Humanitarian Aid As Political Weapon

By Hazel Tyssen

Promoted by Prof. dr. Jan Orbie

[September 2024]

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“Do not turn hunger and poverty into political weapons in the fight against the Taliban.” This quote from Belgian war journalist Rudi Vranckx appeared in the fall of 2021 on the public news site (VRT), in response to the dire health situation in Afghanistan since the Taliban takeover. While fragile humanitarian conditions have persisted for decades, they are now being exacerbated by both the Taliban's internal policies and the international sanctions they have triggered, leading to a severe humanitarian crisis. At the same time, these factors have increasingly hindered aid organisations' ability to operate according to humanitarian principles, complicating efforts to address the crisis effectively. Given these circumstances, the term politicisation of humanitarian aid has become increasingly relevant.

However, in both academic literature and everyday contexts, the term is ambiguous and is used to refer to various developments. This paper has the primary objective of gaining a deeper understanding and insight into politicisation within the context of humanitarian aid. To achieve this goal, two research questions are formulated below. A third research question will be used to assess whether this paper has successfully met its objectives.

• How can the politicisation of humanitarian aid be defined and conceptualized?
• How can the politicisation of humanitarian aid be examined in practice?
• To what extent does the humanitarian policy of DG ECHO regarding Afghanistan indicate signs of politicisation?

The first question is addressed by synthesising the work of various authors. A general definition of the politicisation of humanitarian aid is developed and further refined by identifying and integrating the different actors and factors into a conceptual framework that highlights the causes, indicators, and consequences of politicisation. The second research question focuses on operationalizing the concept. A general step-by-step plan (analytical framework) is developed for researching the extent of politicisation in a donor's humanitarian policy and consists of two parts, each utilizing a combination of document and data analysis. On one hand, by comparing OCHA’s Humanitarian Needs Overviews with funding streams obtained from the EDRIS database, it examines which sectors receive funding and whether this aligns with the identified needs on the ground. On the other hand, using EDRIS, it investigates which partner organisations receive funding and analyses their adhere to humanitarian principles by reviewing their policy documents. Finally, the analytical framework to indicate politicisation will be applied to DG ECHO, the European Commission’s department for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, focusing on its humanitarian policy in Afghanistan between 2014-2020.

Politicisation: a conceptual framework

A general definition

 It is essential to emphasize that politicisation within the context of European integration carries a distinct connotation compared to its use in the field of humanitarian aid. As highlighted by De Wilde (2011, p. 559), in the former context, politicisation refers to an increase in the polarisation of views, interests, or values, and the extent to which these are openly expressed in the formulation of policy within the European Union.

However, an analysis of the existing, albeit limited, academic literature on the politicisation of humanitarian aid reveals a notable absence of a widely accepted definition. Authors often use overly narrow definitions, thereby failing to address the phenomenon in a comprehensive manner. This gap underscores the complexity and multifaceted nature of the issue.

Nevertheless, when synthesised, their work provided the foundation for developing the following comprehensive working definition:

Politicisation of humanitarian aid is the violation of humanitarian space by various national and international (f)actors, which can jeopardize the effective delivery of humanitarian aid.

Before delving into these factors, it is essential to address the concept of humanitarian space. According to Hilhorst & Jansen (2010), this space includes both the physical environment, where humanitarian actors can operate without obstacles—ensuring access to target populations, basic safety, and essential infrastructure—and the conceptual space, where humanitarian principles of humanity^[1], impartiality^[2], neutrality^[3] and independence^[4] are upheld.

In the working definition, politicisation is framed as a detrimental force against this humanitarian space. This perspective is grounded in the classical humanitarianism paradigm, which argues that while the context of aid delivery may be political, humanitarian aid itself should and can remain strictly separate from politics, with humanitarian principles serving as practical tools to achieve this separation (Donini, 2009, 2010, 2011; Donini et al., 2008). However, this dominant paradigm was challenged in the post-Cold War era by various developments that forced humanitarian aid to deviate from its foundational principles, giving rise to the new humanitarianism paradigm, which claims that the separation between humanitarian aid and politics is neither feasible nor desirable.

