptn.)

→ Correct weergeven en interpretatie van argumenten

Pagina 2

- Welk verklaringsmodel komt minder of niet aan bod, maar is volgens jouw relevant? (3ptn.)

→ Eigen positie onderbouwd met argumenten

INDIVIDUELE TAAK → ARGUMENTEER

- Een academisch lezerspubliek verwacht dat je argumenteert. Doe dat niet vanuit je eigen standpunt of zonder bewijzen.

- https://www.ugent.be/student/nl/studeren/taaladvies/schrijven/argumenteer

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INDIVIDUELE TAAK → ARGUMENTEER

PAGINA 1 (SPREKER)

- Bepaal verklaringsmodel(len) / positie in Hollis matrix
- Lijst verschillende argumenten op
  (wat heeft spreker gezegd?)
- Kijk naar verbanden tussen argumenten, schik ze
- Haal er de belangrijkste argumenten uit
- Werk per alinea argumenten uit.

INDIVIDUELE TAAK → ARGUMENTEER

VOORBEELD



Hollis Matrix	Explaining	Understanding
Structuralism		
Individualism		X

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INDIVIDUELE TAAK → ARGUMENTEER

PAGINA 2 (EIGEN POSITIE)

- Bepaal verklaringsmodel die in aanmerking komt
- Lijst verschillende argumenten op (wat spreker heeft gezegd/niet gezegd, leerstof/boek/notities)
- Kijk naar verbanden tussen argumenten, schik ze
- Haal er de belangrijkste argumenten uit
- Werk per alinea uit.

INDIVIDUELE TAAK

2 pagina's

Deadline: **donderdag 4 juni**

Laatste les (14 mei, vragen)

UFORA

Pdf, 'naam_voornaam'

Punten zichtbaar: punten begin juli

HOE ?

- Hoorcolleges
- Gastlezingen
- Individuele taak
- **Micro-teaching**

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MICRO-TEACHING

Wekelijkse enquête (hoorcolleges, via Ufora)

1. Vragen ter verduidelijking van voorbije les.
   → Volgende week : bespreking meest relevante vragen.
   → Indien niet beantwoord : via mail

2. Enquête vraag (stelling) volgende les

Minstens 4 x invullen (→ 2 ptn.)

MICRO-TEACHING



MICRO-TEACHING

MICRO-TEACHING



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EVALUATIE

- Micro-teaching (hoorcolleges) : 2 ptn.
- Individuele taak (gastcolleges) : do 4 juni (6 ptn).
- Schriftelijke examen (hoorcolleges) : do 4 juni (12 ptn).

VRAGEN ?

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B. INLEIDING THEMA

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
Legend
Types of Violence
State-Based Violence
Non-State Violence
One-Sided Violence
Fatal events in 2018 by type of violence according to UCDP GED 19.1 data (unpublished data for Syria).
Each point represents the location of an event
UPPSALA UNIVERSITET
UCDP
Uppsala Conflict Data Program
ucdp.uu.se

STUDIEFICHE

- Basis cursus
- Historisch perspectief (sinds dekolonisatie)
- Begrippenkader / verklaringsmodellen + case studies
- Oorzaken, dynamiek, evolutie, aard, actoren, gevolgen, oplossingen

EINDCOMPETENTIES

- Inzicht hebben in de historische evolutie, aard en omvang van geweld en conflict in het globale zuiden;
- Een algemeen inzicht hebben in het gehanteerde begrippenkader binnen de conflict- analyse;
- Hedendaagse conflicten historisch, politiek en geografisch kunnen situeren;
- Een beter begrip hebben van de verschillende oorzaken van geweld en conflict in het globale zuiden;
- De actoren van geweld en conflict, hun motivaties en hun strategieën begrijpen;
- Een algemene basiskennis hebben van de verschillende interpretaties en invalshoeken van geweld en conflict in het globale zuiden;
- Een algemeen inzicht in de gevolgen van geweld en conflict hebben.

TITEL ?

CONFLICT IN HET GLOBALE ZUIDEN

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TITEL ?

CONFLICT IN HET ?GLOBALE ZUIDEN?

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GLOBALE ZUIDEN ?



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KOUDE OORLOG : 1, 2, 3



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KOUDE OORLOG: 1, 2, 3



The three worlds as they were separated during the Cold War era, each with its respective allies. Colors do not represent current economical development.

- First World: the United States and its allies.
- Second World: the Soviet Union and its allies.
- **Third World**: Non-aligned and neutral countries.

EINDE K.O.: 1, … 3


Not considered Third World
Sometimes considered Third World
Usually considered Third World
Wikipedia Map
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Third_world_countries_map_world_2.PNG

EINDE O.K. : ONTWIKKELINGSLANDEN

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ONTWIKKELINGSLANDEN

- The UN acknowledges that it has "no established convention for the designation of "developed" and "developing" countries or areas".

- "One that allows all its citizens to enjoy a free and healthy life in a safe environment." (Kofi Annan)

ONTWIKKELINGSLANDEN : BNI

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ONTWIKKELINGSLANDEN

Threshold	GNI/Capita (current US$)
Low-income	< 1,005
Lower-middle income	1,006 - 3,955
Upper-middle income	3,956 - 12,235
High-income	> 12,235

Haïti (760), Afghanistan (570), DRC (450), Burundi (290)

Kosovo (3,890), Moldavië (2,180), Oekraïne (2,390)

Peru (5,970), Ecuador (5,890), Zuid-Afrika (5,430), Namibië (4,600), Libië (6,540), Irak (4,770)

Qatar (61,070), Kroatië (12,430), Argentinië (13,040), Hongarije (12,870)

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GLOBALE WERELD ?

CONFLICT IN HET ?GLOBALE ZUIDEN?



GLOBALE ZUIDEN

DUS …

- Constructie
- Rijk ‘Globale Noorden’ en arm ‘Globale Zuiden’
- Historisch
- Niet geografisch
- Globale connecties

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DEKOLONISERING: VAKGROEP

- Vakgroep Studie van de Derde Wereld



- Vakgroep Conflict –en Ontwikkelingsstudies

INHOUD

?CONFLICT? IN HET GLOBALE ZUIDEN

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TITEL ?



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1. CONFLICT : ONVERENIGBAARHEID (BOEK)

Conflict ‘any situation in which two or more parties perceive that they possess mutually incompatible goals’ (Mitchel 1981)

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

Area held by Islamist rebel groups Ansar Dine and MUJWA in northern Mali. Map by Evan Centanni, modified from Wikimedia map by Orionist, using images by Carport and NordNordWest (source). License: CC BY-SA.

1. CONFLICT : ONVERENIGBAARHEID (BOEK)

Doelstellingen	Actors or parties think that the realisation of one or more of their objectives is blocked by the other party's attempt to reach its own respective goal.
Attitudes	Emotionele oriëntaties (woede, angst, wantrouwen, wrok, jaloezie, onrecht, …) Cognitieve processen (perceptie, stereotypering, tunnel visie, …)
Gedrag	Acties die als doel hebben om de andere actor te dwingen om zijn doelstellingen aan te passen of ervan af te zien.

1. CONFLICT : ONVERENIGBAARHEID (BOEK)



2. GROEP

Conflict ‘any situation in which two or more parties perceive that they possess mutually incompatible goals’ (Mitchel 1981)

2. GROEP

- Statelijke actoren
- Niet-statelijke actoren
- Burger bevolking

2. GROEP

Statelijke Actoren

2. GROEP

Niet-Statelijke Actoren



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2. GROEP

Burger

Bevolking

(18 miljoen)



Extract: OECD (2014), An Atlas of the Sahara-Sahel: Geography, Economics and Security, OECD Publishing, Paris

Source: Atlas Jeune Afrique 2010

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2. GROEP

Handboek

1. What makes a group?
2. Why and how does a group resort to violence?
3. Why and how do they (not) stop?

3. GEWELD

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3. GEWELD



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3. GEWELD

Graad van conflict

- linear,
- kookpunt,
- kwantitatief verschil



Type van conflict

- kwalitatief verschil
- eigen dynamieken
- functies ...



3. GEWELD

– Manifest vs structureel

Allepo

Jemen

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3. GEWELD

– Klassieke oorlogsvoering

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3. GEWELD

- Klassieke oorlogsvoering
- Guerilla tactieken

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3. GEWELD

- Klassieke oorlogsvoering
- Guerilla tactieken
- Precisie bombardementen, drone attacks, machetes

3. GEWELD

- Klassieke oorlogsvoering
- Guerilla tactieken
- Precisie bombardementen, drone attacks, machetes
- Straatrellen & repressie



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3. GEWELD

- Klassieke oorlogsvoering
- Guerilla tactieken
- Precisie bombardementen, drone attacks, machetes
- Straatrellen & repressie
- Terrorisme

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3. GEWELD

Diversiteit

- Crimineel vs politiek geweld
- Conflict, oorlog, burgeroorlog
- Oorlogsmisdaad, misdaad tegen de menselijkheid, massamoord, genocide, …



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4. DE STAAT

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4. DE STAAT


A government is an institution that holds a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence.
— Max Weber —
AZ QUOTES

4. DE STAAT

Rol staat

- Beschermer ?
  (monopolie op geweld)
- Slachtoffer ?
  (terrorisme, rebellen)
- Dader ?
  (inter als intra-statelijk:
  oorlog vs repressie)

4. DE STAAT

“America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones.”

– Bush administration’s 2002 National Security Strategy

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INHOUD



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VOLGENDE WEEK

- Vergeet enquête op UFORA niet !

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
REVISED AND UPDATED
SECOND EDITION
THEORIES OF
VIOLENT CONFLICT
AN INTRODUCTION
JOLLE DEMMERS
ROUTLEDGE

Theories of Violent Conflict

This revised and updated second edition introduces students of violent conflict to a variety of prominent theoretical approaches, and examines the ontological stances and epistemological traditions underlying these approaches.

Theories of Violent Conflict takes the centrality of the 'group' as an actor in contemporary conflict as a point of departure, leaving us with three main questions:

- What makes a group?
- Why and how does a group resort to violence?
- Why and how do or don't they stop?

The book examines and compares the ways by which these questions are addressed from a number of perspectives: primordialism/constructivism, social identity theory, critical political economy, human needs theory, relative deprivation theory, collective action theory and rational choice theory. The final chapter aims to synthesize structure and agency-based theories by proposing a critical discourse analysis of violent conflict.

With new material on violence, religion, extremism and military urbanism, this book will be essential reading for students of war and conflict studies, peace studies, conflict analysis and conflict resolution, and ethnic conflict, as well as security studies and IR in general.

Jolle Demmers is Associate Professor and Co-Founder of the Centre for Conflict Studies, Utrecht University, the Netherlands.

‘This book is a masterly effort to navigate us through the multiple ways of thinking about armed conflicts and violence. Amongst its many achievements, are precisely the one which urges us to recognize the implicit assumptions we bring to bear when analyzing these dark aspects of our human communities and how we might build better conversations between theories of conflict in order to re-invigorate our thinking and practice of violence reduction and peace building.’

Jenny Pearce, University of Bradford, UK

‘Demmers brings unique explanatory powers to theories of violence; capturing and interrogating their development, meanings and applications in a conflicted global environment. Cogent, comprehensive and compelling, this is a book for our times.’

Judith Large, University of Kent, UK

‘This updated Demmers text provides a very helpful and accessible framework for understanding the variety, subtlety and breadth of theories of violent conflict and their interconnectedness. This version captures emerging theories and provides updated case studies for a fresh perspective.’

Gloria Rhodes, Emory University, USA

‘Demmers makes a topic that many students struggle with (theory) accessible through clear and concise writing and the use of the Hollis matrix to identify the philosophical assumptions that distinguish theories from each other.’

Maia Carter Hallward, Kennesaw University, USA

Praise for the first edition:
‘*Theories of Violent Conflict* is a delight to read. It has a depth and intellectual passion that students will find very attractive. It is both approachable and straightforward, and yet penetrating and theoretically rich.’

Hugh Miall, University of Kent, UK

‘Jolle Demmers has produced a timely, comprehensive and richly interwoven account of the main theories underpinning our understanding of conflict and chronic insecurity. Lucidly written and explained, from identity through culture and global governance, to rational choice and discourse analysis, Demmers effortlessly brings order and insight to an otherwise fragmented field. Widely referenced and clearly structured, *Theories of Violent Conflict* is an essential and authoritative guide for students, academics and concerned public alike.’

Mark Duffield, University of Bristol, UK

‘Theories of Violent Conflict is a book of remarkable scope that will prove invaluable to academia, government and policy circles, and practitioners of conflict resolution and peacebuilding . . . Demmers deftly and insightfully guides the reader through a rigorous journey of comparative analysis, elucidating the theoretical underpinnings and practical implications of the major approaches that seek to explain contemporary world conflicts.’

Jerry W. Sanders, University of California, Berkeley, USA

Theories of Violent Conflict

An introduction

Second edition

Jolle Demmers

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Preface to the second edition

When I was completing the second edition of this book in December 2015, two Somali nomads announced on a Dutch news website that they were planning to take legal action against the Netherlands. While herding their cattle south of Mogadishu, the two men had fallen victim to a drone attack. They were hit by an American missile that was aiming to target a convoy of cars allegedly transporting members of the Al Shabaab organization. One nomad lost both his daughters, was severely injured himself and saw most of his cattle annihilated. The two men hold the Dutch state accountable for the American drone attack. Over the past years, the Dutch military intelligence agency (MIVD) has intercepted millions of telephone calls and texts messages by Somalis by means of a satellite receiver stationed in the small Frisian village of Burum. The mobile phone 'meta-data' (collected for an anti-piracy operation named 'Ocean Shield') was shared with the American NSA, and allegedly used to plan the drone attack. According to the Dutch lawyer representing the victims, these actions are 'culpably negligent'. By providing telecom data to the NSA, the Netherlands is considered co-responsible for the attacks.

Violent conflict and warfare have become increasingly remote and interconnected at the same time, tying people and places together in unprecedented ways. In the four years separating this second edition with the publication of the first edition of *Theories of Violent Conflict*, it is the increasing interconnectedness of violence that strikes me as most significantly new. This adds to the ongoing challenge for students of violent conflict to unravel the complexity of the web of relations and alliances producing contemporary war and violence, and the ways clusters of conflict cross-infect and exacerbate each other. The multifacetedness of today's violent conflict calls for researchers who can draw on a multiplicity of analytical vocabularies. In this second edition, apart from case-study updates, I have included a number of new voices and directions. Among them are ideas on assemblage analytics, new sections on the conceptualization of violence (and how it differs from aggression), religion and extremism, and more explicit references to gender, post-colonial studies and performance studies. Also, this second edition includes a more elaborate discussion of the critical political economy approach to violent conflict and addresses the 'spatial' and 'practice' turn in the field. Again, students in the MA Conflict Studies and Human Rights at Utrecht University were of invaluable help in thinking through the selected approaches, offering feedback and pointing out new directions. In many ways, this new edition is the product of our collaboration. Working at the Centre for Conflict Studies is fun and a privilege thanks to Chris van der Borgh, Mario Fumerton, Georg Frerks, Luuk Slooter, Lauren Gould, Nora Stel, Toon Dirkx, Niels Terpstra and Floor Zweerink. I am grateful to the Dutch Science Foundation (NWO) for providing me with a writing grant, which enabled me to write the first edition of the book. In addition, I am

indebted to Andrew Humphrys and Hannah Ferguson from Routledge for their patience and professional support and to Routledge's anonymous reviewers for their valuable suggestions. Sameer and Manu Mehendale were crucial supporters, first-readers and designers at the home front. I dedicate this book in loving memory to my academic mentor Alex E. Fernández Jilberto.

Introduction

Conflict analysis in context

Of the many accounts of the tragedy of the war in former Yugoslavia, and particularly of the belated and reluctant international response to this catastrophe, one story is often told. In 1993, the US considered invading Bosnia. It had become increasingly clear that Serb militias were stepping up systematic attacks on the Bosnian Muslim population. But then President Clinton allegedly got Robert Kaplan's bestseller *Balkan Ghosts* for Christmas. Kaplan's is a typically primordial explanation of war. It portrays the region as plagued by ancient hatreds and eternal violence between ethnic groups. According to numerous accounts, the book had a profound impact on Clinton and other members of the administration shortly after they came into office.[1] In his 1997 book on the war, Sarajevo-based editor Kemal Kurspahic wrote: 'At a time of crucial decisions [President Clinton] simply read the wrong book, or more precisely drew the wrong conclusions from *Balkan Ghosts* by Robert Kaplan, which led to the comforting thought that nothing much could be done in Bosnia "until those folks got tired of killing each other"' (1997: 32).