 

Figure 1: Schematic representation of the humanitarian space and the causes, indicators and consequences of politicisation.

Source: Authors´ own creation

The humanitarian molecule

The visualisation (Figure 1) resembles a molecule, where different elements (atoms) are connected in a multi-dimensional structure, creating a whole that is greater than the sum of its parts. At the centre is the humanitarian space, which is influenced by various actors and factors that exert pressure on it, causing this space to shrink. The humanitarian space is surrounded by three main types of actors that play a crucial role in providing humanitarian aid. A donor country provides financial support to humanitarian organisations, which, in turn, use these funds to carry out aid operations in the recipient country. Within each type of actor, there are factors that can contribute to the politicisation of humanitarian aid. "Causes" refer to factors that may explain why humanitarian aid is misused. "Indicators" are the tangible, more visible factors that reflect the ways in which politicisation can manifest. Finally, the "consequences" show the negative outcomes of politicisation for the humanitarian aid sector.

Causes of politicisation

Factors contributing to the violation of humanitarian space can be categorized within three types of actors. First, a donor organisation or country can deliberately instrumentalise humanitarian aid, for example, by leveraging it for geopolitical purposes, enhancing its international reputation or promoting development and peace. This is often intertwined with a security discourse that refers to the fear of underdevelopment as a source of conflict, criminalized activities, and international instability (Macrae, 2002; Goodhand, 2002). States consequently view humanitarian aid and organisations as tools for state- and peacebuilding (Abiew, 2012; Duffield, 2001). This is described by Duffield (2001) as the securitization of humanitarian aid. Additionally, many conflict situations are framed by states as complex emergencies[5] (Donini & Gorden, 2015). This definition shifts the short-term nature of a humanitarian crisis into an extended complex political emergency, characterized by multiple causes and the need for a coherent and integrated approach, where interactions are developed between humanitarian, political, military, peace, and development actors (Donini, 2009, 2011; Donini et al., 2008; Weiss, 1999).

Second, the politicisation of humanitarian aid is influenced not only by factors within the donor country but also by the conditions within the recipient country. In many regions, the nature of warfare has shifted to what Marie Kaldor (2013) terms New Wars—internal armed conflicts that involve military, political, economic, and humanitarian dimensions and engaging a diverse range of international, national, and local actors. Within this context, the principle of neutrality faces significant criticism for allegedly exacerbating conflicts and prolonging wars (Abiew, 2012; Barnett, 2011). Additionally, the recipient country may seek to leverage humanitarian aid to advance its national agenda, such as securing public support or fostering stability. However, corruption within the government and the influence of warlords can obstruct the effective distribution of this aid.

Third, humanitarian organisations often attribute the politicisation and undermining of their effective aid to these preceding actors. Unfortunately, the necessity to secure funding for their survival, external pressures and controls, and negotiations for access compel some humanitarian organisations to be consciously politically influenced, thereby contributing to politicisation themselves (Barnett, 2005, 2011; Donini & Gorden, 2015). Moreover, some acknowledge and attempt to address the political causes of conflicts, thereby becoming automatically entangled in the political sphere (Versluys, 2016).

Indicators and consequences of politicisation

When analysing donor countries, the instrumentalization and securitization outlined in the previous section resulted in political pressure on the armed forces of Western states to support humanitarian aid delivery with political and military interventions, often justified under the Responsibility to Protect doctrine (Abiew, 2012; Barnett, 2005; Collinson & Elhawary, 2012; Macrae, 2002; Weiss, 2001). Sadly, this dynamic has increasingly linked humanitarian workers with Western governments and agendas, thereby reducing the humanitarian space in which they can operate safely and have access to victims (Abiew, 2012; Donini, 2009; Shannon, 2009). A similar effect occurs when donor countries are involved in conflicts or overtly take sides, leading to disproportionate and discriminatory allocation of funds, along with the imposition of conditions on funding. Moreover, the deployment of humanitarian soldiers and the establishment of civil-military collaborations reinforce the problematic narrative that war has a human aspect, thereby providing moral justification for interventions (Kotilainen, 2020; Shannon, 2009).

In recipient countries, governments can further contribute to the politicisation of humanitarian aid by diverting funds intended for humanitarian purposes to other uses or by enacting legislation that restricts NGO’s capacity to operate autonomously. While aid organisations have developed strategies to mitigate such interference, efforts which require engagements with local authorities, have encountered significant resistance from both donors and the Western public (Lang, 2022). These concerns have contributed to donor reluctance in providing financial support, thereby impeding efforts to address and resolve the humanitarian crisis. Additionally, the local insecurity and the variety of actors on the ground, caused by the complex and fragmented nature of violence in the recipient country, further endanger the humanitarian space.

Politicisation can also occur when a humanitarian organisation's philosophy focuses on addressing the root causes of conflict. This can lead to an expansion of its activities into areas like human rights protection, post-conflict reconstruction, long-term development, and even peacebuilding. This shift is known as mission creep, where the original humanitarian mission gradually evolves into a political project (Weiss, 2001). This can lead to controversy and division over the motives behind humanitarian aid, ultimately reducing its effectiveness. The same problem arises when humanitarian organisations engage in advocacy activities, aligning with a specific party in the conflict and emphasizing active involvement in policy to support that party. However, when public messages are impartially directed at relevant actors, such advocacy cannot be considered as inconsistent with humanitarian principles (Van Mierop, 2015). Another indicator of politicisation within humanitarian organisations is the lack of diversity in funding, as it concentrates power in the hands of a few donors who can impose their own demands (Barnett, 2005; Donini et al., 2008). In some cases, organisations may consequently be denied access to operate within a country due to negative perceptions of their neutrality, which can sometimes force them to conduct clandestine operations that bypass required permissions (Ryngaert, 2013).

It is thus clear that politicisation has dire consequences for humanitarian aid provision. The roles between different actors become blurred, perceptions of neutrality are compromised, access to victims is hindered, and humanitarian workers are attacked (Donini, 2011).

Politicisation: an analytical framework, applied to DG ECHO’s humanitarian policy in Afghanistan

In many situations, the donor is the initial actor in the aid chain. Consequently, the responsibility for maintaining the apolitical nature of humanitarian aid starts with the donor itself. First, donors must align their policies and funding strictly with the needs of the population, adhering to the humanitarian principles. Second, donor countries are responsible for selecting partner organisations that equally uphold these humanitarian principles. This paper introduces an approach to analyse these two aspects of politicisation by transforming them into measurable concepts and develops a matrix that combines the findings of both sections into an overall conclusion, determining the extent to which a donor is politicised.

To test the framework’s effectiveness, it is applied to DG ECHO, the body managing the European Commission's humanitarian aid policy. While DG ECHO is often cited as an exception to the trend of politicisation in humanitarian aid, initiatives like the Comprehensive Approach and Resilience Agenda have led to deviations from its principled role (Atmar, 2001; Abiew, 2012; Donini, 2009; Macrae, 2002). Afghanistan is chosen due to its longstanding relevance in studies of politicisation since the late 1990s. The complexity of conflicts and involvement of various actors make it an ideal case.

Given security concerns and limited data since the Taliban takeover, the research focuses on the period leading up to that event, beginning with the international community's withdrawal in 2014 and extending to 2020, which aligns with a European multiannual budget cycle.

The allocation of funds

To evaluate whether fund allocation in a particular crisis reflects politicisation, it is essential to identify the needs on the ground and analyse the sectors funded by the donor. Ideally, the distribution of funding across sectors should align with the identified needs in the field

Document-analysis: which sectors need funding?

Needs assessments are essential for guiding aid allocation, ensuring resources are distributed based on actual needs. Since organisations conduct these assessments, existing documents can be used for analysis. The recommended source for these assessments is OCHA's "Humanitarian Needs Overview" (HNO), which provides an objective and comprehensive annual analysis of the overall situation and sector-specific needs in a given crisis. For the analysis of Afghanistan, this study utilized the Afghanistan-specific HNOs from 2014 to 2020. The annual estimates of civilians needing aid, categorized by cluster, were compiled into a pie chart (figure 2) to illustrate the relative proportions across sectors.

Figure 2: Relative proportions of needs by sector in Afghanistan 2014-2020.