Behind every analysis of violent conflict is a set of assumptions. Assumptions about what moves human action and how to study it, and about the interests, needs, instincts, structures or choices that explain why and how people resort to violence. These assumptions are usually very basic, and fundamentally subjective. Assumptions form the base of academic theories of conflict. Indirectly, they also inform the ways policy-makers and politicians 'read' a conflict. Their interpretation of a conflict determines to a certain extent what sort of intervention politicians and policy-makers design. If a conflict is understood as stemming from 'ancient hatreds' between ethnic groups, there is little outsiders can do: for as soon as 'third parties' pull out, old animosities will flare up again and violence will be resumed ('they'll be at each other's throats again'). With the benefit of hindsight, it can be safely concluded that the Clinton administration's interpretation of the conflict in Bosnia was not, or insufficiently, based on solid case analysis. And it does not stand alone. Lack of grounded and critical analysis of violence and war results in misreading and inaccurate strategies and interventions, with at times dramatic consequences. This calls for a defined specialist field of study which provides analytical frames, research methodologies and skills to explain and understand contemporary violent conflict. Why and how do wars happen? Why are people prepared to kill and die in the name of an ethnic or religious group? How are people mobilized to join in? How can 'neighbours turn into enemies'? And, more fundamentally: What is the role of identity, deprivation, structural change, rationality and discourse? What is the impact of social media and the Internet on repertoires of contention, and what are the connections between the rise of severe global income disparity and local forms of violence? There has been sustained debate in academic disciplines on the causes, dynamics and consequences of violent conflict. However, despite the wealth of material on violence and war, there remains much to understand and there remains much to learn from earlier insights and theories of conflict.

This book has a threefold aim. First and foremost, it brings together a diverse range of theoretical frameworks that try to explain and understand how and why (groups of) people resort to violent action against other (groups of) combatants, civilians, organizations or the state. Second, it addresses the idea of multidisciplinarity. Conflict Studies is a field of study, not a discipline. As such, the view is widely held that violent conflict is a complex social phenomenon that can only be understood and explained from a multidisciplinary approach. In practice, however, scholars largely remain within their disciplinary boundaries. The various approaches to conflict and violence that the academic field seeks to combine under the heading of 'multidisciplinarity' are not simply heterogeneous but in fact often depart from fundamentally different ontological and epistemological stances. Certainly, there are affinities between some of them, but there are strong tensions as well. The field of Conflict Studies bears a multivalent and, at times, even contradictory theoretical burden. This book explores the ways in which a selection of theoretical traditions relates to each other. It aims to review these theories by tracing their underlying assumptions, their ontological and epistemological stances, so as to identify the affinities and contradictions between them. We will see how each of the selected approaches revolves around a different puzzle and is very capable of explaining certain components, dynamics, processes, mechanisms and/or relations but not others. This book aims to further your capacity to analyse violent conflict in a theoretically knowledgeable way. It also hopes to improve your capacity to recognize and assess axioms and paradigms underpinning explanations of contemporary violent conflict in, for instance, the media, policy reports and academic research.

Had Clinton received another, 'right' book on the Balkan wars for Christmas, one which stressed that there was nothing ancient or innate about the 'ethnic' violence in Bosnia, a book that showed how violence was carefully orchestrated by political elites and local strongmen looking for ways to gain power, would he have opted for another strategy? Possibly. Probably not. We all know that political strategies and military interventions are shaped by other elements than case analysis alone (domestic and international politics, economic interest, public opinion, routine, belief, doctrine and ideology, even fashions) and that indeed, politicians tend to select the interpretation of a conflict that best supports their interests.

It is this insight that brings us to the third aim of this book, that is, to carry out conflict analysis in a reflexive and critical way. The selection of a form and level of explanation of violent conflict is not only a difficult but also a delicate act, for by categorizing and labelling a conflict, the analyst, intentionally or not, becomes engaged in discussions on legitimacy, blame and responsibility. As a field of knowledge, Conflict Studies is situated in and shaped by highly political and messy practices of categorizing and coding. It is, therefore, not only important to engage in systematic research on individual cases of violent conflict but also to study the ways conflicts are labelled and coded (by policy-makers, in public debate and in the media) and to think through the consequences of these representations. This book thus not only aims to review the explanatory power of theories of violent conflict, it also aims to gain insight into how theories of conflict themselves are produced, shaped and applied in contexts of power. It suggests placing 'conflict analysis in context' and trying to understand how and why certain interpretations of conflict have come to dominate others.

The interpretation of conflict: trends and frames

Contemporary research on violent conflict has typically focused on causes of conflict, with war and conflict differently defined in various datasets. The most prominent civil

war data set, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), for instance, defines armed conflict as:

> a contested incompatibility that concerns government or territory or both, where the use of force between two parties results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year. Of these two parties, at least one has to be the government of a state.
>
> (Pettersson and Wallensteen 2015: 549)

The difference between 'conflict' and 'war' is determined by the casualty threshold: as soon as the number of annual battle-related deaths reaches the threshold of 1,000, the conflict is defined as 'war'. Data sets such as UCDP show a global shift from *inter-state* conflict to *intra-state* conflict in the post-World War II (WWII) era, with a peak in the early 1990s, when over 50 of these conflicts were recorded (see figure 0.1). Of the 118 conflicts that have taken place between 1989 and 2004, only seven have been inter-state wars (Harbom and Wallensteen 2005). For 2014, the Program recorded 40 armed conflicts, of which 39 were fought within states (leaving India – Pakistan the only inter-state war). However, of these 39 conflicts, 13 (33 per cent) were internationalized, in the sense that these were 'conflicts in which one or more states contribute troops to one or both warring sides' (Pettersson and Wallensteen 2015: 537). These conflicts were in Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Iraq, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, Uganda, Ukraine (Donetsk; Lugansk; Novorossiya), the US (the conflict with Al-Qaeda) and Yemen. This category of conflict is defined as 'internationalized armed conflict'.

The boundaries between classifications of violent conflict are contested. On the one hand, academics cannot do without categorizations. As Cramer (2006: 57) puts it: 'Classifying is a compulsion of the curious'. Without categorical distinctions and groupings, the things we try to understand are too diverse and complex to deal with. On the other hand, categorizations may hide more than they reveal. Until 2012, the Uppsala Program, for example, included



Figure 0.1 Number of armed conflicts by type, 1946–2014.

Source: Pettersson and Wallensteen 2015: 539. Reproduced with permission of Sage Publications.

only those cases of armed conflict in which a state is involved, neglecting violence between groups, or aggregating this type of violence into civil war. Reports on complex conflicts such as in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Somalia, however, show more activity of rebel organizations fighting each other or killing civilians than engaging with government troops. A conflict zone such as Mexico, with an estimated 60,000 people killed due to drugs-related violence between 2006 and 2012, is missing from most data sets. Also, the classification of the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria as primarily internal (but internationalized) downplays the role of external actors, in particular the US, but also Iran and Russia. We will return to the question of the categorization of violence later in this chapter. For now, it suffices to state that – despite the many controversies – the view of the post-WWII conflict landscape as dominated by largely internal forms of violence and 'small wars' is widely held.

The past decades have seen a growing preoccupation with governing this type of 'internal' violent conflict. The end of the Cold War nuclear stand-off opened new possibilities for direct political and military intervention in local zones of conflict. Western governments, in collaboration with international bodies such as the UN, NATO, the Council of Europe and the OSCE, formulated policies to prevent, mitigate and settle violent conflict, often combined with military interventions and peace-enforcing operations. It also enabled the UN to establish supranational juridical institutions such as the international war tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and the International Criminal Court. In addition, aid organizations and development NGOs adopted 'peace-building' as their core business and set up projects on social justice, reconciliation, war-time rape, child soldiers, human security and post-war trauma healing. The heightened policy attention for intra-state violent conflict, and the desire to contain this type of conflict intertwined with a boom in academic research and training centres (including new undergraduate and graduate teaching programs). But also think tanks and conflict monitoring agencies spread like mushrooms after the rain. The steadily inflating 'conflict governance field' consists of heterogeneous elements including aid coordinating bodies, think tanks, international and local NGOs, UN and EU agencies, military commands, international financial organizations, community groups, private security corporations, as well as discourses, laws, norms and doctrines, which – in collaboration and competition – seek to provide solutions for urgent needs. What these elements have in common is the will to govern, or, more precisely, the will to improve: 'the attempt to direct conduct and intervene in social processes to produce desired outcomes and avert undesired ones' (Li 2007: 264). The field of conflict governance can thus be conceptualized as an 'assemblage', a term applied in Critical Security Studies to understand the ways complex social and material formations that consist of heterogeneous elements still hold together and exercise power (Acuto and Curtis 2014; Allen 2011; De Goede and Simon 2013; Voelkner 2011). The analytical vocabulary of 'assemblage analytics' allows us to approach the 'conflict field' as a governing practice that is mobilized through particular threat representations, knowledge practices and strategies of intervention. Although the field shows a lot of heterogeneity, it is possible to detect certain trends. Over the past decades, discursive representations of 'internal' violent conflicts have shifted substantially. During the Cold War, local conflicts were mostly seen as 'proxy wars' and explained in terms of ideological divides (communism/capitalism) and superpower strategy, connected to processes of post-independence state-building. After the Cold War, violent conflicts were coded as 'ethnic' or 'ethno-nationalist': ancient hatreds and primordialist identities were seen as root causes. Since the late 1990s, conflicts are framed as driven by greed, 'terror' and evil. Particularly after 9/11, terror and terrorism became the dominant policy frames through

which local wars were understood and dealt with. Organized violence in Mali, the Central African Republic, Nigeria, Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan is depicted as evil, (religiously) fanatic, greed motivated and a threat to regional and global security. Rather than understanding such forms of violence as interconnected to global and structural histories of violence (colonialism, global capitalism), they are portrayed as endemic and inherently 'local'. Particularly in relation to the post-2012 violence in Iraq and Syria, we see how the 'ancient hatred' discourse, now applied to 'Sunni' and 'Shia' affiliations, is making somewhat of a come-back (see Al-Qarawee 2014). Generally, the mainstream view on intra-state violent conflict in the post-Cold War era is that it can be characterized as excessively cruel, with an emphasis on breakdown, insecurity and criminality.

For the study of contemporary violent conflict, it is important not to take these representational trends for granted but to situate them in (geo)political contexts of power. One way of doing this is to point at their functionality. Authors such as Helen Dexter (2007, 2008) and Mark Duffield (2007, 2010a) are critical about the characterization of post-Cold War violent conflicts (the 'new wars') as unusually cruel and criminal. They argue that what has changed, apart from the undeniable shift from inter-state to internal war, is not so much the nature of violence but the international denial of any legitimacy to warring parties, particularly within developing countries (often referred to as 'Fragile States'). During the Cold War era, supporting conflicts waged by irregular armies was an accepted feature of international conflict. Largely, these wars were seen as legitimate and were supported with funding, arms and political patronage. With the end of the Cold War, internal wars continued but lost their international, geopolitical function and hence legitimacy. The functionality of labels such as terror, criminality and barbarity is that they provided a moral justification for the increased interventionism of the late 1990s.

Seen in this light, the academic field of Conflict Studies (or 'new wars' studies) is itself intractably related to and shaped by changing views on 'necessary' versus 'senseless' wars, on representations of 'victim' and 'perpetrator' and 'just' and 'unjust' military interventions.

Defining the field

How to begin studying such a politicized, theoretically heterogeneous and contested field? A first step is to give an overview of a number of key definitions. Definitions are necessary tools to make sense of the immense complexity of social life. This section first introduces the reader to a general definition of conflict, into which most examples and categories of conflict can be placed. It then looks at the relation between conflict and violence and discusses a number of prominent classifications.

Conflict

In 1981, Chris Mitchell presented a general model of conflict that has become something of a standard in the field. His triangular typology of conflict is inspired by one of the 'founding fathers' of Peace Studies, Johan Galtung (whose work will be discussed in chapter three). For Mitchell, a conflict is 'any situation in which two or more "parties" (however defined or structured) perceive that they possess mutually incompatible goals' (1981: 17). Any conflict consists of three component parts: goal incompatibility, attitudes and behaviour. The first and crucial component of a conflict situation is *incompatibility:* actors or parties think that the realization of one or more of their objectives is blocked by the other party's attempt to reach its own respective goal. Mitchell's conflict triangle model takes the occurrence of goal

incompatibility as the starting point from which a conflict becomes manifest and each of the three elements begins to interact. Goals are defined as consciously desired future outcomes, conditions or end states, which often have intrinsic (but different) values for members of particular parties. The second component consists of *conflict attitudes:* those psychological states (both common attitudes, emotions and evaluations, as well as patterns of perception and misperception) that accompany and arise from involvement in a situation of conflict (1981: 27). There is a difference between emotional orientations (feelings of anger, distrust, resentment, scorn, fear, envy or suspicion of the intention of others) and cognitive processes (such as stereotyping or tunnel vision). The third component of conflict is behaviour. *Conflict behaviour* consists of actions undertaken by one party in any situation of conflict aimed at the opposing party with the intention of making that opponent abandon or modify its goals (1981: 29).

The triangle model highlights conflict as a dynamic process in which incompatibilities, attitudes and behaviour are constantly changing and influencing each other. Conflict formations may widen and transform, drawing in new issues and actors, or generating secondary conflicts within the main parties or among outsiders. Conflict situations, emotions and actions are deeply intertwined and dialectic. As Mitchell claims: 'For one thing, conflicts are not static phenomena, and hence the dynamic aspects of conflict which alter both structure and inter-party relationships over time, are essential aspects of any satisfactory analysis' (1981: 33).

Different research traditions emphasize different components of conflict. Although generally recognizing the transformative capacity of conflict, analysts place the source of conflict at different corners of the triangle. Some approaches are primarily concerned with the underlying *conditions* which produce conflict situations, such as scarcity of valued goods (both material and non-material) or the unequal distribution of resources. These perspectives are interested in how structural incompatibilities in the organization of society can lead to actual conflict behaviour. Marxian approaches, for instance, point at the inherently exploitative nature of capitalism as the 'master' incompatibility. Authors working from a Durkheimian perspective emphasize how conflict occurs when social change ruptures the collective belief system that 'keeps people in their places'. The sources of conflict are thus those conditions in a party's environment leading to situations of goal incompatibility, and ensuing attitudes and behaviour (Mitchell 1981: 26). We will discuss these structure-based traditions in chapter three. There is also a substantial body of literature which places emphasis on *attitudes*. Here human conflict is primarily seen as an 'internally' generated phenomenon, its root causes lying not in the party's environment but in his or her individual make-up. These motive-orientated approaches include social identity theory and human needs theory, which emphasize how people's engagement in conflict stems from a series of deep-seated needs and cognitive imperatives. Rational choice approaches also fit this category. They depart from the idea of the individual as utility maximizer and argue that the large majority of contemporary conflict is greed-motivated. Both structure-based and individual-based approaches, as well as perspectives that aim to combine or look beyond structure-agency orientations, will be discussed in this book.

Although intrigued by the same questions, the theories under review work from divergent positions and use different vocabularies. Where some use terms such as 'behaviour' and 'habit', others say 'action' and 'practice'. The same goes for 'agent'/'subject', 'structural'/'systemic' and 'manifest'/'subjective'. Given that there is no unambiguous vocabulary for the analysis of violent conflict, this book will simply shift about these terms undogmatically, clarifying terms as we go.

Violence in conflict

We have defined conflict as any situation in which parties perceive they have incompatible goals (Mitchell 1981: 17). This broad definition sees conflict as a *situation* and thus includes the possibility for inaction. People do not always act upon situations of conflict. And certainly, violence does not automatically result from perceived goal incompatibility. In chapter six, Schröder and Schmidt (2001), for instance, argue that for violence to break out, parties first have to come to look upon the incompatibility as relevant, and second (and more important), violence needs to be sanctioned as the legitimate course of action. Other theoretical frames explain inaction as resulting from a lack of 'awareness' (chapter three); a lack of 'mobilizing capacity' (chapter four) or simply as 'cost-beneficial' (chapter five). Another implication of Mitchell's working definition is the unimportance of violence as a criterion for conflict behaviour. In his view, conflict behaviour can take on a wide variety of forms in addition to 'physical damage to people and property'. Conflict behaviour includes all actions undertaken by one conflict party aimed at the opposing party with the intention of making that adversary abandon or modify its goals. Repertoires of conflict range from demonstrations and strikes, to self-destructive strategies such as hunger-strikes or suicide but can also include more subtle forms of 'everyday resistance' (Scott 1990) such as sabotage, disobedience or non-cooperation. This book, however, is explicitly interested in violence as a form of conflict.

In everyday representations, violence is often conceptualized as a *degree* of conflict: as something that occurs automatically when conflict reaches a certain 'temperature'. In contrast, most authors in this book argue that we lack evidence showing that higher levels of conflict lead to higher levels of violence. Rather, violence is a *form* of conflict: 'Violence is not a quantitative degree of conflict but a qualitative form of conflict, with its own dynamics' (Brubaker and Laitin 1998: 426). The turn to violence during conflict is a 'phase shift' that requires particular theoretical attention. This is illustrated, for instance, by the work of Della Porta and Tarrow (1986) on the tendency of political violence in Italy in the early 1970s to occur not at the peak of protest mobilization but toward the end of a mobilization cycle. At the moment that mobilization was waning, splinter groups in Italy resorted to violence as the only way left to cause disruption. Rather than seeing violence as a natural, self-evident outgrowth of conflict, this book distinguishes violence from conflict. To be exact, this book aims to address how different research traditions explain and understand the occurrence of violence in situations of conflict. Our focus is on violence in conflict, not on conflict as such.