Source: Authors´ own creation, based on the Humanitarian Needs Overviews Afghanistan 2014-2020.

Data-analysis: which sectors are funded?

Humanitarian actors are encouraged to ensure transparency in their funding flows by reporting them to the Financial Tracking Service (FTS), managed by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA). This comprehensive database compiles global contributions to humanitarian operations. Additionally, UN agencies and multilateral organisations often maintain internal databases to coordinate their activities. Within the European Union, member states' Ministries of Foreign Affairs and DG ECHO report their financial contributions through the European Emergency Disaster Response Information System (EDRIS). The filtering functions in both databases make them valuable research tools for extracting targeted information, such as sectoral funding.

This study tracks DG ECHO's funding flows to Afghanistan using the EDRIS database. By filtering the data by sector, the total funding allocated to each sector is calculated. The results are depicted in the pie chart below (figure 3).

Figure 3: Relative proportion of DG ECHO-funded Sectors in Afghanistan 2014-2020

Source: Authors´ own creation, based on the Humanitarian Needs Overviews Afghanistan 2014-2020^[6]

 

Politicisation in the allocation of funds

After conducting both analyses, the two pie charts  can be compared. If the pie charts show that funding perfectly aligns with identified humanitarian needs, it suggests that the aid is not politicized. However, discrepancies between the charts may indicate varying degrees of politicisation. In cases of light politicisation, minor discrepancies are observed; all sectors with identified needs receive funding, but the allocation is not entirely proportionate. This may imply that the donor country's priorities differ slightly from those of the affected population. Moderate politicisation is characterized by partial funding of identified needs and additional allocations to sectors without identified needs, though without severe discrepancies or predominant political influence. In cases of heavy politicisation, political objectives clearly drive resource allocation, often disregarding or entirely ignoring needs assessments, leading to significant discrepancies in the pie charts.

Comparing figure 2 and 3, the analysis of DG ECHO’s funding for Afghanistan between 2014-2020 shows that all identified needs were adressed. However, the proportions differ slightly. Despite food security being the greatest need, most of the funding went to health and medical aid, the second-largest need. Funding for other sectors was mostly proportional, with a minor shift between WASH and shelter. This small discrepancy suggests a light degree of politicisation, indicating that the donor's priorities may not fully match the population's needs. Nonetheless, external interests or political considerations do not seem to be significant factors.

The selection of partners

Data-analysis: which organisations are funded?

The second part of the analytical framework aligns with Helen Versluys's (2016) perspective that the apolitical nature of a donor organisation is partly influenced by the philosophies of its partners. To evaluate whether a donor's partners adhere to humanitarian principles, it is crucial to first identify these partners. This can be accomplished by using the Financial Tracking Service (FTS) for global funding flows and the European Disaster Response Information System (EDRIS) for European flows. By filtering data by the specific donor and crisis, one can identify the organisations that received funding, as listed under the "Destination Organisation" column in FTS or the "Implementing Agency" column in EDRIS. Each organisation is categorized by "Organisation Type" in FTS or "Agency Family" in EDRIS, encompassing UN agencies, NGOs, Red Cross/Red Crescent organisations, and private entities. The FTS database further differentiates between international, national, and local NGOs and private organisations.

In our analysis, the EDRIS database is used to identify the humanitarian organisations active in Afghanistan that received funding from DG ECHO between 2014 and 2020 (figure 4). To refine the scope of the analysis, the focus is solely on NGOs, as this type of organisation accounted for the majority of the funding (58%).

Figure 4: Type of partners & details of NGO partners funded by DG ECHO in Afghanistan 2014-2020.

Source: Authors´ own creation

 

Document-analysis: Adhere these organisations to humanitarian principles?

Four self-imposed criteria are used in this analytical framework to evaluate how well humanitarian organisations uphold humanitarian principles. These include signing of the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Response, verification of the Core Humanitarian Standard, reference to the principles in NGO policy documents and activities limited to emergency assistance. Each organisation receiving funds is evaluated based on these criteria and subsequently classified using a typology developed by Weiss (1999).