It is important to make this distinction between the larger scholarly field of conflict (including, for example, inter-personal or corporate conflict) and that concerned only with violent conflict, or, more precisely, violence in conflict. Not because general theories of conflict have nothing to offer to the analysis of violent conflict, but because the subfield of violent conflict involves specific puzzles, and revolves around a particular set of questions, which require particular theoretical attention. The following chapters discuss the multiple forms and functions of violence in conflict: its relation to identity and rationality; the connection between 'structural' and 'manifest' violence; the mobilization of collective violent action and the ways violence is imagined and legitimized.

In outlining their theories, we will see how authors conceptualize 'violence' in different ways. What violence is (and what it is not) is not self-evident. In the introduction of their *Anthology of Violence in War and Peace*, Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois (2004:1) argue how violence is a slippery concept: 'nonlinear, productive, destructive, and reproductive' (2004: 1). Violence defies easy categorization. 'It can be everything and nothing; legitimate

or illegitimate; visible or invisible; necessary or useless; senseless and gratuitous or utterly rational and strategic' (Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois 2004: 2). Some authors understand violence as a product, whereas others emphasize how violence is dynamic and processual. The former focuses on violence as an aberration: a sporadic, concrete act or episode that occurs as an exception to the norm. Violence in this view is understood as an outcome or result, for which a causal explanation can be found. The latter, by contrast, views violence as part of a dynamic process and as having a transformative capacity, emphasizing how certain forms of violence mutate into others (e.g. how guerrilla warfare morphs into urban gang war or domestic and gendered violence). Another definitional divide runs between 'minimalist' and 'comprehensive' understandings. Violence, in the restricted sense, is defined as a physical act of force. It is about visible and intentional harm to other persons or objects. In line with this, anthropologist David Riches (1986: 8) defines violence as 'an act of physical hurt deemed legitimate by the performer and illegitimate by (some) witnesses'. Apart from the physical element, this much quoted definition highlights the contested legitimacy and performativity of violence. It is at this point where violence can be distinguished from aggression. Whereas aggression derives from the 'motivation to harm the other as an end in itself' (Brewer 2001: 26), violence is also always communicative: it aims to send a message to an audience. 'Violent acts are efficient because of their staging of power and legitimacy, probably even more so than due to their physical results' (Schröder and Schmidt 2001: 6). In many ways, the violent strategy of the 'terrorist attack' is distinguished from other routines in the way it is designed to be *visible*. Particularly in the contemporary 24/7 news cycle, the violent act is efficient above all if it is screened.

Still, certain authors critique the understanding of 'violence as act' as too narrow. Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois (2004) argue that '[v]iolence also includes assaults on the personhood, dignity, sense of worth or value of the victim. The social and cultural dimensions of violence are what gives violence its power and meaning' (ibid.: 1). They here draw on ideas introduced by authors such as Bourdieu and Galtung in the 1960s and 1970s. Related to Galtung's 'structural violence' (1969), Bourdieu speaks of 'symbolic violence' as a form of social and cultural domination that is often taken for granted and experienced as 'natural', even by its victims. Symbolic violence, with gender domination as a prime example, 'accomplishes itself through an act of cognition and of misrecognition that lies beyond – or beneath – the controls of consciousness and will' (Bourdieu 1977; Bourdieu and Wacquant 2004: 273). The work of Joanne Bourke (2007) on the history of rape, for instance, shows how in most countries rape within marriage (marital rape) was only legally criminalized by the late twentieth century. In line with this, Michael Dillon argues that 'what is taken to be violent differs from time to time and from place to place' (1998: 563). Political regimes specify what violence is legitimate and what is not, suggesting that relations of power politicize certain forms of violence and depoliticize others. The various understandings of violence will be addressed as we move along, with particular attention for structural violence in chapter three.

We have already briefly addressed the contested nature of classifications of violent conflict. The term may include a multitude of situations ranging from wars between states, revolutions, insurgencies, genocides, civil wars, lethal ethnic or religious conflicts, to riots and pogroms, and as such is notoriously difficult to define. Scholars have identified a number of rules and thresholds for deciding what (not) to include into their analysis. We will here consider a number of prominent definitional boundaries between inter-state and intra-state violent conflict; civil war and communal violence and criminal and political violence.

Definitional boundaries

Up until the 1990s, violent conflict and war were predominantly studied from the perspective of international relations and strategic studies. Systemic, global or world wars such as the Cold War, WWI and WWII attracted the lion's share of scholarly attention. Analytical perspectives such as systems theory, realist theory and game theory prevailed (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 1981). Smaller wars, or 'low intensity conflicts', were largely seen as by-products of the Cold War bipolarity. The study of violent conflict was fragmented between disciplinary boundaries, and there was no or very little integration of, for instance, anthropological 'ethnographies of violence' and the knowledge produced in the field of international relations on world systems, nuclear deterrence, arms races, balances of power and inter-state wars.

Ironically, while the overwhelming majority of scholarly attention was directed to the 'big wars', the conflict landscape around the world was gradually assuming a different profile (Gomes Porto 2002). As indicated by Harbom and Wallensteen (2010), from the 1960s to the 1990s there was a sharp increase in the total incidence of violent conflict *within* states. It was particularly during the 1990s, when the number of intra-state wars peaked, that many scholars began to realize the limited explanatory power of the 'proxy war paradigm'. Evidently, the end of the Cold War and the 'triumph' of the neoliberal democratic model did not bring the 'end of history'. War and violent conflict prevailed but now predominantly on a local scale. Small wars turned out to have dynamics of their own.

The realization that local conflicts had in fact become the rule caused an important shift in the study of violent conflict and war. Traditional theories of international relations and strategic studies proved incapable of grasping the dynamics and complexities of the 'new wars'. Turning away from the inter-state level, analysis began to focus on local actors and local contexts: on identity formation, group dynamics, ethnicity, resource abundance, collective grievances and collective action. A new but fragmented field of study emerged and, with this, a plethora of definitions and classifications. Roughly, the 'new wars' are seen to differ from inter-state or conventional conflict in a number of ways. First, they do not have precise beginnings and endings. They do not start with a declaration or war and lack 'definitive battles, decisive campaigns and formal endings' (Gomes Porto 2002: 5). Second, the 'new wars' are protracted: they typically last for decades, during which episodes of fierce fighting alternate with times of relative peace. Often the war/peace boundary is blurry: both in time and across space. While rebel groups may rule a certain territory by night, army forces can be in control during day time. War is fought in certain specific contested areas (borderlands, mines, urban districts) without necessarily affecting outlying territories. Third, there are differences in modes of warfare. The new type of war is fought by loosely knit groups of 'regulars' and 'irregulars': soldiers, rebels and civilians, local warlords, cadres and paramilitaries, and not by two (or more) conventional clear-cut national armies. Fourth, external interference with local wars typically comes from overseas diaspora, international military interventions, private security firms, military-to-military (M2M) programs, lobby groups or foreign mercenaries. Often these 'external actors' make up an intricate part of the conflict dynamics. Importantly, local war economies are not funded by taxation by the state but sustained by global networks of trade, outside emergency assistance and the parallel economy, including drugs trafficking, oil bunkering, trade of diamonds, timber or coltan. Fifth, due to the revolution in communication technology, new wars are deterritorialized, involving globally dispersed networks of actors and organizations (or 'cells'). Strategic decisions can be made and instantly communicated across the globe. Increasingly,

(irregular) armed actors make use of advanced and remote technologies such as drones, satellites and cyber intelligence. Finally, it is organizations claiming to represent identity groups (ethnic, religious, cultural or other) that are at the core of contemporary violent conflicts.

In relation to this, by the late 1990s, Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse raised a number of definitional questions (1999: 66):

> What are we to call these conflicts? Current terminology includes 'internal conflicts' (Brown 1996); 'new wars' (Kaldor and Vashee 1997), 'small wars' (Harding 1994), 'civil wars' (King 1997), 'ethnic conflicts' (Stavenhagen 1996), 'conflict in post-colonial states' (van de Goor et al. 1996) and so on, as well as varying expressions used by humanitarian and development NGOs and international agencies, such as 'complex human emergencies' and 'complex political emergencies'.

All these labels underline the necessity to theoretically distinguish inter-state war from intra-state war. From the above list, two definitions are broadly applied: *internal violent conflict* and *civil war.* Of the two, internal violent conflict is the more general. The term is not only applied to distinguish internal violent conflict from inter-state war but also from other types of large-scale social and political violence. Definitions emphasize the internality of the conflict to the *territory of a sovereign state* and the participation of the *government as combatant* and often include a requirement that the conflict exceeds a certain threshold of deaths (as in Pettersson and Wallensteen 2015). Classic definitions of civil war often strongly resemble those of internal conflict. In their seminal study *Resort to Arms,* Small and Singer define civil war as any armed conflict that involves '(a) military action internal to the metropole, (b) the active participation of the national government, and (c) effective resistance by both sides' (1982: 210). More recently, however, scholars have argued for the necessity to specify the term, and to indicate rules and thresholds to analytically distinguish civil war from other forms of large-scale violence such as homicide, riots or communal violence. We will briefly look into this here.

Civil war

Definitions of civil war generally include criteria such as state involvement and level of political organization of the group or party opposing the state. Nicholas Sambanis (2004: 829–30) uses no less than 11 criteria to define civil wars. His description of civil war location and parties is stated as follows:

> (1) The war takes place within the territory of an internationally recognised state with a population of more than 500,000 (the smallest population size allowed by most coding rules); (2) The parties to the conflict are politically and militarily organised, and they have publicly stated political objectives – this distinguishes insurgent groups and political parties from criminal gangs and riotous mobs; (3) The government must be a principal combatant – or, at least, the party representing the government internationally and claiming the state domestically must be involved as a combatant; (4) The main insurgent organisation(s) must be locally represented and must recruit locally. Additional external involvement and recruitment need not imply that the war is not intra-state. Insurgent groups may operate from neighbouring countries, but they must also have some territorial control (bases) in the civil war country and/or the rebels must reside in the civil war country.

Sambanis is equally precise when it comes to defining the beginning and ending of civil war, which he ties to the level of war-related deaths:

> (5) The start of the war is the first year that the conflict causes at least 500 to 1,000 deaths. If the conflict has not caused 500 deaths or more in the first year, the war is coded as having started in that year only if cumulative deaths in the next three years reach 1,000; (6) Throughout its duration, the conflict must be characterized by sustained violence, at least at the minor or intermediate level. There should be no 3-year period during which the conflict causes fewer than 500 deaths; (7) Throughout the war, the weaker party must be able to mount effective resistance. Effective resistance is measured by at least 100 deaths inflicted on the stronger party. A substantial number of these deaths must occur in the first year of the war. But if the violence becomes effectively one-sided, even if the aggregate effective-resistance threshold of 100 deaths has already been met, civil war must be coded as having ended and a politicide or other form of one-sided violence must be coded as having started; (8) A peace treaty that produces at least 6 months of peace marks an end to the war; (9) A decisive military victory by the rebels that produces a new regime should mark the end of the war. Because civil war is understood as an armed conflict against the government, continuing armed conflict against a new government implies a new civil war (allowing researchers to study the stability of military victories). If the government wins the war, a period of peace longer than 6 months must persist before we code a new war; (10) A cease-fire, or truce, or simply an end to fighting can also mark the end of a civil war if they result in at least two years of peace; (11) If new parties enter the war over new issues, a new war onset should be coded. If the same parties return to war over the same issues, this is coded as a continuation of the old war, unless any of the above criteria for coding a war's end apply for the period before the resurgence of fighting.

This extremely fine-tuned definition is an attempt to bring consensus into the divergent, and often fuzzy, coding rules used in the analysis of civil wars. Particularly, scholars aiming to measure the onset and termination of civil war through statistical analysis claim that such a precise definition of what is and what is not a civil war is necessary. For Sambanis (2004), without a clear operational definition, researchers run the risk of making inferences from unstable empirical results. This will make it difficult, if not impossible, to measure and predict civil war.

No definition comes without its hazards, and the categorization of contemporary violent conflict as civil war, or 'internal', is criticized for a number of reasons. First of all, both terms tend to obscure the international element in conflict. For Cramer (2006: 65), it is questionable whether 'it makes sense to think in terms of civil war if many, if not most of these conflicts are characterized to a large extent by the interdependence of the countries where they occur with other parts of the world?' The Spanish Civil War of the 1930s, the wars in El Salvador and Nicaragua of the 1980s and the more recent conflicts in Ukraine, Nigeria, Colombia, South Sudan, the DRC, Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan are all heavily internationalized (and regionalized) in their origins and conduct. Many of the origins of conflict stem from the conditions of dramatic social change related to postcolonialism, Cold War military involvement, spill-over effects from neighbouring wars, the War on Terror and their integration into the global neoliberal market. Hardt and Negri (2004: 4) coined the term 'global civil war' to express the necessity to understand local war as part of a 'grand constellation'. Keen (2008) too, argues against the term, when pointing at the classic case of the 1994

Rwandan genocide. Key members of the UN Security Council used the classification of 'civil war' during the early stages of the Rwandan genocide and this allowed the UK, the US and France to argue that a major peace-keeping operation was inappropriate in such a context – effectively giving Rwandan extremists free rein for mass killing. For Mary Kaldor, the new wars have to be understood in the context of 'the process known as globalisation' (1999: 3). Edward Azar (1990) argued that we should dismiss the term and use 'international social conflict' instead.

Another critique pertains to the criterion of 'government involvement'. Large-scale violence not directly involving the state is set apart as analytically different from civil wars. But the distinction between civil war and communal violence may fade in some zones of conflict. Government involvement can be cryptic, such as when governments indirectly support militias. In other cases, it may not be possible to identify who represents 'the government' because all warring parties may be claiming the state (e.g. Somalia after 1991).[2] State–society relations are often characterized by complex networks of political patronage, with blurry distinctions between private/public and political/personal, state/non-state. Ethnographic research on intercommunal pogroms in Gujarat, for example, revealed the role of political middlemen in instigating what was coded as 'communal violence'. The dependence of the poor on political middlemen in their dealings with the state permitted these 'brokers' to mobilize their 'clients' for politically motivated violence (Berenschot 2011). Micro-analyses of communal violence, riots and pogroms show that state officials and agencies are often implicated (e.g. Horowitz 2001). There is more political organization in this type of violence than meets the eye. A form of conflict that is also excluded from the civil war category is what Duffield (2002) describes as 'network wars'. Here warring parties find it no longer necessary to project power through the bureaucratic control of a fixed territory. The state is replaced by multiple centres of authority, controlled by warlords and business networks, who no longer consider the state the main 'trophy' in war.

A final sense in which the category of civil war is analytically fragile concerns the distinction between criminal and political violence. Violent conflict in Colombia (after 1993) and Mexico (after 2006), for example, shows the deep entanglement of political and criminal agendas of state and non-state parties. The FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia), once a traditional peasant guerrilla movement, is sustained by coca production and drugs trafficking. La Familia Michoacana, one of the most powerful drug cartels of Mexico, presents itself as an insurgency movement rather than a criminal enterprise. La Familia solidifies its power base through the selective and symbolic use of extreme violence but also allegedly provides charity and services, propagating a public image of defender of the poor (using Facebook, Twitter, but also bill-boards and newspaper advertisements) and directly challenges the legitimacy of the Mexican state. By most definitions, Mexico is excluded from any set of civil war. Yet the duration and scale of violence (with an alleged death toll of over 60,000 for the period between 2006 and 2012), the conflict over territory between cartels and the government, as well as the capacity of the cartels to mount effective resistance (with at least 500 deaths inflicted on the side of the state), and the way they publicly voice their objectives, suggest that this type of large-scale violence is in many ways relevant to the study of civil war and internal violent conflict. In this regard, even David Apter's helpful distinction between criminal and political violence is thwarted by on-the-ground complexities. Apter distinguishes political violence from criminal violence in that it is focused on a specific 'reordering' purpose and as such requires legitimacy (1997). The ways in which 'narco politics' has seeped into the cultural fabric of societies such as Mexico (but also El Salvador and Afghanistan) make it very hard to draw that line.

In sum, the boundaries between global/local, inter/intra, state/non-state, political/criminal are blurry. Definitions and classifications of violence are tools to advance our thinking but can also have the opposite effect, and muddle analysis. Furthermore, the act of categorizing always has a political dimension, for one aspect is singled out, often for a reason. Cramer (2006: 84) emphasizes this as follows:

> [S]tandard labels or categories used to classify violence and violent conflict are unwieldy. A category involves a definition (and criteria by which events are judged to 'fit' that definition). On the one hand these definitions are extremely useful. The definitions, and classification systems they support, have as their purpose the clarification of a complex and divers world. On the other hand the process of clarifying through classification systems and categorical distinctions necessarily involves simplifying the world. Again, this is not necessarily a bad thing. However, the simplification can be misleading. It arises because the definitions involved work like borders separating artificially or at least crudely phenomena that might be closely related.