• “Classical Humanitarians” recognize that humanitarian situations may be political, but they insist that humanitarian actions must remain non-political. They emphasize the importance of adhering to humanitarian principles to access and assist vulnerable groups. These organisations value the Code of Conduct and reference humanitarian principles in their operations, and they are verified for their commitment to these principles. They focus solely on emergency aid, avoiding broader political or developmental issues, and may engage in advocacy solely to promote humanitarian assistance.
• “Political Minimalists” acknowledge that complete separation from politics is neither feasible nor desirable but emphasize the importance of humanitarian principles for access. They sign the Code of Conduct, reference it in policy documents, and are CHS-verified to ensure effective aid delivery. However, their commitment to principles may vary based on context, and they may also engage in recovery and development initiatives pragmatically. Their advocacy efforts are aimed at effective aid rather than political goals
• “Political Maximalists” aim to address the root causes of conflicts and engage in state-building, peacebuilding, and promoting human rights and democracy. Their advocacy is politically driven and seeks structural policy changes. They have a more contentious relationship with humanitarian principles, particularly neutrality, and may interpret principles flexibly to serve their goals. They sign the Code of Conduct but may avoid CHS verification, which provides a formal framework for upholding humanitarian principles.
• “Solidarists” reject the pretence of adhering to humanitarian principles for access. They do not sign the Code of Conduct, reference it in policy documents, or pursue CHS verification. Instead, they openly support a specific party in a conflict, consciously forsaking neutrality and impartiality. Their access is often restricted, and they exceed their traditional roles, especially in advocacy for the supported party.

For each of the 22 NGOs, an assessment was conducted to determine the extent to which they adhere to humanitarian principles, based on the criteria outlined in the analytical framework.

Figure 5: Compliance with criteria for respecting humanitarian principles by humanitarian organisations funded by DG ECHO in Afghanistan 2014-2020, categorized according to Weiss's typology (1999).

Source: Authors´ own creation, based on the Humanitarian Needs Overviews Afghanistan 2014-2020

*note: These organisations have a different combination of criteria that doesn't fit into any of the predefined categories. They were placed in this category based on my own judgment and rationale.

Politicisation in the selection of partners

When nearly all partner organisations (90-100%) are categorized as classical humanitarians, it indicates that the donor country prioritizes partnerships with organisations that strictly adhere to humanitarian principles and focus exclusively on emergency aid. This reflects the donor's apolitical stance in selecting partners. A 10% margin is maintained to account for potential exceptions without significantly distorting the overall assessment. Since it is unlikely that all partners fit neatly into a single category, classifications often involve combinations of different types.

In cases of light politicisation, 90-100% of partners are a mix of classical humanitarians and political minimalists. This suggests that while the donor also supports organisations involved in recovery and development, these organisations still respect humanitarian principles. Moderate politicisation occurs when 90-100% of partners are either political minimalists or political maximalists. Here, the donor supports a broader range of activities beyond emergency aid, with varying degrees of commitment to humanitarian principles, which may result in funding that is somewhat politicized. In scenarios where 90-100% of partners are political maximalists or solidarists, the donor's policy is heavily politicised, favouring organisations that prioritize political objectives over humanitarian principles, often channelling aid to benefit a specific party.

In the case of DG ECHO's involvement in Afghanistan from 2014 to 2020, it can be observed that 90-100% of its partners were political minimalists and maximalists. This indicates that DG ECHO primarily supported organisations engaged in a wide range of activities beyond emergency aid, focusing on either operational effectiveness or political objectives. While all these organisations exhibited respect for humanitarian principles, not all of them took these principles equally seriously or fully incorporated them into their operations. According to the analytical framework, this situation aligns with moderate politicisation.

A Matrix of conclusions

The four possible outcomes of politicisation in partner selection (none, light, moderate, and heavy) are combined with the same four outcomes for reflecting needs in a matrix. Each intersection of a row and column is assigned a colour corresponding to a specific outcome regarding the level of politicisation in a donor country's humanitarian policy. This outcome can be viewed as an average of the results from both parts and may vary across seven degrees of politicisation: none, minimal, light, moderate, significant, heavy, and complete.