The point is to accept the complexity and multifacetedness of violent conflict and its transformative capacity: various forms of violence overlap and mutate into each other. This does not mean we should refrain from categorizing altogether. As can be learned from the above discussion, there are convincing arguments to analytically distinguish violent conflict as a sub-field of study.

Approach: group formation and violent action

In reviewing theories of 'violence in conflict', this book takes the centrality of the group as actor in contemporary conflict as a point of departure. The key role of the group and the organization claiming to represent the group – insurgents, rebels, guerrillas or others – is widely acknowledged. Any meaningful study of violent conflict should thus consist of a systematic analysis of (identity) group formation, dynamics of interaction and collective action. This is *not* to say that 'identity' or 'identity differences' are causing violent conflict. Rather, *identity boundary drawing* is a central aspect of the mobilization of support for armed conflict in the world today. Clearly, group identity labels should be handled with caution: collective actors in violent conflict cannot be treated as if they were unitary, bounded entities. Often the relationship between organizations in conflict and the groups they claim to represent is deeply ambiguous (see Brubaker 2004). Violent conflicts are complex phenomena that foster interaction among actors with distinct identities, needs and interests. It is this complex interconnectedness between different actors and levels (local, global, state, region) that endows contemporary violent conflict with its particular character and leads to joint violence that 'straddles the divide between the political and the private, the collective and the individual' (Kalyvas 2003: 487). The study of contemporary conflict involves the analysis of relations and interactions at different levels and between a variety of actors: insiders and outsiders, individuals and organizations, civilians and armies.

By taking the process of group formation and violent action as points of departure, we are left with three rather straightforward questions:

1. What makes a group?
2. Why and how does a group resort to violence?
3. Why and how do they (not) stop?

In the following chapters, we examine and compare the ways by which these questions are addressed (and at times *critiqued)* from a number of prominent theoretical traditions.

Conflict analysis

The task of conflict analysis is to unravel the complex dynamics of interactive processes in order to explain and/or understand how and why people resort to violence. The making of such an analysis is part of doing social research. We will here briefly discuss a number of guidelines on how to do theoretically informed analysis with the help of Charles Ragin's *Constructing Social Research* (1994, 2010) and Martin Hollis' *The Philosophy of Social Science* (1994).

In essence, Ragin argues, social research involves a dialogue between theory (ideas) and evidence (data). Theories help to make sense of evidence, and researchers use evidence to extend, revise and test theories. The end result is a representation of social life that has been shaped and reshaped by ideas. An important part of doing social research is dedicated to the analysis of the phenomena the researcher is studying. Analysis means 'breaking phenomena into their constituent parts and viewing them in relation to the whole they form' (Ragin 1994: 55). In analysing a violent conflict, a researcher aims to break the conflict up into its component parts, dissecting the different key elements and conditions that combine to 'make' the conflict. A first possible step in making such an analysis is conflict mapping.

Mapping a conflict

By 'mapping' a conflict, you visually (on a flip chart, blackboard) break a conflict into its key component parts. These parts can then be studied in isolation from one another, in relation to one another or in relation to the larger conflict. Basic questions that will help you to map a conflict are:

1. Who are the main parties?
2. What is happening between them?
3. What is happening within them? (distinguish positions, interests, needs, fears)
4. Who are the secondary parties (or other stakeholders)?
5. What is happening between them all?
6. What is happening between the parties and the external environment?
7. Where are you on the map?[3]

Conflict mapping is used in many different ways. It is used by analysts to get a good snapshot overview of a conflict situation. It is also used as a method in conflict resolution workshops to bring out the different perceptions of conflict. In Wehr's words, conflict mapping is 'a first step in intervening to manage a particular conflict. It gives both the intervener and the conflict parties a clearer understanding of the origins, nature, dynamics and possibilities for resolution of the conflict' (Wehr 1979: 18 quoted in Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1999: 91). Above all, mapping is a playful way to organize evidence. Drawing a conflict map allows you to think through relationships between parties, their alliances and split-off movements and their relation to their 'constituency'. It is a way to trigger questions on not just the more obvious core parties (e.g. the Islamic State fighting the Syrian government forces), but also on the wider network of stakeholders (e.g. US Army Psychological Operations in Iraq, Saudi preachers of Wahhabism, international oil

companies). It also shows how (1) a conflict mostly consists of a cluster of conflicts and (2) conflicts involve different 'levels of analysis'. Apart from individuals (leaders, elites), organizations (Islamic State, Lord's Resistance Army, the FARC) and groups ('Sunni', 'Acholi', 'peasant population'), conflicts involve state and international actors. It is exactly these complexities that can be visualized on a conflict map and serve as a starting point for further research (e.g. by zooming in on a specific relationship, or sub-conflict). Conflict mapping is also an exercise in 'mind mapping' for by drawing 'your' map, you bring out your own perceptions and 'reading' of a particular conflict.

Conflict analysis is not just an exercise in the organization of evidence, it is also about 'explaining' or 'making sense' of particular phenomena. It is here that the dialogue with theory becomes apparent. What defines a group? What is ethnicity? When is a Tamil not a Tamil? Can individuals cross group boundaries? How do organizations in conflict sustain themselves? How are people mobilized for violent action? Why do people follow? How is power organized? What is the role of fear, poverty or inequality in explaining people's readiness to wage war? These are just a few questions that will automatically pop up when mapping a conflict and which require a more abstract level of thinking. Abstract knowledge about social life is called *social theory*. In Ragin's words, 'social theory is an attempt to specify as clearly as possible a set of ideas that pertain to a particular phenomenon or set of phenomena' (1994: 25). As it turns out, most people know at least something about conflict theory without studying it. They are, after all, confronted with imagery and news reports on violence and war on a daily basis. They know, for instance, that 'violence begets violence' and that populist leaders try and scapegoat certain groups in society. They do not need to study elite theories of conflict – a branch of conflict theory discussed in chapter one – to know this. Most people have heard about stereotyping and exploitation without reading social identity theory (chapter two) or Galtung's work on structural violence (chapter three). They know that grievances and propaganda play a role in conflict, also without Edward Azar (chapter four) or studying discourse analysis (chapter six). They may acknowledge that people have a tendency to act in self-interested ways and do not need a theory of rational choice (chapter five) to understand that this may also be the case in war. Still, theory is valuable because this body of thinking explores these ideas in depth, learning from and building on earlier insights. How and why are people resistant or receptive to populist rhetoric? Why do groups end up in escalatory dynamics of identity competition? Is violence always a visible and concrete act of physical hurt, or can it also be indirect and hidden, such as when people die of poverty, or a lack of medicine? When is violence rendered a normal and legitimate course of action? And how do we distinguish rational from irrational behaviour in war? Everyday understandings of war are often seriously flawed as well. Many commonsense ideas on the role of ethnicity, poverty and utility are contradicted by the body of knowledge gathered here in this book.

Theories of conflict form an important resource and guidance in grasping the complexities of war. Roughly, theories are informed by different underlying claims on 'being' (ontology) and 'knowing' (epistemology). As a way to bring out the affinities and contradictions between the theories reviewed in the following chapters, I propose to try and situate them in what is here termed the 'Hollis matrix'.

Ontological and epistemological stances

As citizens in an increasingly mediatized world, a world that is told to us through our screens, we are constantly bombarded with images of war and violence. Most of these images show

direct acts of violence: videotaped decapitations, violent clashes between suburban youth and (military) police forces, air strikes, drug cartel executions, insurgency attacks. Portrayals of 'indirect' violence abound as well: the bodies of refugees who drowned when trying to cross the Mediterranean Sea, testimonies of 'new slaves' in Italy's garment industry, or dehydrated children in Benin. Two sets of rather straightforward questions pop up each time we witness such cases: *Why* is this happening and *how* is this possible? Whereas the *why* often refers to motive (are we the product of our instincts, slaves of the system, autonomous agents?), the *how* refers to organization (how are people recruited, how is violence financed?). By thinking about these questions, we cannot escape entering into a more fundamental debate on 'being' (ontology) and 'knowing' (epistemology). 'Ontology' comes from two Greek words: *on*, which means being, and *logica*, which means study. So ontology is the study of being, and concerned with questions such as 'who/what are we?' or 'what moves us?' 'Epistemology' comes from the Greek word *episteme* and refers to theories of knowing; it relates to ideas about how we can know the (social) world. Underlying the 'how and why of violent conflict' are ideas on *what drives humans* into action supported by ideas on knowing: on *how do we know* what we claim to know about conflict? In the end, the many different theoretical traditions of violent conflict are all simply variations on two sets of ontological and epistemological themes: 'structuralism' and 'individualism' as ontological stances, and 'explanation' or 'understanding' as epistemological stances. Martin Hollis scrutinizes these positions in great depth in his book on *The Philosophy of Social Science* (1994). We will here – in a simplified way – lay out the very core positions. The matrix will be discussed in greater detail at the end of each chapter.