When the level of politicisation regarding the funding of needs is lower than that in partner selection, it indicates that politicisation is primarily driven by the partners. When the opposite is true, politicisation is primarily driven by the donor. If the outcome is either not politicised or minimally politicised, neither actor is responsible and therefore it is considered as non-driven. However, if the outcome is significantly or heavily politicised, it means that both actors share responsibility, and is thus considered as NGO- and donor-driven.

Figure 6: Results matrix

 

 

To address the question, "To what extent does the humanitarian policy of the Directorate-General ECHO regarding Afghanistan exhibit signs of politicisation?", the analysis utilizes the result found at the intersection of the second column and third row, which corresponds to moderate politicisation. This finding indicates that DG ECHO’s funding strategy aligns with the sectors identified as critical needs, though not always in exact proportions. Moreover, the donor has engaged partners that extend their activities beyond emergency aid and do not consistently adhere to humanitarian principles. This moderate level of politicisation appears to be primarily influenced by NGOs, but DG ECHO bears the ultimately responsibility for the decision to fund these organisations.

Conclusions

This paper aims to address the lack of a widely accepted definition of politicisation of humanitarian aid and the resulting ambiguity surrounding its conceptualisation. By offering a general definition and examining its causes, indicators, and consequences, it seeks to provide clarity on the issue. While not exhaustive, this overview provides a comprehensive understanding of contemporary humanitarian crises, including those in Afghanistan and the Israel-Palestine conflict, as well as other frequently overlooked situations. By identifying these elements, the analysis facilitates greater accountability among humanitarian actors.

Additionally, an analytical framework is established as a general tool to measure the degree of politicisation in a donor’s policy. The more this framework is applied and refined, the more effective it becomes in assessing politicisation. However, the decision to focus on sector funding and partner selection was based on personal interpretations. It is therefore important to note that politicisation can also manifest in other areas or stages of the decision-making processes. In this study, the framework was tested specifically on DG ECHO’s operations in Afghanistan, revealing a moderate degree of politicisation. This finding aligns with academic literature, which suggests that although DG ECHO perceives itself as committed to humanitarian principles, its efforts to achieve coherence in its foreign policy have resulted in mixed signals. 

In terms of horizontal coherence—where policies across different domains should be consistent—Part 1 demonstrated that DG ECHO avoids pursuing political, economic, or military objectives in its fund allocation, which remained based on needs. On the other hand, efforts to achieve vertical coherence, aligning policies with member states and partners, do impact the donor’s apolitical nature. The analysis supports the observation that, despite all partners being required to adhere to the Framework Partnership Agreement (FPA), compliance varies, with some treating it as a mere formality. It is, however, important to note that the conclusion of moderate politicisation is partly based on the findings from Part 2, which focused solely on the analysis of NGOs. This may be viewed as a limitation of the application.

To draw a more general conclusion about the politicization of DG ECHO's humanitarian policy, the analytical framework should also be applied to other countries receiving humanitarian aid. Additionally, interviews with staff involved in humanitarian projects could provide further insights. To reach a comprehensive conclusion regarding the politicisation of humanitarian policy in Afghanistan, the analytical framework should also be applied to the humanitarian policies of other donors operating in Afghanistan.

 

 Footnotes

[1] Human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found. The aim of humanitarian action is to protect life and health and to ensure respect for human beings.

[2] Humanitarian action must be carried out solely based on need, prioritizing the most urgent cases of distress, and making no distinctions based on nationality, race, gender, religious beliefs, class, or political opinions.

[3] Humanitarian actors must not take sides in hostilities or engage in controversies of a political, racial, religious, or ideological nature.

[4] Humanitarian action must be independent of political, economic, military, or other objectives that actors may have regarding areas where humanitarian action is being implemented.

[5] These are humanitarian crises in a country, region, or society where authority has completely or significantly broken down due to internal or external conflicts, requiring an international response that exceeds the mandate or capacity of a single organisation and/or the ongoing UN country program (IASC, 2004).

[6] Three funded sectors—Coordination, Disaster Preparedness, and Support for Special Operations—were excluded from the pie chart. These are considered supportive functions with needs that are not measurable. Including them might distort the comparison.

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