The first divide is that of ontology: theories are informed by two different claims on what primarily moves people. There is a fundamental ontological divide in the social sciences between approaches that attempt to account for human action by reference to movement in an encompassing social structure (structuralism) and approaches that take the actions of individuals to be the stuff of history and that regard structures as the outcome of previous actions (individualism). So, does structure primarily determine action or does action determine structure? Do we take the individual as the starting point of our analysis, or do we choose to emphasize the structures that tell him or her 'how to do' social life? Do violent conflicts begin because of structural pressures or do they result from individuals acting in concert? And are these positions in radical conflict or can they also complement each other? We will deal with this 'chicken-or-egg' question later in the book. For now, we state that individual-based approaches locate the source of violent conflict at the level of the individual. They may emphasize different aspects of the individual. Some individual-based theories focus on the ways our actions are determined by inner psychological imperatives and preferences. Others take 'agency', that is, the individual's capacity to initiate change, as their starting point. Structure-based approaches, by contrast, locate the sources of violent conflict in the organization of society. Conflict is understood as deriving from tensions and contradictions inherent to the ways social systems are structured. Let us take the example of 'insecurity'. 'Insecurity' figures as a key concept in many theories of violent conflict. Where individual-based theories are interested in how people *act upon* forms of insecurity (such as identity, economic, or physical insecurity) and how these actions may translate into conflict, structure-based theories are primarily concerned with examining *the causes* of insecurity: How are certain imbalances (poverty, inequality, marginalization) produced structurally? So, although intrigued by the same phenomenon, they ask different sets of questions, implying different research puzzles and methodologies. In abstract terms, *ontological individualism* maintains that the elementary unit of social life is the individual.

To explain social institutions and social change is 'to show how they arise as the result of the action and interaction of individuals' (Elster 1989: 13 in Hollis 1994: 109). *Ontological structuralism*, in contrast, holds out for a focus on the power of structures. Power resides in institutions and as such is beyond the control of the individual. People's actions are constrained by the rules that tell them 'how to do' social life. It is the constitutive and regulative rules supporting, for instance, the system of capitalism, the modern state or global governance, that primarily explain human action and hence need to be placed at the core of analysis. There is, however, more to the structure–individual debate. Ontological claims are merely dogmatic unless connected to epistemological stances (Hollis 1994: 107). Before we turn to this connection, we first outline the two different epistemological stances.

Epistemology is the theory of knowledge. There is a basic epistemological divide in the social sciences between scholars who argue that the social world can best be examined from *without* (explanation) and scholars who claim that the social world must be studied from *within* (understanding). The former position departs from the idea that human action is subject to a combination of causal laws and regulations. Through the testing of a series of hypotheses, it is possible to produce general explanations of human behaviour. Human action is taken as essentially determined and predictable. Theory is seen as a set of propositions that link cause and consequence. In contrast, scholars arguing from an 'interpretive epistemology' (understanding) claim that instead of looking for causes of behaviour, we are to seek the meaning of action. Actions derive their meaning from shared ideas and rules of social life. The construction of meaning is historically and culturally specific, and as such can only be studied 'in context' and by integrating the self-conscious perspectives of informants themselves. Scholars emphasize the creative (and unpredictable) way in which people construct meaning. Theory building is first and foremost about sense-making. Researchers in this tradition are confronted with what is called the 'double hermeneutic': they aim to acquire knowledge by making an (academic) interpretation of how actors understand their social world.

Hollis connects these two views on epistemology to the earlier views on ontology by means of a basic matrix. His way of mapping the core assumptions underlying social theory in a matrix allows us to position the various conflict theories in their proper ontological and epistemological 'boxes'. Surely, the matrix is schematic. The idea is to use it as an organizational device, and to quiz, play with and, if necessary, critique the 'boxing' of theoretical traditions.

Let us walk through the four quadrants of the matrix, beginning with the upper row, 'Structuralism' (see table 0.1). By implication, there are two basic and different understandings of what structure is and does. The first, explanatory (or positivist) epistemological view, sees structures from without. Social structures are systems which are external and prior to actions and determine them fully. This view on society as functioning as an objective whole, such as a clock, beehive or body, external and independent of the actors involved, is little in use in academia today. Some scholars have ascribed this kind of objectivism to aspects of the work of Marx, where capitalism is presented as an objective system determining the lives of people. However, it is Marx's famous statement on social being in his Preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (1859), which may incline us to rather fit him in the box next door, where structure is seen from within, from an (understanding), interpretative epistemology:

> It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but on the contrary, their social being, that determines their consciousness.
>
> (Marx 1963 [1859]: 51)

Table 0.1 The Hollis matrix (based on Hollis 1994, *The Philosophy of Social Science)*

Ontology/Epistemology	*Explaining (positivist)*	*Understanding (interpretative)*
Structuralism	Social structures are systems (like clocks, planets, bodies, beehives) external and prior to actions and determining them fully.	Social structures are sets of meaning rules ('games') telling people how 'to do' social life (language, religion, economy). Actors are role/rule followers.
Individualism	Actors are self-contained units and the source of action (act upon individual laws of utility maximization, natural preferences, psychological laws).	Actors are embedded in society but have agency, they can act, initiate change, they have room for reflexive self-direction.

What this quotation in any case seems to imply is that human beings are actors in a larger whole, and that it is their position in this larger whole that makes them who they are, not their individual agency, or 'consciousness'. Hollis suggests that we see this larger whole, the structure, as a game.[4] Games are sets of meaning rules, external to each of their players. Yet, in contrast to external structures or systems envisaged in the top left quadrant under the heading of 'explaining', games are internal to the players collectively. They are external to each but internal to all: inter-subjective, rather than objective, one might say (Hollis 1994: chapter seven). So, structures are sets of meaning rules telling people 'how to do' social life. Examples of sets of rules are language, religion or the market economy. Although these rules are formed collectively, they hold great power over the individual. Actors are largely seen as rule followers, or as puppets on strings.

In a similar way, we can discuss the two distinct views on the individual. Again, we see how from an explanatory epistemology the individual is studied from without. Here the main idea is not to study what people say (for they may say anything) but the way they behave (hence the term behaviourism). The idea is of the individual as self-contained unit, acting upon his or her 'internal computer', one might say. In rational choice theory, for instance, the individual is seen as acting upon individual laws of utility maximization. In Social Identity theories, human behaviour is seen as primarily driven by a set of psychological laws or imperatives. In both cases, the individual is seen as the source of all collective action and hence explanation. If we move to the bottom right quadrant, we will see that scholars working from an interpretative epistemology support this idea of the individual as initiator. By contrast, however, they aim to understand the individual from within. The actor here is not seen as self-contained unit, but as firmly embedded in society. He or she is seen to have agency and as capable of reflexive self-direction with room for moral and normative engagement but at the same time as firmly 'situated', and motivated by historical and cultural specific forms of meaning. The four core positions on structures and individuals are outlined in table 0.1.

This all may seem very abstract. 'Why bother?' you may ask. Or like the impatient gryphon in *Alice in Wonderland*, you may demand to have 'the adventures' first (for, indeed, explanations take a dreadful long time). As described here, the matrix is merely a skeleton: a rough guide. Its usefulness will become apparent as we move through the chapters. What lies ahead is a range of theories on violence in conflict organized in six chapters. Clearly, justice cannot be done to the full writings of each of the theorists considered here, and I hope this book will inspire you to read the original texts as given in the list of further readings at the end of each chapter. The approach is to inform you about this selection of ideas on

violence and conflict, to try and unpeel layers of theoretical complexity and (with the help of the Hollis matrix) locate the ontological and epistemological assumptions underlying the approaches. So let's move to the 'adventures' now, and see how the different research traditions relate to the question, both unnerving and intriguing, of how and why (groups of) people resort to violent action.

Notes

1 Often the memoirs of US diplomat Richard Holbrooke on the Dayton Peace Agreement are given as a source here. Although Holbrooke (1998) does describe how the 'ancient hatreds' idea was expressed by many officials and politicians over the course of the war, Clinton's 'change of heart' after receiving the book for Christmas is not explicitly mentioned.
2 Sambanis (2004) acknowledges how distinctions are blurry at times. He identifies such cases as 'ambiguous' in his data set.
3 With thanks to Judith Large's course on Peace, Conflict and the Global Economy, European Peace University, Stadtschlaining, Austria, November 2002.
4 Here Hollis builds on the work of Wittgenstein.

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